



# What Makes the United Arab Emirates Safe: A Call for Increased Criminological Examination

Eric Halford\*

\*Department of Research and Innovation, Rabdan Academy, United Arab Emirates

**Citation:** Eric Halford, (2024), What Makes the United Arab Emirates Safe: A Call for Increased Criminological Examination, *Educational Administration: Theory and Practice*, 3(4), 5782-5793  
Doi: 10.53555/kuey.v3oi4.2282

## ARTICLE INFO

## ABSTRACT

This article provides a criminological perspective of how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) achieves its reputation as one of the safest, low interpersonal crime societies in the world. By offering an examination of legal, policing, financial, social, environmental, cultural, and religious factors, through the lens of contemporary criminological theory, the article presents the view that the UAEs status is achieved because of a diffusion of benefits from a combination of the conditions presented. The article argues that although these conditions affect criminal behavior in ways that are predicted within theories of deterrence, rational choice, routine activities and situational crime prevention, much research is needed to confirm or refute this position due to the absence of criminological research in the Arab region. Ultimately, the article delivers a 'call to arms' to researchers to examine this perspective through the conduct of empirical research that will add a unique angle to existing areas of academic literature.

**Keywords:** United Arab Emirates; Middle East; Policing; Crime; Criminology

## INTRODUCTION

Recent reporting indicates that the United Arab Emirates has the second lowest crime index score in the world with just 15.23 crimes per 100,000 residents. In contrast, the United Kingdom's crime index is 46.07 and the safety index is 53.93. The United States has a crime index of 47.81 and safety index of 52.19. As a result, the UAE, and cities like Abu Dhabi have been voted amongst the safest in the world for 5 years in a row and achieved a ranking of 11 in the personal security index (Al Mazrouei, 2022). All whilst maintaining 98% public satisfaction with regards to personal security and safety (Al Mazrouei, 2022).

The UAE has a population of approximately 9.2m residents and boasts one of the highest mean salaries in the world. The UAE government indicates that there are over 200 nationalities living and working in the UAE and as a result, less than 12% are Emirati citizens with most residents being expatriates from overseas countries such as India (27.49%), Pakistan (12.69%), the Filipinas (5.56%) and Egypt (4.23%). Of the population, 69% are male, and age distribution is overwhelmingly between the ages of 25-54, who make up 66% of the population. In addition, the country is very proud of its religious heritage and is open in its identity as an Islamic nation that follows a dual track civil and sharia, legal framework.

Despite such impressive statistics on crime and safety being achieved in an unparalleled diverse population, there have been very few studies that have sought to explain or understand how the country achieves this. This article takes a small step towards beginning to fill this research gap by offering a criminological perspective of factors that potentially enable the UAE to achieve its status as a low interpersonal crime society. In doing so, it sets the scene for further studies by offering recommendations that other researchers in the political, social and crime sciences can consider as a signpost to future studies. We achieve this by analyzing the situational, social, environmental, cultural, and policing conditions present within the UAE that contribute to achieving its status as one of the world's safest countries. We do this by providing an overview of how the conditions within the UAE both consciously, and unconsciously, provide crime prevention benefits, that when considered as a whole; achieve an extremely robust model for reducing crime and improving public safety.

## CRIME IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

To begin our analysis, we start by exploring the issue of crime recording. It is difficult to collect and compare international crime statistics (Del Frate, 2010) due to an absence of comparable data sets. As a result, the standard mechanism is to use officially reported statistics of recorded crimes and compare the rates per 100,000 of the population, and it is this approach that many of the online crime index monitoring systems use to produce the statistics that provides the UAE with its status as a low crime society. For example, the current crime index score for the UAE is assessed as 15.23 crimes per 100,000. As a result, the UAE is routinely ranked as having one of the lowest crime rates in the world.

In achieving this status such indexes do not include crimes such as money laundering or other 'white collar' crimes. It would be amiss not to outline that the UAE has been identified as having gaps in their response to money laundering, to the extent that in March 2022, the country was added to the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (The Grey List) by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This simply means that there are identified gaps in anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) safety measures, but that commitments have been made to resolve these. Studies that have explored laundering of crypto currency since that time have suggested that progress is being made to address these shortcomings and that the UAE now has a robust legal system aimed at bolstering anti-money laundering frameworks (Na, 2022).

However, in assessing their status as one of the safest countries in the world, crime indexes most frequently focus on interpersonal crimes such as robbery, assault, sexual offences and property related crimes. This is understandable as these are the crimes which have the greatest impact on feelings of personal safety, and as such, this is the focus of our analysis. Research that has been able to examine official figures in depth is limited but has suggested that the statistics on crime levels in the UAE may not be 100% accurate (Al-Shaali, 1999). This study, now over 20 years ago, suggested that under-reporting does exist, and that the true overall crime figure is estimated to be approximately 40% higher than the recorded volumes, and a similar level for property related crime (Al-Shaali, 1999). In addition, it is indicated that recorded drug related crime could be 60% higher and rape or sexual offences 65% (Al-Shaali, 1999).

There is no suggestion in this study (Al-Shaali, 1999) that the under recording is intentional, instead it is suggested that it is a result of a myriad of reasons, including under reporting, which is a distinct issue, and not one that is unique to the UAE. Putting the issue of crime recording into context, it is not unusual for police services to fail, or under report crimes. This a behavior is seen in police services elsewhere in the world. For example, in 2020 Greater Manchester Police in the UK was identified by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS, 2020) as failing to record 80,100 crimes in a single year. The reasons for this are often complex and include systematic failings in processes and policies. Additional to the internal reasons services fail to record crimes there are also external influencers. As we have outlined, the most significant of these is the absence of reporting of crime to the police, and research from across the world has shown that this occurs for reasons including a lack of confidence or cynicism (Bradford et al, 2013; Carr et al, 2007; Yoon, 2015), trauma related to the offence (Jones et al, 2002), level and nature of previous contact (Rengifo, et al, 2019) and being a member of a minority community (Davis and Henderson, 2003). However, even when accounting for a 40% figure of under recording of crime, as has been suggested (Al-Shaali, 1999), the UAEs crime rate per 100,00 would still be just 21.32, which when compared against un-amended figures from other nations, would still be amongst the lowest 5 in the world. If one was to consider similar upscaling to account for underestimating recorded crime in other countries, I suggest the countries position withstands rigour.

