



Arming The Iraqi Army By Western Countries 1958-1963

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ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

The establishment of the republican regime in Iraq on the fourteenth of 1958 represented an important turning point in the policy of arming the Iraqi army, as the Iraqi government sought during this period to diversify the sources of weapons, with the aim of achieving multiple goals, most importantly the security and economic motives for this diversification, in addition to To the military and organizational reasons that pushed it towards this direction, the government also sought to obtain high-quality weapons at the lowest possible costs.

The government tended to strengthen the capabilities and capabilities of the Iraqi army, as part of the strategy to implement the goals of republican rule. In this context, the government increased financial allocations to the Ministry of Defense with the aim of improving military equipment and modernizing the armed forces. This period also witnessed intense competition between the countries of the Western bloc and the countries of the eastern bloc regarding... Imposing their influence in Iraq by supplying weapons and equipment to the Iraqi army, as each country sought to strengthen its military and political presence in the region.

Keywords— Armament, the Iraqi army, Iraq, arms deals, arming the Iraqi army.

Introduction:

The military force played a fundamental and historical role in achieving the goals of the Iraqi government, by preserving the supreme interests of the state and preserving its national independence, and to enable the military institution to effectively perform the tasks assigned to it, it must be equipped with the latest and best technologies and weapons.

There were a group of factors that contributed to choosing the research topic, and the most important of these factors was the importance of the topic and the lack of academic studies that dealt with this period of time in Iraqi universities, as the available sources did not adequately cover all the details of the topic, and did not receive sufficient research and analysis to meet its actual importance. During the period from 1958 - 1963. The aim of the research was to shed light on the role of the Iraqi government in developing the military institution, especially with regard to its armament aspect. The research also aimed to analyze the military deals concluded between Iraq and Western countries, and to focus on their modernity, development and effectiveness, as well as discussing the reasons for the increase in expenditures in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The importance of this research is also evident in providing a clear picture about arming the Iraqi army, as well as providing observations about the Iraqi government's ability to conclude arms deals and choose sources of armament without following the policies of those sources.

After the fourteenth of July 1958 and the change of the monarchy in Iraq, the Iraqi government paid clear attention to the army, as it brought about a major change in the military systems in terms of armament, types, plans and formations. Perhaps the creation of the headquarters of the armed forces and the

consecration of civil and military authority in the hands of the leader Abdul Karim Qasim ⁽¹⁾As Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense, he stands at the forefront of these changes ⁽²⁾.

Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim met with the American Ambassador, Al-Dammar Gholman ⁽³⁾ (Waldemar J. Gallman) On July 15, 1958, to provide the new regime's assurances about the safety of American citizens and their property in Iraq, he also met on the same day with the British ambassador in

Bagdad Michael Wright (Michael Wright) and in the presence of his deputy, Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif ⁽⁴⁾He discussed with him matters of concern to the British government and reassured him by affirming his efforts to win the affection of Western countries in a manner that did not conflict with the highest interest of

(1) Abdel-Karim Kassem (1914-1963) He is Abd al-Karim Qasim Muhammad Bakr al-Zubaidi. He was born in the Mahdia district of Baghdad on November 21, 1914. His family moved to the city of Suwayra, and in 1921 he entered the Suwayra Primary School and completed his primary studies in the al-Mamouniya School in Baghdad after his family returned to it. He entered the Central Secondary School in the year 1927 and graduated in 1931. He was appointed as an English teacher at Al-Shamiya Primary School in the Diwaniyah Brigade. He entered the Military College in 1932 and graduated from it with the rank of second lieutenant in 1934. Then he entered the Staff College in 1941. He joined the veteran officers course at the Senior Officers School in Devarriz (England).) In 1950, he joined the Free Officers Organization in 1956, and led Troops Which eliminated the monarchy in Iraq and She announced Republic On July 14, 1958 He became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense, and was executed from Without a trial on February 9, 1963, at the hands of a number of coup plotters, including Baathists and nationalist officers. look :Faiq Abdul Hadi Saleh, Abdul Karim Qasim and his political and military role in Iraq 1958-1963, doctoral thesis, Institute of Arab History and Scientific Heritage, University of Baghdad, 2003; Ahmed Fawzi, Abdul Karim Qasim and his last hours, Heritage and Contemporary Library, Baghdad, 1988, pp. 16-134; Jamal Mustafa Mardan, Abdul Karim Qasim, The Beginning and the Fall, Eastern Library, Baghdad, 1989, pp. 8-82; Aqeel Al-Nasiri, Abdul Karim Qasim from the essence of biography, Part 3, 2nd edition, Dar Al-Hasad for Publishing and Distribution, Damascus, 2015, p. 235.

(2) Rana Abdel Hammad Hammadi Al-Janabi, The development of the Iraqi military establishment during the first Republican era in 1958-1963, Master's thesis, College of Arts, Tikrit University, 2021, p. 54.

(3) and destruction for whom (1899-1981): An American diplomat, born in 1899 in the US state of Kansas. He received his secondary and university education in the United States of America. He became an employee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and rose through the ranks until he became an ambassador. For his country In Baghdad from July 2, 1954 until December 14, 1958, he served as Director General of the Diplomatic Corps. He died in 1981 in Washington. look : <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/gallman-waldemar-john>

(4) Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif (1921-1966): And-D in Karkh, Baghdad on March 21, 1921, belonging to A-something-A beautiful woman. He completed his primary and middle school studies in Baghdad. He joined the military college in 1937. He contributed to the Rashid Ali al-Kilani movement in 1941. He also participated in the 1948 war in Palestine. He planned and implemented with Abdul Karim Qasim. To change the monarchy in Iraq in July 14, 1958, he became President of the Republic in February 8, 1963. He died on April 13, 1966, as a result of the helicopter that was carrying him crashing under mysterious circumstances. See: Nasser Alwan Al-Waeli, Abdul Salam Arif and his political and military role until 1966, Master's thesis, Higher Institute for Political Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2005; Ahmed Fawzi, Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif - his biography, his trial and his death, Al-Dar Al-Arabiyya, Baghdad, 1989, pp. 5-16.

Iraq. On July 17, the American ambassador met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Iraqi Abdul-Jabbar Al-Joumrad⁽¹⁾ Who stressed the desire of the new regime to maintain good relations with Western countries⁽²⁾. American policy at that stage was based on several foundations, the most important of which were spreading democracy, containing Soviet influence, and undermining communism, in addition to acquiring the rich oil reserves in the Middle East⁽³⁾ Thus, the United States of America was not prepared to abandon Iraq because of its economic potential and strategic importance in the Middle East region.

The American ambassador to Iraq, Gilman, sent a telegram to the US State Department on July 19, 1958, in which he advised reconsidering previous military agreements and the possibility of providing military aid to the new regime in Iraq, as stopping that aid would contribute to the deterioration of relations between the two sides, as he put it, This may push the new regime in Iraq to depend on the Soviet Union⁽⁴⁾ It seems that the American ambassador did not listen to his proposals. On July 29, 1958, the US Department of Defense suspended sending a shipment of weapons that was headed to Iraq⁽⁵⁾ On the same day, the countries participating in the Baghdad Pact held a meeting to discuss developments in Iraq. All member states were in attendance except Iraq, and those countries were discussing the issue of recognition of the new regime in Iraq and weapons pacts and agreements⁽⁶⁾.

On July 30, 1958, the British Foreign Office telegraphed to its ambassador in Baghdad recognizing the new regime in Iraq. Britain officially recognized the Iraqi Republic on August 1 of the same year, and Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Finland, Norway, and Austria also recognized it after that⁽⁷⁾.