In contrast, what is known with certainty is that crime has increased in the UAE over the past 50 years since the country began the journey of rapid development that the world has played witness to. Just like elsewhere in the world, where research has shown that recorded crime is heavily impacted by population levels (Braithwaite, 1975), crime increases have occurred. This has never been disputed, even within the UAE, where it has been outlined that population rises, as well as factors such as introduction of new laws, shifting attitudes towards behavior, and changes in police procedures regarding crime recording (Al-Shaali, 1999), have all underpinned rising volumes of crime. However, volume is a simplified measure, and when considered against increases in population size, the crime rate per 100,000 actually decreased steadily in the UAE between 1976 and 1995 (Al-Shaali, 1999). Official statistics from 2019 indicate that this decline has even occurred in the country's most 'westernized' metropolis, Dubai, where the rate per 100,000 has decreased over the past decade from 58.6 to 32.5 (Dubai Police, 2022). In Abu Dhabi, reported crime per 100,000 people has declined by 57%, (Al Mazrouei, 2022).

As such, currently, there is little evidence to doubt the crime levels in the UAE. However, the absence of up-to-date research means no cast iron conclusions can be drawn on the current accuracy of crime reporting and recording, and as such, this is the first area that we propose needs to be explored.

## LITERATURE ON CRIME AND POLICING IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Despite the reportedly low crime levels I have outlined, surprisingly, research on crime and criminology in the UAE is incredibly scarce. Despite the early 2000s starting positively with PhD studies covering a variety of subjects including crime control and security (Al-Shaali, 1999), our literature review has identified that although there has been an upsurge in literature emanating from the UAE over the past 5 years, it has predominately focused on the area of policing, and not crime or criminology directly.

For example, studies have been conducted on subjects such as behavioral evidence analysis (Al Mutawa, 2015), with a strong focus on digital forensics (Al Obaidli and Iqbal, 2011 and Al Mutawa, 2019) and crimes such as cyber-stalking (Al Mutawa, 2016). The focus on technology within policing and security has also been the emphasis of studies that have explored the use of body worn cameras (Al-Shehhi, 2018) and smart technologies such as artificial intelligence and GPS (Al Shamsi et al, 2022). Research has also explored how technology is being used in the country to better manage roads policing and traffic safety (Binsubaih et al, 2006 and Davies and Al Shamis, 2022) and the police approach to using traditional forensic methodologies such as fingerprints in cases of murder (Almehiri et al, 2019 and AlSuwaidi et al, 2020).

In addition, there have been a small number of studies that have explored areas relating to procedural justice, including police accountability (Al Shaali et al, 2000) and perceptions of police-civilian encounters in the UAE (Choi et al, 2019). Community policing has also been examined through studies on the use of media and engagement tactics (Alam, 2022) and police community relations as effective applications of soft power (Al Hanaee and Davies, 2022) through interventions such as the “we are all police” scheme (Al Manhali et al, 2022), which is a form of volunteer policing.

In terms of police management, there is a systematic emphasis in the UAE placed upon forward planning through what is described as future foresight (Khalaf Al Mazrouei, 2022). Under this banner studies have explored how the UAE has trained and educated emerging officers (Davies and Sharefeen, 2022), how they conduct risk management (Juma et al, 2022), use of police knowledge management systems (Al Muhairi, 2013 and Al Dhanhani and Al Naqbi, 2022) and their application of novel managerial methods, such as six-sigma (Alosani, 2019 and Alosani et al, 2020). Research has also explored leadership issues such as determinants of job satisfaction (Abdulla et al, 2011) and happiness of officers in the police in the UAE (Al Kaabi, 2022), along with the role of gender in policing, and specifically the perceptions of policewomen (Chu and Abdulla, 2014).

This brief overview of the recent literature in the UAE highlights that although studies are taking place, they lack a criminological emphasis. Instead, they focus on ‘what’ the UAE does to achieve success by examining process, policy and practice. This is important, especially for police practice. However, these studies rarely explore the criminological underpinnings, or the associated effect that may occur, and as such, we (the academic and practitioner community) are lacking an understanding of ‘how’ and ‘why’ crime has come to be so low. We argue that as a result, researchers are missing an opportunity to explore what is, when compared to settings of western literature on criminology, a relatively unique cultural, political, sociological and environmental setting. It is for this reason that in this article we attempt to outline some of the key criminological theories, how they theoretically relate to the setting of the UAE, and offer proposals as to how research exploring these further could be conducted to add value to the wider literature base.

## KEY CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES

### Deterrence Theory

There are several key criminological perspectives for understanding criminal behavior that are accepted amongst contemporary scholars. One of the most basal theories is deterrence theory, which posits that the likelihood that a person will commit a crime can be reduced through the threat of punishment (Beccaria, 1764). At its core this theory argues that severe punishments are most effective in deterring crime (Beccaria, 1764; Kennedy, 1983; and Paternoster, 2019). This position is based on the premise that people are rational and as part of their decision making, they weigh the costs and benefits before committing a crime (Beccaria, 1764; Kennedy, 1983; and Paternoster, 2019). Rooted in classical criminology, deterrence theory has been an influential component of criminal justice systems worldwide for a considerable time (Beccaria, 1764; Kennedy, 1983; and Paternoster, 2019). The main principles of deterrence theory are severity, certainty, and swiftness of punishment. Therefore, in addition to the existence of strong punishments, the certainty of detection and apprehension play a key role (Beccaria, 1764; Kennedy, 1983; and Paternoster, 2019). Furthermore, the more immediate the punishment, the more effective it is in deterring criminals (Beccaria, 1764; Kennedy, 1983; and Paternoster, 2019). In the context of deterrence theory, when applying sanctions there are two dominant forms of deterrent, informal and formal (Apel, and DeWitt, 2018). Informal deterrence comes from social factors like family, friends, and community. Formal deterrence is the result of actions by official institutions like the police and the judicial system (Apel, and DeWitt, 2018).

### **Rational Choice Theory**

Borne from deterrence theory, the rational choice theory (RCT) of crime (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) articulates the decision-making process of criminals in greater detail. At its fundamental level, RCT argues that if the benefit of committing a crime is outweighed by the consequence, and if the criminal is consciously aware of this, then they are less likely to commit the crime (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). How, where and when criminals choose to commit crime relates to routine activity theory (RAT) (Cohen and Felson, 1979). At its core, this theory suggests that most criminals commit crime as they go about their normal day-to-day activities or in the parameters of their 'routine activity' (Cohen and Felson, 1979). RAT also suggests that for a crime to occur there are three converging facets which the presence or absence of, has a significant impact on the likelihood of a crime occurring (Cohen and Felson, 1979). These three elements are the presence of a motivated offender, a suitable target such as a person or property, and the absence of a capable guardian, who is a person that can disrupt or prevent the crime occurring (Cohen and Felson, 1979).

### **Situational Crime Prevention**

A further, intrinsically similar philosophy is that of situational crime prevention (SCP) (Clarke, 1980) which pulls together many of the theories into a systematic approach for preventing, reducing and controlling crime through the means of reducing the opportunities for criminal acts (Clarke, 1997). Situational crime prevention achieves this by placing an emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities that increase the attractiveness of a crime, and that can be taken advantage of by motivated offenders. In general, SCP focuses on 5 key methodologies of crime control; first, SCP advocates increasing the effort the offender must make to carry out the crime; next, there is an emphasis on increasing the risks the offender must face in completing the crime; this is followed by reducing the rewards or benefits the offender expects to obtain from the crime; SCP also focuses on removing excuses that offenders may use to "rationalize" or justify their actions; and finally, reducing or avoiding provocations that may tempt or incite offenders into committing criminal acts (Clarke, 1997).

Over time, studies examining the geography of crime, identified trends and patterns regarding its commission. The most significant of these was the discovery of the law of crime concentration (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). The law of crime concentration identified that regardless of place, cultural, or religious setting, small geographic areas accounted for disproportionately high proportions of criminal offences (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). Although other theories exist that help to understand crime and offending, over the past 40 years, the aforementioned theories have formed the cornerstone for policing approaches such as problem orientated policing (POP).

## **APPLYING CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY TO THE CASE STUDY OF THE UAE**

In this article, we begin by offering a perspective of crime in the UAE within the context of deterrence and rational choice theory, whilst considering from a situational crime prevention perspective, how factors in the country increase the risks the offender could face in conducting a crime.

### **Legal Framework**

Previous research on the UAE has indicated that there are several factors that impact the low levels of crime in the country, but one of the primary reasons that has been cited is the strong culture of obedience to rules, which is the case regardless of whether they are legal, religious, or social (Al-Shaali, 1999). The UAE has a strong legal framework that incorporates both civil and sharia law that can be flexibly applied dependent on the status of the offender as a citizen, resident, Muslim or non-Muslim. Both legal frameworks provide coercive and non-coercive consequences of crime in the UAE, which operates on a felony / misdemeanor system like that of several western nations. Misdemeanors are punishable either way, by imprisonment of up to three years, a fine, or both (EI-Dakkak, 2014). A felony is much more severe and is punishable by death, perpetual servitude, penal servitude for a term, and reclusion (EI-Dakkak, 2014).

Although the UAE criminal justice system does recognize, advocate for and provide rehabilitative sanctions, it has been suggested that for felony crimes, imprisonment remains the primary consequence of criminal behavior (Al-Shaali, 1999). From the perspective of deterrence and rational choice theory, this increases the deterrent when considering committing a crime as it could be argued that the consequences generally outweigh those seen in many western societies. For example, in nations such as the UK, outcomes such as community orders and suspended sentences are routinely given to offenders for serious crimes and are often criticized due to their reportedly low success rates (Taylor et al, 2008).

Although strict coercive sanctions for felony offences garner the highest publicity in the Arab region they have not been researched and their effectiveness still requires examination as a deterrent. This would complement existing literature, as it would be amiss to suggest that harsh sentences alone act as an effective deterrent as there are numerous examples of countries that retain severe sanctions, such as capital punishment, that have some of the highest prison populations in the world, the United States being an obvious example.



## Law Enforcement

The role of the police in maintaining the low crime rate in the UAE should also not be overlooked. It is difficult to ascertain the true number of police officers in the UAE but if we consider Abu Dhabi as a single case study, recent reporting (Salama, 2018) has indicated that there are approximately 35,000 police officers. With the last population estimate indicating that Abu Dhabi contains approximately 2,908,173 residents this represents one officer for every 83 people. In contrast, the UK has a population just above 68m residents and 135,301 officers, equating to one for every 505 residents. As a result, the scope and breadth of policing is wide, and in theory, means that areas that do suffer from high levels of crime concentration can be afforded significant attention and when needed, enforcement, preventative or disruptive interventions. Such an abundance of police officers significantly enables the deterrent effect as swiftness and certainty are both heightened. As a result, the risk of apprehension when committing crime is significantly enhanced, and as this is supported by robust legal punishments and sanctions, it 'closes the circle' in respect of delivering the key components of deterrence.

Furthermore, the capacity of the police service enables them to deliver high levels of community policing. This has been an ambition of police in the UAE since their inception and it has been highlighted (Al Shehhi, 2018) that in 2008 they were commended by the United Nations as a model for emulation by other nations. Al Shehhi (2018) has outlined how in practice, their capacity enables the police in the UAE to focus significant time and effort on preventative work such as patrolling neighborhoods, engaging with citizens, visiting schools and community groups and readily taking part in National Days and Eid festivals.