Britain was prepared to sell weapons to Iraq despite its awareness of Abdul Karim Qasim's intention to withdraw Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. Britain also decided to keep British advisors at the Habbaniya and Baghdad bases, whose number is estimated at (600 personnel)⁽⁸⁾ In this regard, the British side announced its desire to equip Iraq with some military equipment in accordance with the military agreements concluded during the royal era⁽⁹⁾.

On August 2, 1958, the United States of America announced its official recognition of the new republican regime in Iraq. The American ambassador to Iraq and Damar Gilman presented his credentials to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and according to what was indicated by one of the American newspapers, this recognition was one of the results of the assurances of the politicians of the new regime on Respect the Charter of the United Nations and other international obligations⁽¹⁰⁾ This was accompanied by the release of two American soldiers (Marines) who were arrested by the Iraqi government coinciding with the change of the monarchy⁽¹¹⁾.

On August 4, 1958, the US State Department decided to suspend the provision of military aid to Iraq, especially the military advice provided by the officers stationed at the Habbaniya and Baghdad bases, as it

(1) Abdul Jabbar Al-Joumrad(1909-1971)He was born in Mosul in 1909 and completed his secondary studies there. He graduated from the Higher Teachers' College in 1929. He joined the Faculty of Law, but was expelled from it due to his political activity. He traveled to France to complete his studies and obtained a doctorate in law. In 1946, he worked as a legal expert in Mosque-He became the first foreign minister in Iraq after July 14, 1958. He worked actively to strengthen Iraq's relations with the countries of the world and obtain international recognition for the Iraqi Republic. He resigned from the ministry in protest against the policy of Abdul Karim Qasim and his suppression of the nationalist movement, so he remained away from politics until his death in 1958. 1971. See: Adnan Sami Nazir, Abdul Jabbar Al-Jumrad, his cultural activity and political role, Al-Ma'rifa Company, Baghdad, 1991.

(2) Bryan Robert Gibson, US Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958 – 1975, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2013, p. 24.

(3) Ayana Lindsey, Soft Weapon: Cold War-Era American Propaganda In The Middle East (1947-1979), Spelman College, Georgia, 2016, p. 24.

(4) FRUS, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, No. 124, Baghdad, July 19, 1958, p.328.

(5) Los Angeles Times, (Los Angeles), July 30, 1958.

(6) The Christian Science Monitor, (Boston), July 30, 1958.

(7) Al-Jumhuriya newspaper, (Baghdad) ,August 3, 1958.

(8) The Washington Post, (Washington), March 26, 1959.

(9) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, US policy towards Iraq during the era of leader Abdul Karim Qasim 1958-1963, Al-Murtada Publishing House, Baghdad, 2013, p. 316.

(10) The New York Times, (New York), August 3, 1958.

(11) Chicago Tribune, (Chicago), August 3, 1958.

ordered their withdrawal ⁽¹⁾While the Iraqi government, before July 14, 1958, had contracted with the United States of America regarding the supply of a number of weapons and ammunition. With a value of (9) million dollars, and under the new system, the American side agreed to deliver a number of shipments of spare parts and small arms only, while it did not agree to deliver the other materials that were previously contracted, which are (10) F-86 aircraft and (39) An armored car carrying a 76 mm cannon ⁽²⁾And two 30 mm machine guns. In addition to (54) modern 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and (93) 42 mm mortars ⁽³⁾The American ambassador, Al-Dammar Gholman, commented on that deal by saying that American military aid to Iraq continues with regard to equipping policemen with light weapons and motorcycles. As for military aid and heavy weapons, they will be the subject of discussion between the two governments ⁽⁴⁾.

On August 11, 1958, the British Foreign Office refrained from supplying Iraq with buggy-type military vehicles. (Pogie), in addition to their refusal to supply Iraq with some spare parts for vehicles of the same type found in Iraq ⁽⁵⁾On the same side, one of the British documents indicated that the British side refused to supply the Iraqi Air Force with (2,500) gallons of aviation fuel. The British attributed this to regime change in Iraq, while the document indicated that this amount of fuel is available at the Habbaniya base ⁽⁶⁾Thus, Britain had followed the American policy regarding the supply of weapons or military materials and equipment.

A shipment of American military aid arrived at the port of Basra on August 20, 1958, via two American ships, as these weapons had been contracted for. Before the fourteenth of July 1958 ⁽⁷⁾This was accompanied by Abdul Karim Qasim's announcement of his country's desire to obtain American military aid, stressing that Iraq is a friend of all countries. In the same context, the US State Department, on the twenty-second of the same month, directed its ambassador to Iraq, Gholman, to approach the Iraqi government regarding the United States' readiness to supply Iraq with weapons. According to the American aid program, in addition to restoring training curricula on aircraft of the same type (F-86) In light of the assessment of the US military mission operating in Iraq ⁽⁸⁾In the same context, this coincided with the arrival of (6) training planes with their trained pilots. These trainers remained waiting for the signal to begin training, but approval did not come, so they returned to the United States of America, and the planes remained ⁽⁹⁾.

The American side sensed the friendly feelings of the new regime in Iraq and the desire to cooperate on an independent basis and respect previous commitments and contracts, especially weapons, in light of the emergence of an internal trend hostile to the United States of America, which had begun to expand due to its support for Israel ⁽¹⁰⁾In return, the Americans wanted to undermine Soviet influence in Iraq by participating in supplying the Iraqi army with weapons ⁽¹¹⁾.

On September 10, 1958, the American administration authorized its ambassador in Baghdad, Gholman, to approach the Iraqi Prime Minister regarding the desire of the American side to proceed with its previous

(1) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2633 of September 27, 1958.

(2) She indicated One of the British documents states that the 39 armored vehicles were agreed to be manufactured in Britain under a contract between the American and British sides to be delivered to the Iraqi government, but Changing the monarchy in Iraq This prevented the completion of this deal, and despite the readiness of (7) vehicles of the above type, the American government informed the British side of stopping the production of the rest of the vehicles, and it was also studying the cost of canceling its contract with Britain. look :

FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, EQ11959/10, SUB. Iraqi military, From D. L. Haviland To G. Wheeler, Esq. CH, Ministry of Defense, October 10, 1958.

(3) FRUS, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume 141, Washington, October 16, 1958, p. 349.

(4) Naseer Mahmoud Shukr, previous source, p. 125.

(5) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, From Miss Hutchinson Washington to Mr. Davies BOT, August 22, 1958.

(6) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, From P. Brightling To DF Ballentyne, Esq. , Foreign Office, EQ1195/5, 10 September, 1958.

(7) The New York Times, (New York), August 21, 1958.

(8) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, pp. 316-317.

(9) Qahtan Ahmed Salman Al-Hamdani, Iraqi Foreign Policy from July 14, 1958 to February 8, 1963, Madbouly Library, Cairo, ed., p. 384.

(10) FRUS, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Gumming) to Secretary of State Dulles, No. 133, August 22, 1959, p. 336.

(11) The Christian Science Monitor, (Boston), November 12, 1958.

commitments with Iraq regarding aircraft training.(F-86) After the Iraqi government stopped that training, the ambassador explained that the presence of the training staff without any duties is undesirable because the American government needs them elsewhere in the world ⁽¹⁾Gholman was also instructed to express his government's serious desire for its commitment to implementing its pledges towards Iraq, in addition to inquiring from Abdul Karim Qasim about how to continue the forms of military cooperation with the United States of America in light of the practices to which American diplomats were subjected in Iraq. The US State Department stressed the need to They decided not to raise any issue of military assistance during the year 1959 unless this issue was raised by the Iraqi Prime Minister, and in the event that he requested that, it is necessary to emphasize that the outstanding problems between the two sides will be resolved fruitfully ⁽²⁾.