Not only is the capacity of the police in the UAE a huge asset, but their capabilities have also risen sharply since their creation just over 60 years ago. Possessing relatively new formal police services compared to countries such as France and the UK, who have had established police institutions for well over 100 years, does bring some advantages. The ability to build from a blank canvas is one, and this has been used to great advantage in the development of the structure of policing within the UAE. For example, only a handful of police services exist that cover each of the Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um al Qawain, Ras al Khaimah, and Fujairah) compared to the UK who possess 43 and the USA where there is reportedly in excess of 15,000 police departments (PDs), made up of around 12,000 local PDs. As a result, many of the inefficiencies this creates, such as problems with sharing information, and incompatible intelligence and criminal record systems are not as prominent. Difficulties encountered in tackling cross border issues such as organized crime, are also likely to be less pronounced. Such a structure likely serves to further increase the risks for those involved in crime, especially cross border criminality, and considering countries such as the UK often revisit the potential for amalgamation of police services, research in the UAE may provide greater evidence of its strengths and weaknesses.

In police services in the UAE there is also a strong culture of developing and adopting best practice, which is evident in the UAE's embracement of new technological approaches to policing. For example, the use of 'big data' and predictive analytics has been used to great effect to direct, task and co-ordinate geographic patrolling since as early as 2015. In contrast, it wasn't until 2017 when the UK's National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC, 2017) sought to truly understand and begin to embrace such approaches. In addition, body worn video has also been widespread for many years (Al-Shehhi, 2018). This falls into a group of tactics that are widespread in the UAE that has led to complete acceptance of security by surveillance (Al-Shehhi, 2018). For example, the use of artificial intelligence to support policing is now commonplace, to the extent that the country boasts an entity specifically focused on this area called the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence. In addition, Abu Dhabi Police has also launched its own specialized AI strategy and the Emirates' 2071 Centennial Plan aims to rely 100% on Artificial Intelligence by 2031 (Al Mazrouei, 2022).

The practical impact of this cultural openness within policing was evident in 2020 when Abu Dhabi Police upgraded all patrol vehicles to include facial recognition technology (Hilotin and Pulikkal, 2021). This is a technology that is now also routinely used on public transport and in public spaces to support policing objectives (Al Shouk, 2019). Further examples of the use of AI can be seen in the creation of the safe city system, which helps support and inform the decision making of the police by integrating data from 44 separate systems to provide real time data analysis that underpins their response to road safety and crises by forecasting future patterns and probability for occurrence of incidents (Al Mazrouei, 2022). Such AI driven systems have achieved a reported predictive accuracy of 98% (Al Mazrouei, 2022) and in doing so reduced incidents by 32%, and improved police response times to under 6 minutes (Al Mazrouei, 2022).

Such initiatives serve to increase the likely apprehension of offenders, and thereby the deterrent effect, but importantly, it also enables the police to prevent crimes from occurring. These developments provide ripe opportunity for research. Not only on how the police have developed and implemented these technologies, which as we have outlined, is already underway, but on the wider societal issues and implications. For instance, studies on the effectiveness of the use of AI and innovation are emerging, but there are few countries that have embraced it as openly. This means that the UAE again offers a beacon of opportunity for studies on the police use of emerging technologies and innovation, and their associated effectiveness as methods of crime control.

Specific areas of interest could include the impact of technology on the perceptions of citizens, as some literature has suggested that intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and automated number plate recognition are welcomed by residents of the UAE (Ekblom et al, 2013), who indicate that it makes them feel

safer (Al Shehhi, 2018). This is in contrast to western societies who often cite human rights infringements as a key consideration (Fussey and Murray, 2019, p5). This is a suggestion also argued by those who believe the identified technologies in the UAE can be used for nefarious reasons, such as monitoring the movements of non-citizens for example (Ziadah, 2021). Such issues are, however, not unique to the UAE with reports from the UK indicating that “it is highly possible that the live facial recognition (LFR) trial process adopted by the metropolitan police service (MPS) would be held unlawful if challenged before the courts” (Fussey and Murray, 2019, p5). This indicates that all police services are wrestling with the issue of balancing justified, and proportionate use of such technologies, and as such, the UAEs extensive implementation will provide a good learning ground if research can be enabled.

To fill this void, research in this area should consider the perspectives of citizens, its application, and of course, how these technologies affect the decision making of potential offenders. In respect of the latter, such technologies are likely to force significant behavioral change upon would be criminals who will find it increasingly difficult to commit crime whilst simultaneously avoiding facial recognition software, automated number plate recognition and extensive application of drone and satellite coverage. All of these technologies will force offenders to adapt or evolve their modus operandi in response to the increased effort to avoid detection, or, simply decide that the effort is not worth the reward for traditional crimes such as robbery and theft, potentially displacing motivated offenders to commit other, harder to detect crimes such as cyber-crimes like fraud or identity theft, a shift witnessed during the coronavirus pandemic of 2020 (Halford, et al, 2020).

### Expatriate Communities

In addition to the deterrent effect presented by the legal framework and policing response, the potential for non-coercive sanctions that reduce the financial, social, and educational opportunity for residents also present a significant influence on the rational assessment of a would-be criminal's decision-making. For instance, in the UAE, the expat community forms approximately 80-90% of residents. The vast majority are authorized to remain on working visas and unemployment is not considered to be a significant issue (Al-Shaali, 1999). As such, their presence in the country is dependent on their adherence to the laws within the UAE. Despite recent changes to the visa system, particularly the introduction of long term ‘golden visas’ that last for up to 10 years, generally, the visa status of entire families as economic migrants is dependent on employment, and this relies on the sponsorship of their employer. Any misdemeanor crime is almost certain to result in withdrawal of employment and/or the resident visa. As such, the lifestyle, financial and educational benefits on offer stand to be lost, regardless of the expat's profession and socioeconomic status. For many low-income migrant workers, this could mean facing returning to often far less favorable conditions in their home nations. This suggestion was supported by a respondent to a non-academic survey in the UAE who stated, “*Such strict rules and fear of being deported and losing jobs prevent people from committing crimes.*” (Ahmad, 2017).

This is not to say that crime does not occur amongst expat communities. Evidence indicates that most violent crime in the country occurs between people of the same expat ethnicities/nationalities, which is due to their physical proximity, resulting in most offences in the UAE being committed by the non-citizen population. In fact, Al-Shaali (1999) has previously identified that the prison population is made up of only 8% citizens, who are predominately those from lower economic status portions of society (Al-Shaali, 1999). Therefore, I suggest the distinct categories of expatriates, their socio-economic characteristics, and physical concentration based on ethnicities/nationalities and socio-economic similarities, all have a significant impact on the geography, types of crime, and significantly, the reporting practices. In respect of the latter, studies have supported this assertion and suggested that most crime occurs in the migrant community and includes minor issues of theft, pickpocketing, and recreational drug use (UAE 2017), but most of these crimes go unreported (Al-Shehhi, 2018).

I therefore suggest that it is the deterrent provided by such informal sanctions that stand to reduce the financial, social and educational opportunity for residents which plays a significant part in influencing the rationalization of both committing and reporting crime. As a result, crime remains introspective, within distinct communities where relatively minor offences are resolved internally or go unreported. To test these hypotheses, I advocate for qualitative studies that explore this area through interviews and surveys with expatriates to better understand how the reward/consequence balance may or may not be a factor in their decisions regarding both the commission and reporting of crime. Research examining the distribution of crime would also help us further understand how crime is spread amongst these unique micro communities and its relationship with the wider social environment.

### Deprivation and Unemployment

When considering decision-making and crime in the UAE, it is also useful to acknowledge that the country also has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world. As a result, those on the desperation threshold are far lower than many nations and this has a significant impact on decision-making (De Courson and Nettle, 2021). Although deprivation itself is not a cause of crime, it is closely correlated and reportedly increases the tendency of criminal behavior (Weber, 2021). It also helps rationalize the commission of crime, especially when the reward is great, and consequences low. As such, in theory, the fewer residents who fall into this

category, the lower potential for crime, especially property offences (Weber, 2021). Studying deprivation and crime within the UAE would again offer unique insights that are yet to be explored, especially as it relates to communities of lower socio-economic status, such as laborers and construction workers.

### Capable Guardianship

In addition to the deterrent impact on financial, social and educational opportunity that may affect offender decision-making, the opportunities for crime in the UAE are also significantly reduced when compared to other nations. If we consider the UAE in the context of routine activity theory, Cohen and Felson (1979) have argued that the presence of a capable guardian offers a significant deterrent to motivated offenders. Felson (1995) has described a capable guardian as anyone who 'keeps an eye on' a potential target of crime. Under this broad definition we can appreciate the breadth of capable guardians within routine society in the UAE.

For instance, it is not unusual to see a capable guardian on every street corner and their crime prevention impact is easy to appreciate. For example, fuel drive-offs from petrol stations are a crime that blights the UK, but not the UAE. These are prevented by the presence of pump attendants in every fuel station whose sole role is to interact with the driver and take, then dispense the fuel order. This process means any person potentially considering driving off without paying for their fuel must navigate direct contact with a capable guardian. Although their likelihood of active intervention is debatable, their omnipresence undoubtedly increases the certainty and swiftness of reporting, and as such, likelihood of apprehension.

Similarly, almost every convenience store, both large and small, has a security guard. This also includes those within shopping malls, which also have a ring of security upon entry. In contrast, in the UK, such levels of security only tend to exist in high-end stores or operate as roaming patrols in shopping centers for example. As a result, offences such as theft, specifically shoplifting is extremely precarious in the UAE as the pure volume of watchful security guards dramatically enhances the risk of detection. This mind-set was also identified during a survey of residents conducted by a news outlet in the country (The National) who quoted one respondent as saying, "If you want to indulge in crime [in Abu Dhabi], security people will stop you because always we are on security radar" (Ahmad, 2017).

Offences that also target the home, most notably burglary, are significantly lower in the UAE as I believe the effort required to commit such crimes, and the risk of apprehension, both key deterrent and preventative elements within criminological theory, are significantly increased. The reasons for this are three-fold. First, many residents in the UAE, especially those living within the cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, live within high-rise apartment buildings. This creates numerous obstacles for a burglar, including the ever-present security on station in almost every entrance, combined with internal CCTV, and a reduction in points of access restricted to a single front door. In addition, many residents often reside within the abundant offerings of gated communities. Again, entrance is through security-operated gates, and streets are patrolled both day and night. Finally, if a burglar is motivated sufficiently to reach a potential target home there is then the likely presence of an occupied residence to overcome. This is because the employment of live-in or daytime staff such as drivers, cleaners, and nannies are extremely common in the UAE by both Emirati citizens and expat families. As a result, it is not uncommon for family homes with young children to be occupied all day (Ekblom et al, 2013) which provides a constant capable guardian deterrent in a multi-layered system of protection. Compared to many other nations, gated communities, live in household staff and private security patrols are forms of guardianship usually reserved for the wealthy, but are commonplace in the UAE.

In contrast, in the UK for example, it is not uncommon for entire streets to be vacant of capable guardians during the day as occupants are at school and work, leaving motivated burglars only needing to find an open window or unlocked door to facilitate an offence. Consider these preventative factors in the context of SCP and it is evident that the seven factors that are often cited as preventing and reducing crime (access and movement, surveillance, structure, ownership, physical protection, activity, and management and maintenance) are practically omnipresent (Ekblom et al, 2013).

A counter argument to this is that not all the guardians outlined here may feel capable of actively intervening if a crime is witnessed, which is a key factor when a guardian is considering intervention (Moir, 2019). As such, many could be described as inhibited guardians, who may possess neither the capability nor willingness to intervene. We should also consider the power-distance dimension of culture that may also factor into the decision making of guardians in the UAE when considering intervention, particularly as it relates to gender, or intervening against Emirati citizens. Both are circumstances that could significantly inhibit a potential guardian's willingness to intervene. Regardless of their motivation to intervene, their simple presence is often enough to heighten perceived risk and act as a deterrent for an offender.