The Iraqi government took advantage of the desire of the United States of America to strengthen its relationship with the new regime by obtaining American weapons, and in this regard it assigned the commander of military operations, Colonel Farid Diah Muhammad, to communicate with the American advisory mission in Baghdad. Colonel Farid sent a secret message to the mission in which he inquired about the aid approach. The American military and the possibility of the American side handing over weapons and equipment ⁽³⁾On the same side, the US State Department instructed its ambassador in Iraq of the need to meet with Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qassem to find out his intentions regarding the arms agreements before 1958 and to complete the delivery of the current shipment of weapons located at sea in addition to future military aid, in addition to informing the Iraqi side of its approval to deliver Pending arms shipments contracted before the establishment of the republican regime. The two parties met on September 15, 1958, and Abdul Karim Qasim informed him of his lack of familiarity with previous military agreements and promised to study them. He also expressed his government's desire to continue supplies of effective military aid, as he described it ⁽⁴⁾In return, Ambassador Gholman assured the Prime Minister that it was desirable to reach a common understanding regarding other batches of weapons in the future ⁽⁵⁾It appears from this that Abdul Karim Qasim did not want to give a specific position of acceptance or rejection so that he would not be considered one of the two camps (eastern and western). As for his lack of knowledge of previous arms agreements, it is likely that this is inaccurate because Abdul Karim Qasim is a military man and has Sufficient information in this aspect.

In the same context, one of the British documents indicated that the American Ambassador Gillman had recommended that the resumption of the supply of weapons and military materials to Iraq should be limited to weapons that were contracted before July 14, 1958. The ambassador also stressed that any additional assistance to the Iraqi side should be It is being introduced very gradually so that it will take a long time for the direction of the new regime in Iraq to become clear ⁽⁶⁾.

The internal political developments represented by the dispute that occurred between Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif and the latter's dismissal from all his positions on September 30, 1958, caused Abd al-Karim Qasim to be preoccupied with responding to the American ambassador, Gholman, regarding the military aid agreement, which prompted the latter to contact the Minister of Guidance, Muhammad. chinchilla friend ⁽⁷⁾He informed him of his government's readiness to equip the Iraqi army with weapons. Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal inquired from the ambassador about Washington's stipulation that the Iraqi government not cooperate with the Soviet Union in the event of equipping weapons. The ambassador's answer was negative. Whatever the case, Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal submitted a memorandum to Prime

(1)FRUS, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume

(2) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, pp. 318-319.

(3)Same source, p. 318.

(4)FRUS, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume

(5) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, previous source, p. 319.

(6)FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2536 of September 18, 1958.

(7) Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal(1910-1990): Born in 1910 in Mosul, Ant-He moved with his family to Baghdad and received his education there. He entered the College of Law and did not complete his studies there, so he moved to study at the Institute of Law in Damascus.-He graduated in 1933. He completed his studies in political economy at the University of Paris. He belonged to the Al-Muthanna bin Haritha Al-Shaibani Club. He was thrown into prison during the Rashid Ali Al-Kilani movement in 1941. He was later released and contributed to the founding of the Istiqlal Party, then he became secretary of the party. He was appointed Minister of Guidance in The government of Abdul Karim Qasim On July 14, 1958, he submitted his resignation from his positioninFebruary 7, 1959. See: Samir Abdul Rasoul Abdullah Al-Obaidi, Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal and his political role in Iraq until 1959, Master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1997.

Minister Abdullah Karim Qasim informed him of what had happened, and the latter's response was that he did not trust the intentions of the Americans and that he would neglect that matter ⁽¹⁾.

Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim spoke on October 12, 1958, in a press interview with the American National Broadcasting Radio, and in response to the journalist's question who asked him about the Iraqi government's acceptance of unconditional military aid from the Soviet Union or the United States of America, his answer was that Iraq is a country Independent and sovereign, and on this basis Iraq seeks to obtain weapons from all friendly countries ⁽²⁾.

The economic and technical cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union aroused the ire of the United States of America. On October 16, 1958, the National Security Council met and discussed important global developments that have an impact on the security of the United States, including the situation in Iraq, as CIA Director Allen Dulles stated. (Allen Dulles)⁽³⁾The new Iraqi regime has concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and this regime has also begun implementing the recent arms agreement with the Soviet Union ⁽⁴⁾This position was reflected in the British, who believed that the Iraqi-Soviet rapprochement would lead to expanding the influence of the Soviets in the region by establishing a communist state in Iraq. Britain also believed that the Soviets had another goal in the region, which was to cut off oil from Western countries ⁽⁵⁾.

The delay in responding to American proposals regarding American aid to Iraq aroused the ire of officials in the US State Department, who asked Ambassador Gilman on October 17, 1958, for an official explanation for the Iraqi government's failure to respond to American proposals regarding equipping Iraq with weapons ⁽⁶⁾At a time when the military attaché at the Iraqi embassy in London requested from the British government on October 17, 1958, (600) pieces of Bernese machine guns.(Bren), in addition to three and a half million rounds of ammunition (automatic combat), and a number of tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and tanks. The British side sent the request to the Near East Arms Coordination Committee in Washington to express their opinion on it ⁽⁷⁾In the same context, the British advisors at the Habbaniya base requested, on October 20, 1958, permission from the British Air Ministry to sell (19) automatic anti-aircraft guns.(Bofors L.60) surplus to the needs of the Iraqi army, while the document in which this information came stated, that these cannons are old and date back to their manufacture in 1934, and if the Iraqi government does not accept this offer, they will be destroyed and sold as "scrap" metal, as described. document ⁽⁸⁾. Whatever the case, orders were issued to the British mission in Habbaniya to destroy those cannons due to the inability to evacuate them in the event of their withdrawal from Habbaniya and the lack of opportunity for the Iraqis to obtain and use them ⁽⁹⁾.

The American Ambassador Gholman's response to his country's foreign ministry's aforementioned request came on October 21, 1958, stating that the government of Abdul Karim Qasim was afraid of entering into military agreements with the United States of America again, whether the old or new agreement. In this regard, Gholman declared his hope to The possibility of reaching a formula for the Iraqi government to receive American aid ⁽¹⁰⁾.

(1) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, previous source, p. 321.

(2) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, From Baghdad to Foreign Office, Sir Michael Wright, Telegram No.95, EQ1195/15, 16 October, 1958.

(3) made by AIYn Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed In which He believed that communism in Iraq had become T This is a dangerous matter, and the situation in Iraq is considered one of the most dangerous in the world. See: Thamer Bard Mahdi Al-Hadithi, The internal situation in Iraq 1958-1963 and the position of the United States of America and Britain towards it, Master's thesis, Institute of Arab History and Scientific Heritage, Baghdad, 2000, pp. 82-83.

(4) FRUS, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, Editorial Note, No. 140, p. 838.

(5) Abdul Hamid Kazem Hammadi Al-Shukri, previous source, p. 160.

(6) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, previous source, p. 321.

(7) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, Request from Iraqi Military Attaché: Bern Machine guns, EQ1195/13, October 27, 1958.

(8) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, RAF Reserve Holding Detachment at Habbaniya To Offer Iraqi Government Surplus Bofors Guns, EQ1195/16, 20 October, 1958.

(9) FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, From WI Combs To Foreign Office, Arms For Iraq, EQ1195/16(B), 25 November, 1958.