In contrast, the sense of social responsibility, another key factor when a guardian is considering intervention (Moir, 2019) is a virtue widely praised in the UAE. This may serve to shift potential guardians from 'inhibited', into what has been described as a 'monitoring' (Moir, 2019), which involves observing and

reporting, but not directly intervening. Either way, the extensive existence of potential capable guardians in the UAE presents an opportunity to explore this issue further by examining both the deterrent impact on offender decision making, the impact of culture, religion, and demographic status on inhibition of guardians, and fundamentally, how such extensive guardianship is economically enabled and supported.

### **Juvenile Delinquency**

Crime committed by the young is also an area worthy of study in the UAE. Al Kitbi (2010) and Amir (2007) have both highlighted the absence of anti-social tendencies amongst the young, but this has not been studied. Evidence suggests that there is a link between open spaces and lower levels of both violence and crime (Bogar and Beyer, 2015) and this is an area where the UAE has placed significant emphasis. Young residents have ready access to public beaches, parks, and cultural and religious landmarks. In addition, children have an abundance of open spaces such as basketball courts and public parks. This offers residents, especially the young, abundant activities that are open to them, which helps to reduce or prevent issues such as anti-social behavior, which is not a common occurrence in UAE society. This is especially relevant when we consider other countries where the absence of entertainment provided by amenities, social clubs and activities for children are often cited as a factor underpinning the shift towards gang culture amongst the young (Owen and Greeff, 2015).

### **Military Conscription**

Another area worthy of consideration is military conscription. This is mandatory in the UAE for all citizens. Those who fail to enlist for military service without a valid reason before they reach 29 years of age potentially face a jail term of one month, to one year, or a fine (U.A.E, 2022). Although certain research on military conscription has shown that it increases the likelihood of contact with the criminal justice system (Snowden et al, 2017), the prison population figures we outlined earlier suggest this may not be the case in the UAE. In fact, studies on peace time conscription indicate it reduces the likelihood of criminal activity amongst the young (Albæk et al, 2017) which may be a further factor at play in the UAE and again requires examination. The exact nature and volume of crime committed by the young, in the UAE is also unclear. Whether it be high or low, the reasons for this are worthy of exploration and the UAE again offers another area for analysis that interviews and surveys with the young could help to further explore their relationship to crime and identify any preventative mechanisms that may be at play.

### **Climate**

A further environmental factor that cannot be overlooked is the impact of the climate on crime within the UAE. The effect of weather on crime has been examined previously (Cohn, 1990) but it would be inaccurate to consider seasonal changes in climate in Arab context. Instead, in the UAE and wider Arab region, it is the temperature that plays a significant deterrent effect on the commission of crime. In the context of rational choice theory and SCP, the weather alone significantly increases the effort the offender must take to carry out a crime. This is because unlike many nations, the UAE and wider Arab region do not experience the traditional phases of seasons that most Western countries can relate too. Instead, what is experienced is a shift from warm and mild sunshine in the 'winter' to extreme heat in the summer months. Previous research has identified a link between hotter temperature and increases in property crime (Field, 1992), and in hot climates a link between heat aggression (Anderson et al, 1995) and violence has been identified (Bruederle et al, 2017). However, recent research in climates of extreme heat has begun to suggest that there is a threshold (above 30 Celsius) when the effect of heat on violent crime either reduces, or ceases to occur (Stevens et al, 2019). The UAE surpasses this threshold significantly as one of the hottest countries in the world, where in the summer it has an average temperature of 35.5 Celsius. This is extraordinarily hot and daytime temperatures routinely exceed 40 Celsius. In these months, it is striking how vacant the streets and open spaces are completely absent of people as the heat becomes unbearable, meaning individuals rarely stray far from air-conditioned buildings. The intuitive impact of this suggests it is likely to be a further factor that reduces the motivation of offenders, especially those involved in property related crimes that require a level of outdoor activity such as burglary, theft and robbery. It is also likely to reduce the availability of potential targets, especially in public areas as residents choose to stay within air-conditioned homes or public buildings such as shopping malls or other attractions. With all the aforementioned factors in mind, the link between extreme heat and crime is a further area where the UAE provides a unique setting for research.

### **Alcohol and Crime**

Alcohol is often highly correlated to the commission of crime, particularly violent crime. Martin (2001) has argued that the link between alcohol and violent crime such as assault and murder is extremely strong, with as much as 40% of such crimes being committed whilst under the influence of alcohol. Although the UAE has recently changed its laws in relation to alcohol consumption, until 2020 residents required a license to possess and consume alcohol, and it was only permitted to be sold by specialized stores or licensed public venues such as hotels and restaurants. In certain Emirates (Sharjah), the sale and consumption of alcohol still remains illegal. As such, the widespread use, and importantly, misuse of alcohol in the country appears to be very rare outside of cosmopolitan zones such as Dubai and coincidentally, the number of people who



consume alcohol is likely to be much lower than many other nations. This reduces the possibility of subsequent violent behavior committed whilst under its influence (Lipsey et al, 2002). This is especially true given the Islamic status of the country where regardless of laws, it understandably has a lower level of cultural acceptance. Therefore, the UAE again provides fertile ground for studying potential links between legal, and cultural alcohol control and its effect on crime, especially as the country transitions towards less restrictive controls.