(10) FRUS, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, telegram from Baghdad, 21 October, 1958, Washington, p. 843.

On October 26, 1958, the Iraqi government requested from the American side (200) mine detection devices, in addition to purchasing a number of spare parts and some equipment worth one million US dollars. It was recommended that these requests be approved ⁽¹⁾. According to one of the documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States of America was aware of the Soviet Union's readiness to meet the requests of the Iraqi side according to simple terms and conditions in terms of the value of those weapons and the duration of payment for them, so it recommended agreeing to meet those requests ⁽²⁾. The Iraqi government also submitted a request to purchase (30,000) mines, as well as attack and reconnaissance boats and floating bridges for tanks from Britain, which informed the Iraqi military attaché of the unavailability of these requests and sent a list of other potential suppliers of these weapons ⁽³⁾. Perhaps this British position came under the influence of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which advised the British side not to risk sending weapons to Iraq due to the instability of the internal situation there. The agency also indicated that there are plots to overthrow Abdul Karim Qasim in the near future, as described in one of the CIA documents ⁽⁴⁾.

Iraq's requests for weapons were presented for discussion in the US National Security Council at its meeting No. (395) on December 22, 1958, and the prevailing feeling in the Council was that the requests of Abdul Karim Qasim's government would not be met until the latter's position towards the West became clearer ⁽⁵⁾.

On the other hand, the British sent a memorandum Another letter on December 27, 1958, to the Near East Arms Coordination Committee in Washington, in which they expressed their willingness to provide these goods for shipment to Iraq in order to win the favor of the new Iraqi government. The memorandum stated the following: ((It is in our interest to be as close as possible in supplying equipment. Not heavy weapons for the Iraqis, as this will help us confront the effects of our sale of weapons to Israel and that impression derived from those operations of ours..))⁶ Whatever the case, Britain agreed to supply Iraq with the weapons it requested, including anti-tank guns, but only 9 mm caliber ⁽⁷⁾. It seems that the British wanted to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, military aid in the form of light weapons is provided only to prove their good intentions to the Iraqi government as suppliers of weapons to it. On the other hand, this step comes as an attempt by them to reduce the intensity of the wave of Arab condemnation towards them because of their sale of weapons to the Zionist entity. ⁽⁸⁾

US Ambassador John Jernigan arrived in Baghdad on January 15, 1959. (John D. Jernigan) He met with Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim on the eighteenth of the same month and they discussed many topics, the most important of which was American military aid. The American ambassador felt Abdul Karim Qasim's dissatisfaction regarding the delay in equipping Iraq with heavy weapons, as well as the behavior of the United States of America when it returned a number of ships loaded with weapons and equipment that were heading to the port of Basra. Whatever the matter, the ambassador sent the contents of what happened in this meeting to his country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ⁽⁹⁾.

In January 1959, Abdul Karim Qasim asked the British ambassador in Iraq to provide him with tanks, bombers, and heavy artillery to resist aircraft. From the point of view of the British ambassador, Abdul Karim Qasim wanted, through this request, to either test Britain's political position on Iraq, or he wanted not to rely on weapons. Completely Soviet, and whatever Abdul Karim Qasim's justifications for requesting weapons from Britain, the latter had its justifications for approving the request, as the British did not want Iraq to be completely dependent on the Soviet Union, and at the same time they were keen on the continuation of their interests in Iraq, and this was clearly stated by the British ambassador. He said: ((We could not refuse to sell

(1)FRUS, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII,Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Dulles, No. 142, 5 November 1958, Washington, P. 392.

(2)CIA, Periodic Requirements List (Prl) Ussr (1 January- 30 April 1959), Guide No. 164, 1959, p. 22.

(3)FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, Eastern Department letter EQ 1195/13 [of October 27: Arms for Iraq, 5 December, 1958.

(4)CIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin (4. December 1958), Guide No. C 60, 1958, p.5.

(5)FRUS, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, "NSC Consideration of United States Policy Toward Iraq", Mem. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon, Washington, 22 December, 1958, P. 371.

(6)FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, Arms For Iraq, EQ1195/13(B), 28 December, 1958.

(7)Ibid.

(8)In September 1958, the Zionist entity had received large quantities of various weapons from Britain and the United States, and this sparked Arab reactions characterized by denunciation and denunciation. look : The New York Times, (New York), September 23, 1958.

(9) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, previous source, p. 328.

weapons to him.... We had interests in Iraq and we had to protect them)), so the British ambassador proposed to his government to respond to Abdul Karim Qasim's requests, and the British Council of Ministers agreed to provide Iraq with modern tanks and aircraft. However, this will take a year, and they can withdraw from this commitment if things go unsuitable for their policy ⁽¹⁾.

Britain's policy of supplying weapons to the Iraqi government was characterized by caution and procrastination, in order to know the results of the political developments of the new regime and its suitability to its interests in Iraq. The British side was also afraid of the leakage of weapons and ammunition to the Omani and Algerian revolutionaries, so it responded to a limited number of requests for weapons, and also avoided selling weapons. Light equipment and equipment that these revolutionaries need ⁽²⁾ The following events proved the truth of the British intuition. On February 11, 1959, Abdul Karim Qasim declared that Iraq was providing military support to the Algerian revolutionaries, indicating that Iraq sent a plane weekly to Algeria equipped with various types of weapons ⁽³⁾.

On February 19, 1959, Britain revealed that it would send a batch of weapons to Iraq, in addition to providing logistical support ⁽⁴⁾of British weapons used in Iraq, and it has been noted that the delivery of these weapons would be outside the framework of the Baghdad Pact ⁽⁵⁾These weapons included Chieftain tanks.(Chieftain) and Cashier aircraft, while Britain made it clear that it is ready to supply Iraq with the weapons it requests ⁽⁶⁾It is worth noting that Abdul Karim Qasim was not serious about purchasing British-made weapons due to their high price, as the price of a Soviet tank was ten thousand Iraqi dinars, while the price of a British tank with similar specifications was ten times more, and all he aspired to was to obtain the tools. Reserve British weapons that the Iraqi army was armed with before the change of the monarchy and their supply was cut off ⁽⁷⁾.

Britain began to become wary of the growing Iraqi-Soviet relations, fearing for its interests in Iraq and the region, which prompted British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to(Harold Macmillan) ⁽⁸⁾To visit the Soviet Union on February 21, 1959, with the aim of convincing the Soviet Union to respect Britain's interests in the region and not to harm them, and in return, the British government would understand the interests of the Soviet Union in it ⁽⁹⁾However, the objectives of the visit were not successful, and perhaps what confirms this is Khrushchev's statement on the twenty-fifth of the same month, when he indicated that he was not responding to the British proposals and that the Soviet Union government's relationship with Iraq was good and that he would provide full support to Iraq for the sake of liberation and independence ⁽¹⁰⁾.

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Profumo announced(Profumo) in the British House of Commons on March 2, 1959, stating that some of Iraq's requests for weapons will be met, while others are still under consideration. He also stated that the provision of reserve materials, spare parts, and sustainment materials for British weapons present in Iraq is still continuing ⁽¹¹⁾This coincided with the tension in relations between the Iraqi government and the United Arab Republic following the Shawaf movement on March 8, 1959, when

(1) Humphrey Trevelyan and Sam Foale, *Iraq in the Memoirs of British Diplomats*, Trans-Vinegar water-Ibrahim H-Sin Al-Zubaie, House of Wisdom, Baghdad, 2003, pp. 34-36.

(2) Nouri Abdel Hamid Al-Ani and others, previous source, vol. 2, p. 242.

(3) *The New York Times*, (New York), February 13, 1959.

(4) Logistics: is the science of managing the flow of goods, energy, information, and other resources such as products and services from the production area to the consumption area. It is not possible to carry out any export or import operation without logistical support. Logistics includes collecting information, transportation, inventory, storage, and packaging. See: Sami Awad, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, Dar Osama for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2008, p. 413.

(5) *The Washington Post*, (Washington), February 20, 1959; *The New York Times*, (New York), February 20, 1959.

(6) Qais Jayoul Musafer Al-Shahmani, previous source, p. 69.

(7) See footnote No. (10) in: Humphry Trevelyan and Sam Fall, the previous source, p. 36.

(8) Harold Macmillan(1894-1986)He is a British politician, born in 1894. He became British ambassador to Algeria in 1955, and was appointed Minister of War in 1954.-M. Minister of Foreign Affairs-In 1955, and in 1956 he became Prime Minister. See: Emery Hughes, *Macmillan, Political Personality*, translated by Hussein Al-H-WT, National House of Medicine-Publishing and Publishing, Cairo, 1963.

(9) Abdul Hamid Kazem Hammadi Al-Shukri, *Iraqi-British relations 1958-1963*, doctoral thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 2000, pp. 159-160.

(10) Ahmed Merih Al-Mansrawi, Ibrahim Kubba and his political and intellectual role in Iraq 1919-2004, published by-Arab Renaissance, Beirut, 2014, p. 136; Nouri Abdul Hamid Al-Ani and Alaa Jassim Al-Harbi, previous source, vol. 2, p. 224.

(11) Qahtan Ahmed Salman Al-Hamdani, previous source, p. 374.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser attacked ⁽¹⁾On March 11, 1959, Abdul Karim Qasim's policy and the communist parties in the Arab world also denounced international communism ⁽²⁾Egyptian newspapers also launched a scathing attack on the Iraqi government and the Iraqi communists ⁽³⁾In light of these conditions, the British ambassador sent a telegram to his foreign minister in which he said: "Qasim's situation is very bad, and he does not have a sure chance to maintain his position, and it is likely that the strength of the opposition against him will increase.... We must equip Qasim with the weapons he requested, and if they do not work." Qasim was determined to make a change, as the army was the only force that might be able to change the situation ⁽²⁾, and on March 16, 1959, the British ambassador visited Abdul Karim Qasim and assured him of his government's support and readiness to secure Iraq's requests for weapons ⁽⁴⁾.

The concern of the United States government increased after the events of the Shawaf movement in Mosul and the random arrests carried out by the Iraqi government about the possibility of Iraq drifting towards a communist government ⁽⁵⁾Which led to a change in its policy towards Iraq, especially on the military side, as the American ambassador to Iraq, Jernigan, suggested to his country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to raise the issue of arming the Iraqi army because it would have a negative impact from his point of view. He also suggested that if the British side agreed to equip Iraq with weapons believes that the United States of America should only send commercial equipment, including spare parts and ammunition, that are used in the Iraqi army ⁽⁶⁾.

The memorandum of the American ambassador to Iraq sparked many discussions in the US State Department and the US government in general, and those discussions concluded with acceptance of his proposals, as the US State Department informed the Iraqi government that it was not the interest of the Washington government to equip Iraq with weapons to any extent more than selling spare parts for used American weapons. In the Iraqi army, however, the American side wanted to reassure the Iraqi government that it was not isolated from the sources of supplying military equipment from the rest of the Western countries, on the basis that the British at that time were determined to sell weapons to Iraq, but the truth of the matter is that the British had not taken a final decision regarding the sale. Those weapons only after consultation with the American side ⁽⁷⁾.

Iraq announced its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact on the twenty-fourth of March 1959. This announcement was made by Abdul Karim Qasim, who held a press conference at the Ministry of Defense and stated in this regard, saying: ((We left the Baghdad Pact and got rid of the last card of colonialism)) ⁽⁸⁾Iraq also withdrew from the special bilateral agreement with Britain concluded on April 6, 1955, and it was also agreed between the two sides on March 30, 1959 to withdraw British forces from the Habbaniya base ⁽⁹⁾In the same context, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the American ambassador informing him of the Iraqi government's decision to cancel the agreements concluded during the royal era with the American side, explaining that canceling these agreements is among the measures taken by the Iraqi government to liquidate its previous relations so that it can pursue a policy of positive neutrality. which was announced ⁽¹⁰⁾Abdul Karim Qasim's delay in withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact can be attributed to his

(1) Jamal Abdunnasser(1918-1970)He was born in Alexandria in 1918. He joined the Military College in 1937 and graduated as an officer. He was appointed to the infantry divisions in Assiut in 1938. He later joined to work in Sudan. He was appointed as a teacher at the Military College. He participated in the Palestine War in 1948. He organized the Free Officers Group and led them. During the July Revolution of 1952, he assumed the position of Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior in 1953. He also assumed the position of Prime Minister in 1954, and in 1956 he was elected President of the Republic by the Egyptian people. He had a prominent role on the Arab, regional and international levels, especially his leadership of the movement Non-Aligned, he died in 1970 after suffering a heart attack in Cairo. See: Buthaina Abdul Rahman Yassin Al-Takriti, Gamal Abdel Nasser, a historical study of the origins and development of Nasserite thought, doctoral thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1998; Ahmed Atiya Allah, Political Dictionary, 3rd edition, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, Cairo, 1968, pp. 291-294;

(2) Ahmed Abdel Karim, Highlights on the Experience of Loneliness, Al-Ahali Press, Damascus, 1991, p. 175.

(3) Al-Ahram Newspaper, (Cairo), Issue No. 26309, May 15, 1959.

(4)Adapted from: Khalil Ibrahim Hussein Al-Zubaie, Al-Iraq in British documents-Aniya 1958 - 1959, Part 3, Dar Al-Hekma, Baghdad, 2000, p. 156.

(5)The New York Times, (New York), April 29, 1959.

(6) Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, pp. 329-330.

(7)Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, p. 330-331.

(8)Al-Thawra newspaper,(Baghdad) ,Issue No. 127, March 25, 1959.

(9)Same source Issue No. 132, March 31, 1959.

(10) The Iraqi government canceled the military aid agreement between the United States of America and the Iraqi government concluded on April 21, 1954, in addition to canceling the agreement regarding the disposal

preoccupation with consolidating his authority. He also saw some benefit in not taking any decision to withdraw from the Pact completely, and this was confirmed by the American Ambassador Gilman ⁽¹⁾ It also appears that Abdul Karim Qasim wanted Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact to be planned and gradual, so as not to give any opportunity to the countries participating in it to military intervention in Iraq.