### **Culture and Religion**

Finally, in addition to the high levels of capable guardianship and other factors in play within the UAE, the role of culture and religion are two further factors worthy of mention due to the potential criminogenic impact on offending. From the perspective of SCP, reward, removal of excuses and provocation, all form key elements that impact the commission of crime. Research has suggested that there does exist an association between religious spirituality and lower levels of substance misuse (Chitwood et al, 2008) and crime. Al-Shaali (1999) has argued that evidence has shown that adherence to religious guidance also enhances social restraint and reduces the likelihood of committing certain forms of crime due to the acceptance and obedience of both religious and culturally influenced social norms (Al-Shaali, 1999). In addition, Al-Shaali (1999) argues that when faced with periods of deprivation or challenge, that an 'absolute' faith in God provides the fulfilment required, preventing struggling residents turning to crime as a solution.

Although not all the population in the UAE is religious, some reports suggest as much as 76% identify as Muslim, with the remainder being a range of other religions and only 125,000 atheists or agnostics (United States Department of State, 2021). Fernando and Jackson (2006) have previously suggested that the influence of Islam is one of the key factors that helps the UAE create and maintain its low crime rates. As a result, it has been argued that the population of the UAE is both socially and politically conservative, further restraining involvement in crime (Bristol-Rhys, 2016).

Considering the culture within the UAE, Ekblom (2013) outlines how the sense of family and group cohesion within Islamic communities has a strong positive influence over residents and citizens, the young particularly. As a result, they are much more likely to prioritize loyalty and support of family members over friends and other commitments (Stevens and Nydell, 2006), leaving less time to 'go astray' or commit crime, as the sense of moral responsibility is greater (Al-Shaali, 1999). Al-Shaali (1999) has also argued that when faced with tough times people of the UAE look to rely on family or historical tribal bonds (Al-Shaali, 1999), further reducing the need to pursue reward through crime.

Feghali (1997) has also argued that crimes that occur due to close contact between people are also less likely in Arab nations such as the UAE as there is a far higher tolerance level for overcrowding and infringement on personal space. It has been suggested that this is borne from the Bedouin culture, (2011) and that Emiratis are 'touchy' people, which encourages closer relations and removes rationalization and provocation of crime (Naffis-Sahely, 2017). This is relevant when considering crimes such as assault that can often occur after breaches of personal space, such as pushing and shoving in crowded environments leading to an assault for example. The true impact of the religious and cultural deflationary factors within the UAE are unclear, and it presents another area of criminological study that could be enhanced by research in this unique setting.

To conclude, we suggest that the UAE possesses a powerful combination of legal, policing, economical, situational, social, environmental, and cultural characteristics that serve to deliver what Clarke (1997) has argued as a diffusion of benefits that have a cumulative affect beyond their targeted settings, and together create one of the safest countries in the world.

### **CONCLUSION**

In this perspective article, an examination regarding policing and crime in the UAE is offered. It is suggested that the country deserves its label as one of the safest in the world and it is proposed that it has achieved this in part by maximizing the deterrent effect of its existing systems, a diffusion of benefit from capable guardianship, openness to new ways of working, and embracing technology. In addition, the UAEs unique economic, environmental, social, religious, and cultural landscape all provide additional levers that serve to influence offender decision making and deflate crime levels. They do this in ways that do not widely exist together in many other nations. Finally, we propose that the UAE and wider Arab region offers an environment that is ripe for criminological, policing and security research. Pursuing this with vigor will enable a deeper understanding of if, and how the proposed conditions play their role as I suggest, and in doing so, add valuable literary research that does not presently exist.

### **Acknowledgements**

No acknowledgements

### **Financial Support**

No financial support was received for this article.