The British forces stationed at the Habbaniya base began to leave Iraq on April 6, 1959 ⁽²⁾ However, this matter did not stand in the way of Britain's continued supply of weapons to Iraq. On the contrary, British foreign policy emphasized the necessity of continuing to supply Iraq with weapons, despite the objection of some members of the Labor Party in the British House of Commons. The Labor Party presented in May 11, 1959, an objection to the British Prime Minister against supplying weapons to Iraq, explaining that this policy is characterized by "sedition and confusion" and contributes to strengthening a communist state with British weapons, which prompted the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to respond to the objectors by saying: ((We must continue to supply this country with weapons and do our best to allow General Qasim to maintain the independent path that he says he wishes to take.) The British Minister also reassured members of the Labor Party by delaying the delivery of those weapons for a year to demonstrate the nature of Abdul Karim's regime. Qasim, if he is a communist, the British government will cancel the license to export these weapons to Iraq ⁽³⁾. It is worth noting that the British decision to export these weapons was with the approval of Iran, Turkey, and Jordan, given that those countries are neighbors of Iraq, in addition to the prior approval of the United States of America, while Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Zionist entity (Israel) were among the countries that expressed their objection to that. The decision indicated that it would obstruct the rapprochement sought by the West with the United Arab Republic. In the same context, Egyptian radio stations and newspapers denounced that step, considering it "an imperialist plot against Arab nationalism" and a threat to the borders of the United Arab Republic, which borders Iraq on the Syrian side.⁴

On May 11, 1959, the British military attaché in Baghdad discussed a list of purchases of British-made weapons with the Chief of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army and in the presence of Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim, who informed the military attaché of his desire to continue British supplies. It was agreed to supply Iraq with some medium weapons. In addition to new aircraft and tanks, the Iraqi side requested payment of 20% of the value of those weapons upon delivery and the rest of the amounts be paid in installments over four years, with each year 20% being paid. It also requested early delivery of those weapons.

⁽⁵⁾ It was agreed to supply British aircraft and tanks worth \$30 million.⁶ During those discussions, the British pointed to the influence of the communists in the Iraqi government, as indicated by one of the British documents, which confirmed: ((We hinted to Qasim that the communists say that he is now under our control))⁷ It seems that these developments have provoked American politicians, as indicated by the American newspaper (The Washington Post), which saw Britain's decision to sell weapons to Iraq as a risky gamble, noting that the failure of this policy would contribute to arming a new Soviet state ⁽⁸⁾.

Iraqi arms deals with Britain aroused the ire of the United Arab Republic, as Gamal Abdel Nasser was not satisfied with Britain's policy of exporting weapons to the regime of Abdul Karim Qasim in Iraq, and British officials were informed that this had serious repercussions on the region, according to what was indicated in one of the British documents. ⁽⁹⁾It seems that Gamal Abdel Nasser was aware of Abdul Karim Qasim's desire to annex Kuwait to Iraqi territory by importing these weapons, and Gamal Abdel Nasser's action may have been prompted by the Emir of Kuwait, as one of the British documents indicated that the ruler of Kuwait was

of equipment and ammunition that the United States of America is supplying to Iraq on July 5, 1955. It also canceled the economic aid agreement between the two governments, known as the Eisenhower Project. See: Laith Abdul Hassan Al-Zubaidi, previous source, p. 336.

⁽¹⁾ Alaa Musa Kazem Nawras, previous source, p. 92.

⁽²⁾The last group of British forces left Iraqi territory through the port of Basra on May 31st 1959. See: Qahtan Ahmed Salman Al-Hamdani, Previous source, pp. 374-386.

⁽³⁾The Christian Science Monitor, (Boston), May 12, 1959; The Washington Post, (Washington), May 12, 1959.

⁽⁴⁾The New York Times, (New York), May 12, 1959.

⁽⁵⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 545 of May 12, May 13, 1959.

⁽⁶⁾Chicago Tribune, (Chicago), May 15, 1959, p.1.

⁽⁷⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 556 of May 13, May 13, 1959.

⁽⁸⁾The Washington Post, (Washington), May 13, 1959.

⁽⁹⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office No. 645, May 14, 1959.

rejoiced by Gamal Abdel Nasser's action to The extent of astonishment, as the document put it ⁽¹⁾While the American newspaper (Washington Post) reported that the continued flow of British weapons to Iraq will intensify the differences between Britain and the United Arab Republic ⁽²⁾.

On a related level, the American press launched a wave of criticism of Britain's policy towards Iraq. The Washington Post published in its issue of May 17, 1959, an article entitled: ((Britain gambles with weapons in Iraq)) that included a scathing criticism of British policy regarding the weapons provided. To Iraq, indicating that the British, after all their defeats and humiliations in the Middle East, are providing these weapons to the political regime that ended the lives of their close friends, a regime that prides itself on its departure from the Baghdad Pact ⁽³⁾.

The British were ready to supply Iraq with various weapons to show their friendship to the new regime and for fear of it falling into the arms of the Soviets and its dependence on Soviet weapons ⁽⁴⁾ This was clearly indicated by one of the British documents dated May 20, 1959, which stressed the necessity of winning over the regime of Abdul Karim Qasim to prevent it from completely relying on the Soviets. The document also included approval to supply Iraq with (48) Centurion tanks. Newly manufactured Centurion and 20 Canberra bomber aircraft.⁵ (Canberra) ⁽⁶⁾ In addition to (24) howitzer anti-aircraft guns.(Howitzer) caliber (5.5 knots), and the financial value of that deal was estimated at (14 million British pounds) equivalent to (40 million US dollars) ⁽⁷⁾.

On May 31, 1959, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the American ambassador in Iraq that included the cancellation of the aforementioned mutual security agreement and the agreement to provide military aid. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry clarified in its memorandum that this decision does not mean unfriendly action towards the United States of America, as the government The Iraqi government wants the friendship between the two countries to grow on the basis of mutual understanding. On the other hand, the British government has shown more flexibility towards weapons requests from the Iraqi side, perhaps out of fear for its interests in Iraq. The British government has agreed to license a company(English Electric Company) to equip Iraq with a number of aircraft ⁽⁸⁾.

On June 1, 1959, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the American Embassy in Iraq confirming the Iraqi government's decision to cancel the military aid agreement concluded in 1954, while clarifying that this does not mean unfriendly behavior towards the United States of America, but rather that Iraq desires the growth of friendship and relations. between the two parties on the basis of understanding ⁽⁹⁾In June 1959, the Iraqi government requested a company agentThe British Alvis Company in Baghdad supplied (60) Alvis Saladin armored military vehicles to support the local police and the Iraqi army. This request was approved and it was agreed to deliver the vehicles within one year ⁽¹⁰⁾.

On November 2, 1959, the Iraqi government asked the British government to supply drawings and plans to establish a 9 mm ammunition factory. One of the British documents indicated that the Iraqis could easily obtain those drawings and plans from Italy, as well as equipment from Czechoslovakia, if they refused to do

⁽¹⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, From Geneva (United Kingdom Delegation To Meeting Of Foreign Ministers) To Foreign Office, No. Code 27, May 13, 1959.

⁽²⁾The Washington Post, (Washington), May 14, 1959.

⁽³⁾The New York Times, (New York), May 17, 1959.

⁽⁴⁾Chicago Tribune, (Chicago), May 12, 1959; Los Angeles Times, (Los Angeles), May 9, 1959.

⁽⁵⁾ The Plane(Canberra): It is a British-made, three-seat light bomber aircraft with two jet engines and a speed of 930 km/h. This aircraft is armed with (2720 kg) of bombs as a payload inside the hull, in addition to (900 kg) of bombs as an external payload under the hull, with Missile containers under the wings, and its combat range is estimated at (2000 km). Its first flight was in 1949 and it was produced by the English Electric Company. look :Sobhi Nazem Tawfiq, Military aircraft used in the world, Military Culture Series No. 64, Combat Development Directorate, Baghdad ,Ibid. 1984, p. 158.

⁽⁶⁾ The commander of the Iraqi Air Force, Jalal Al-Awqati, thwarted the deal to purchase Canberra planes, due to the lack of radar in those planes and their being out of service in Britain. Therefore, the Iraqi government was content with spare tools and equipment for British weapons. See: Qahtan Ahmed Salman Al-Hamdani, the previous source, p. 375.

⁽⁷⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, From Foreign Office To Geneva (United Kingdom Delegation To The Meeting Of Foreign Ministers, 2May 0, 1959 .

⁽⁸⁾Qahtan Ahmed Suleiman Al-Hamdani, previous source, pp. 374-386.

⁽⁹⁾The Washington Post, (Washington), June 2, 1959.

⁽¹⁰⁾FO, PREM 11- 4319, Supply of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1959-1963, Supply of Armored Cars To Iraq, 6 July, 1959.

so. the demand ⁽¹⁾On December 22, 1959, Abdul Karim Qasim asked the British ambassador in Baghdad to equip Iraq with tanks, cannons, anti-aircraft guns, and some light weapons, stressing that he wanted Britain to remain one of the main sources of weapons for the Iraqi army. In this regard, the British ambassador believed that Abdul Karim By requesting this, Qasim wanted not to rely entirely on the Soviets alone, as well as to test Britain's political position on his government. The British ambassador recommended that Abdul Karim Qasim's requests be accepted ⁽²⁾.

Iraqi-American relations developed in the early 1960s. On March 24, 1960, at a meeting of the US National Security Council, the US Secretary of State called for investing in the improvement of diplomatic relations with Iraq by demonstrating the provision of military assistance in a positive manner. The Secretary of State also proposed providing training opportunities for Iraqi officers. In the United States of America, in addition to studying the basic Iraqi demands to purchase reasonable quantities of military equipment and spare parts, it appears that the Secretary of State's proposals have faced opposition from American officials due to Abdul Karim Qasim's reliance on the socialist camp to obtain weapons, and it appears that this position was Under the influence of the Central Intelligence Agency, which had an influential role in the departments concerned with supplying weapons to

Iraq, but with the accession of US President John Kennedy(John F. Kennedy) ⁽³⁾On January 20, 1961, the American administration responded to the Iraqi government's request for an Iraqi military delegation to visit military installations in the United States of America and see the technological progress on the military side. The delegation arrived in late February 1961 and included the Assistant to the Military Governor, Colonel Saadoun. Al-Madfai and the Director of Military Intelligence, Colonel Mohsen Al-Rafi'i, and the delegation was received with a warm welcome. The visit lasted two weeks, during which the Iraqi delegation visited several American military installations, most notably the American Armored Forces Center in the state of Kentucky and the American missile unit center in the state of Detroit, in addition to attending some military maneuvers for various types of weapons. ⁽⁴⁾

After the Iraqi delegation completed its visit to the United States of America, the Iraqi government requested the purchase of (200) American-made troop carrier vehicles. The American side agreed to this, but they opposed completing a deal to purchase anti-aircraft missiles on the pretext that they threaten the security of the Zionist entity ⁽⁵⁾The United States of America also agreed to meet the Iraqi government's request to purchase 500 military trucks, and one of the American documents indicated that there is a change in Iraq that is likely to lead to the emergence of another strong national government, and this came after consultations with the British side ⁽⁶⁾This coincided with the outbreak of a dispute between Abdul Karim Qasim and Mullah Mustafa Barzani ⁽⁷⁾Abdul Karim Qasim then thought about completely controlling the

⁽¹⁾FO 371-133107, Supplies of arms and military equipment to Iraq, 1958, From Brightling Air Ministry to D. H. Ballentyne, Esq, Foreign Office, EQ1195/16(A), 5 November, 1959.

⁽²⁾ Qahtan Ahmed Salman Al-Hamdani, previous source, p. 374.

⁽³⁾ John Kennedy (1917-1963): He is the thirty-fifth president of the United States of America. He was born in 1917 in the state of Massachusetts From a young age, he was taught Catholic teachings. His father, Joseph Kennedy, was a wealthy man in the field of commerce and the film industry. His father also worked as the United States' ambassador to Britain. John Kennedy obtained a doctorate from Harvard University in 1940. He joined the US Naval Forces in 1941. He participated in World War II against the Japanese forces and was subsequently wounded. He was elected from the Democratic Party in Massachusetts to the House of Representatives from 1947 until 1953 when he became a member of the Senate. He was elected in 1960 as president of the American administration after he was nominated by the Democratic Party. He was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. See: Amina Dakhel Shalash Al-Tamimi, John Kennedy and his policy towards the issues of the Arab Levant 1961-1963, doctoral thesis, College of Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2008.

⁽⁴⁾ Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, pp. 337-338.

⁽⁵⁾ Salem Ismail Mustafa Al-Ani, US policy towards Iraq during the Arifi era 1963-1968, Master's thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, Anbar University, 2012, pp. 194-195.

⁽⁶⁾FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, No. 303, Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, June 20, 1962, P.743.

⁽⁷⁾ Mullah Mustafa Barzani(1904-1979)Mullah Mustafa Barzani was born in 1904 in the village of Barzan in northern Iraq. He received his religious education in his village. In 1943, he led an armed movement against the government, but it failed, so he was forced to seek refuge in Iran in 1945 and then to the Soviet Union in 1947, but he returned. To Iraq after July 14, 1958, he was able in June 1966 to conclude an agreement with the government to obtain autonomy for the Kurds, but it was not implemented. In the second Baath

Kurdish region in northern Iraq and eliminating the Kurdistan Democratic Party ⁽¹⁾And reduce his influence in the northern region, and was convinced that the only solution to achieve this was a military attack and the use of force to subjugate the Kurdish region ⁽²⁾.

Abdul Karim Qasim's attempt to annex Kuwait in June 1961 raised a new regional and international problem for his government, as Abdul Karim Qasim was determined to use military force to annex Kuwait, which aroused the ire of the United States of America and Britain ⁽³⁾In this regard, one of the American documents dated December 29, 1961 indicated that the situation in Iraq was in a state of instability, and this could lead to being drawn into a political catastrophe represented by the annexation of Kuwaiti lands to Iraq. The document indicated that Abdul Karim Qasim Determined to annex Kuwait, and that this will tighten the stranglehold on American and British interests in the Middle East, especially after Abdul Karim Qasim was able to add Kuwaiti oil production to the Iraq Petroleum Company, in addition to his good relationship with the Soviets and their support for him with weapons ⁽⁴⁾.

US Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent (Dean Rusk) (1961-1969) sent a telegram to the American embassy in Baghdad on July 6, 1962, in which he explained that the American administration, after an extensive study of the security situation in the Middle East, decided to equip some countries with defensive weapons in small quantities, provided that those countries were not involved in (the conflict). Arab-Israeli ⁽⁵⁾This applies to the Iraqi request to purchase anti-aircraft weapons, despite the fact that these weapons are defensive, not offensive, as the American administration aimed not to provide advanced weapons to any country for fear of these weapons entering into the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and the Zionist entity. In addition, it did not The United States of America allows these countries to possess American (surface-to-air) missiles because they are of a secret nature and it is not easy to hand them over to a foreign country without having a political agreement with them ⁽⁶⁾.

The attention of the Iraqi government turned towards investing and directing the available economic resources and distributing them in a thoughtful manner to achieve economic renaissance. The public budgets after July 14, 1958 reflected the philosophy and goals of the young republic's government, which represented a revolutionary trend ⁽⁷⁾Political, military and economic factors were the main factor in determining military spending during the period 1958-1963, as building a modern defensive military force requires a lot of financial resources, and this is what actually happened as the government took all necessary measures to support the military sector by investing the increase. obtained in oil revenues ⁽⁸⁾The following table represents the values of government spending in the annual budgets for the years 1958 - 1962, according to the table below.

government, he concluded an agreement with it in March 1970, but it was not implemented either, so he launched an armed movement. In northern Iraq, but it failed because of the cutting off of the military supplies that the Shah of Iran was sending to him. illness He died in 1979 in the United States of America. See: Hassan Latif Al-Zubaidi, the previous source, pp. 584-586.

⁽¹⁾The Kurdistan Democratic Party was founded secretly in August 1946, after the failure of the armed movement led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani between 1943 and 1945. Barzani was elected president of the party, and one of the party's most important goals was to establish self-rule for the Kurds, and members joined the party. From other Kurdish parties that were weak and dispersed, making it the largest and most important Kurdish party. See: Hassan Zaza, Iraq - A Study of Its Political History 1908-2005, Dar Al-Ru'ya for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Damascus, 2007, p. 180; Abdul Sattar Taher Sharif, Kurdish associations, organizations and parties in half a century 1908-1958, Baghdad, 1989, spp. 155-177.

⁽²⁾ Mahmoud Jawar Al-Ukaili, July 14, Revolution and Deviation, Dar Al-Jawahiri, Baghdad, 2013, p. 106.

⁽³⁾ Kazem Habib, Glimpses of Twentieth Century Iraq - Book Six, Aras Printing and Publishing House, Erbil, 2013, p. 309.

⁽⁴⁾ FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, No. 156, Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, December 29, 1961., P.379.

⁽⁵⁾ Jeffrey S. Milstein, Soviet And American Influences On The Arab - Israeli Arms Race: A Quantitative Analysis, The Conference On The Middle East Conflict Of The Peace Research Society, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 7.

⁽⁶⁾ Sinan Sadiq Hussein Al-Zaidi, the previous source, pp. 339-340.

⁽⁷⁾ Finance Magazine, (Baghdad), No. 3, year 1976, p. 79.

⁽⁸⁾ Tariq Ahmed Bakr, The relationship between national defense and economic development with special reference to Iraq, Master's thesis, College of Administration and Economics, University of Baghdad, 1977, p. 526.

Table No. (1) Iraqi state budgets for the years 1958-1962 and the Ministry of Defense's percentage of them⁽¹⁾.

Percentage from the general budget	Ministry of Defense budget	of the currency	The total amount	fiscal year
32.84%	25450000	Iraqi dinar	77358433	1958
30.43%	34081000	Iraqi dinar	104010880	1959
29.70%	36534800	Iraqi dinar	116151918	1960
30.73%	39300640	Iraqi dinar	120735000	1961
30%	39000000	Iraqi dinar	127003945	1962

From the table above, we note that the appropriations for the fiscal year 1958 increased over the appropriations of the previous year⁽²⁾ Whereas the general budget for the year 1958 was approved in April 1958, that is, before the fourteenth of July 1958, and a total amount of (77,358,433) dinars was allocated for that fiscal year, of which an amount of (25,450,000) dinars was allocated to the Ministry of Defense⁽³⁾ Subsequently, an amount of (2,750,000) dinars was added to the budget of the Ministry of Defense, and this amount was considered greater than the estimated amount within the 1958 budget, with the aim of covering the increasing expenses of the Ministry of Defense and enhancing the military and armament capabilities of the Iraqi army⁽⁴⁾ The establishment of a modern republic in the Middle East requires that it possess a strong military arsenal to defend itself.

The government moved towards raising the capabilities and capabilities of the Iraqi army in response to implementing the goals of republican government in its first budget, as the government increased its financial allocations to the Ministry of Defense in the 1959 financial budget to (34,081,000) dinars from the total amount of the Iraqi Republic's budget for the year 1959 amounting to (104,010). (880) dinars, and thus the budget of the Ministry of Defense constituted more than (30%) of the total amount of this year's budget⁽⁵⁾ this coincided with the Soviet Union granting a financial loan to Iraq worth (100,000,000) one hundred million dollars, with the aim of increasing the armed capacity of the Iraqi army⁽⁶⁾.

General Budget Law No. 58 of 1960 was issued on April 30, 1960. This year's budget represented a record number in Iraq's budgets. The government sought to give priority in that budget to meeting national defense, administration, and security expenses by strengthening and arming the Iraqi army within the framework of A neutral policy in international relations and not entering into alliances between the Western and Eastern camps⁽⁷⁾.

The 1961 financial budget was organized with an increase in financial allocations over the previous year, and military spending occupied the forefront, as that budget was considered armament par excellence⁽⁸⁾ In the

⁽¹⁾The table was prepared by the researcher based on: D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate file The Iraqi State Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 1958, File No. 32112, Sequence 76, s73; D.K.W., File of the General Budget Directorate, Budget Law of the Iraqi Republic for the Fiscal Year 1959, File No. 32112, Series 72, p. 70; D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate file, Law Republic's budget Iraqi for the Sunnah 1960 Finance; File No. 32112, Sequence 71, pp. 1-12; D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate, Budget Law of the Iraqi Republic for the year 1961 Finance, File number 32112, sequence 311, p. 1; D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate, Budget Law of the Iraqi Republic for the year 1962 Finance, File number 32112, sequence 314, s1.

⁽²⁾The general budget for the year 1957 was a total amount of (70693430) Iraqi dinar, allocated from this amount) 21530130) Iraqi dinar, the share of the Ministry of Defense, at a rate of (30%) of the general budget for the aforementioned year. See: Iraqi Fact Sheet, Issue No. 3965, March 30, 1957.

⁽³⁾D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate file The Iraqi State Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 1958, File No. 32112, Sequence 76, s73.

⁽⁴⁾ Ministry of Justice, Collection of Laws and Regulations of 1958, First Section, Government Press, Baghdad, 1959, pp. 193-194.

⁽⁵⁾ D.K.W., File of the General Budget Directorate, Budget Law of the Iraqi Republic for the Fiscal Year 1959, File No. 32112, Series 72, p. 70.

⁽⁶⁾ Ammar Fadel Hamza, previous source, p. 19.

⁽⁷⁾D.K.W., Documentary Unit, General Budget Directorate file, Law Republic's budget Iraqi for the Sunnah 1960 Finance; File No. 32112, sequence 71, ppp. 1-12.

⁽⁸⁾Public revenues in the 1961 budget amounted to (112,000,000) dinars, to which an amount of (160,000) dinars was added. This increase in revenues was the result of receiving the largest portion of the installment

1962 budget, an amount of (39) million Iraqi dinars was allocated to the Ministry of Defense to meet the requirements of building a national army on modern foundations and arming it from various international sources. The total amount of the general budget amounted to (127,003,945) Iraqi dinars, and the Ministry of Defense's share in it was (30% of the total amount ¹.

By comparing the proportions of military spending during the royal era and the republican regime, we see that the total amount spent on the Iraqi Ministry of Defense from the general budget of the Iraqi state during the royal era for the period 1922-1957 amounted to (228,706,808) Iraqi dinars. In contrast, we note that the allocations The Ministry of Defense in the state's general budget exceeded 30% during the years (1958-1962). In other words, we find that the allocations for the Ministry of Defense in the first Republican era (1958-1963) increased in percentage and in the size of the amounts allocated in the state's general budgets compared to the era. Royal (1921-1958), and in terms of numbers, we find that the total allocations for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense during the years (1958-1962) amounted to (135,065,800) Iraqi dinars, which constitutes a percentage (58.67%) of the total allocated to the Ministry of Defense since The establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921 until 1957, with the exception of the amounts of aid and loans in the royal and republican eras, as they were not included in the state's general budgets. This reflects the extent of the increasing interest in the army by the first republican regime (1958-1962), which was led by army officers. He felt threatened and was trying to consolidate the pillars of his rule, in addition to seeking the independence of his national decision-making, so he worked to increase the capacity of the armed forces and diversify their sources of armament.

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