## References

1. Albæk, K., Leth-Petersen, S., Le Maire, D., & Tranæs, T. (2017). Does peacetime military service affect crime?. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 119(3), 512-540.
2. Abdulla, J., Djebarni, R., & Mellahi, K. (2011). Determinants of job satisfaction in the UAE: A case study of the Dubai police. *Personnel review*.
3. Alam, E. (2022). Enhancing the policing response to COVID-19 with media engagement: The United Arab Emirates experience. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 311-324.
4. Al Dhanhani, M. A., & Al Naqbi, S. (2022). Identifying Enablers and Obstacles for Knowledge Management in a Police Organization: Case Study of Abu Dhabi Police. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 270-281.
5. Al Hanaee, M., & Davies, A. (2022). Influencing Police and Community Relations in Abu Dhabi with a Soft Power Approach during COVID-19. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 249-259.
6. Al Kaabi, F. (2022). Building resilience: a case study of occupational factors influencing levels of 'happiness' for Abu Dhabi police officers. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 296-310.
7. Al Manhali, A. H., Al Kaabi, F., & Al Hanaee, M. (2022). We Are All Police—Abu Dhabi Police Community Engagement Initiative. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 236-248.
8. Almehiri, A. M. O., AlSuwaidi, M. A. A. A., Almarri, M. T. R., Rashid, J. M. A., & Sharma, B. K. (2019). A Complicated Murder Case Solved with the Aid of Fingerprints. *International Journal on Emerging Technologies*, 10(3), 306-310.
9. Almuhairi, K. (2013, March). Dubai Police: Strategic Ontological Police Force Knowledge Management Framework (SOPFKMf). In UKAIS (p. 41).
10. Al Mutawa, N., Bryce, J., Franqueira, V. N., & Marrington, A. (2015, August). Behavioural evidence analysis applied to digital forensics: an empirical analysis of child pornography cases using P2P networks. In 2015 10th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (pp. 293-302). IEEE.
11. Al Mutawa, N., Bryce, J., Franqueira, V. N., Marrington, A., & Read, J. C. (2019). Behavioural digital forensics model: Embedding behavioural evidence analysis into the investigation of digital crimes. *Digital Investigation*, 28, 70-82.
12. Al Mutawa, N., Bryce, J., Franqueira, V. N., & Marrington, A. (2016). Forensic investigation of cyberstalking cases using behavioural evidence analysis. *Digital investigation*, 16, S96-S103.
13. Al Obaidli, H. Y., & Iqbal, A. (2011, December). Digital forensics education in UAE. In 2011 International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (pp. 766-770). IEEE.
14. Alosani, M. S. (2019). The effect of continuous improvement tools on organizational performance of the Dubai police: the mediating role of innovation culture. *Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia*.
15. Alosani, M. S., Yusoff, R. Z., Al-Ansi, A. A., & Al-Dhaafri, H. S. (2020). The mediating role of innovation culture on the relationship between Six Sigma and organisational performance in Dubai police force. *International Journal of Lean Six Sigma*, 12(2), 368-398.
16. Al-Shaali, K. R. M. (1999). Crime control, policing and security in the United Arab Emirates (Doctoral dissertation, Aberystwyth University).
17. Al Shamsi, A. S., & Davies, A. (2022). Smart policing: Abu Dhabi police AI/GPS-based initiative to reduce heavy vehicle driver violations. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 260-269.
18. Al-Shehhi, M. (2018). A criminological critique of body worn cameras in policing: the case of the United Arab Emirates. *University of Salford (United Kingdom)*.
19. AlSuwaidi, M. A. A. A., Almehiri, A. M. O., Almarri, M. T. R., Rashid, J. M. A., & Sharma, B. K. (2020). Significance Of Fingerprints In A Brutal Travel Bag Murder-A Case Report. *Medico-Legal Update*, 20(1), 393.
20. Al Shouk, a. (2019, May 5). How Dubai's AI cameras helped arrest 319 suspects last year. *Gulf News*. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from <https://gulfnews.com/amp/uae/how-dubais-ai-cameras-helped-arrest-319-suspects-last-year-1.62750675>
21. Al-Shaali, K. (1999). Crime control, policing and security in the United Arab Emirates.
22. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from: [https://pure.aber.ac.uk/portal/files/28897732/247414\\_1\\_.pdf](https://pure.aber.ac.uk/portal/files/28897732/247414_1_.pdf)
23. Ali, W. (2015). Big Data-Driven Smart Policing: Big Data Based Patrol Car Dispatching. *Journal of Geotechnical and Transportation Engineering*, 1.
24. Al Kitbi A, 2010, Youth and Crime: A Field Study. Sharjah: Police Research Centre.
25. Alomosh, A. F. (2009). Victims of crime in the United Arab Emirates. *Social Behavior and Personality: an International Journal*, 37(7), 971-975. <https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2009.37.7.971>
26. Alosani, M. S. (2020). Case example of the use of six sigma and kaizen projects in policing services. *Teaching Public Administration*, 38(3), 333-345. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0144739420921932>
27. Alshehhi, M. (2018). A criminological critique of body worn cameras in policing: The case of the united arab emirates (thesis). *School of Health and Society University of Salford*.
28. Amir Q, 2007, Security Statistics Indications and Comparisons in Sharjah City, Sharjah: Police Research Centre.
29. Anderson, C. A., Deuser, W. E., & DeNeve, K. M. (1995). Hot temperatures, hostile affect, hostile cognition, and arousal: Tests of a general model of affective aggression. *Personality and Social Psychology*

- Bulletin, 21(5), 434–448. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167295215002>
30. Apel, R., & DeWitt, S. E. (2018). Informal and formal sanctions. *Deterrence, Choice and Crime: Contemporary Perspectives*. NY, New York: Routledge, 139–156.)
  31. Beccaria, Cesare. 1764 (1963). *On Crimes and Punishments*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill.
  32. Binsubaih, A., Maddock, S., & Romano, D. (2006). A serious game for traffic accident investigators. *Interactive Technology and Smart Education*.
  33. Bogar, S., & Beyer, K. M. (2015). Green space, violence, and crime. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse*, 17(2), 160–171. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838015576412>
  34. Bradford, B., Jackson, J., & Hough, M. (2014). Police legitimacy in action. *Oxford Handbooks Online*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.013.002>
  35. Braithwaite, J. (1975). Population growth and crime. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 8(1), 57–60.
  36. Bristol-Rhys, J (2016) *Emirati Women: Generations of Change*, Hurst and Co, NY.
  37. Bruederle, A., Peters Jörg, & Roberts, G. (2017). Weather and crime in South Africa. RWI Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.
  38. Bryden, A., Roberts, B., Petticrew, M., & McKee, M. (2013). A systematic review of the influence of community level social factors on alcohol use. *Health & Place*, 21, 70–85. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2013.01.012>
  39. Carr, P. J., Napolitano, L., & Keating, J. (2007). We never call the cops and here is why: A qualitative examination of legal cynicism in three Philadelphia neighborhoods. *Criminology*, 45(2), 445–480. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2007.00084.x>
  40. Chitwood, D. D., Weiss, M. L., & Leukefeld, C. G. (2008). A systematic review of recent literature on religiosity and substance use. *Journal of Drug Issues*, 38(3), 653–688. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002204260803800302>
  41. Choi, C. W., Khajavy, G. H., Raddawi, R., & Giles, H. (2019). Perceptions of police-civilian encounters: Intergroup and communication dimensions in the United Arab Emirates and the USA. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, 12(1), 82–104.
  42. Chu, D. C., & Abdulla, M. M. (2014). Self-efficacy beliefs and preferred gender role in policing: An examination of policewomen's perceptions in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. *British journal of criminology*, 54(3), 449–468.
  43. Clarke, R. V. (1980). "situational" crime prevention: Theory and practice. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 20(2), 136–147. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a047153>
  44. Clarke, R. V. (1997). *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*. Criminal Justice Press.
  45. Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling offenders' decisions: A framework for research and policy. *Crime and Justice*, 6, 147–185. <https://doi.org/10.1086/449106>
  46. Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44(4), 588. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2094589>
  47. Cohn, E. G. (1990). Weather and crime. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 30(1), 51–64. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a047980>
  48. Davies, A., & Al Sharefeen, R. (2022). Educating Future Police Professionals Amid Covid-19 a UAE Perspective. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 282–295.
  49. Davis, R. C., & Henderson, N. J. (2003). Willingness to report crimes: The role of ethnic group membership and community efficacy. *Crime & Delinquency*, 49(4), 564–580. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128703254418>
  50. De Courson, B., & Nettle, D. (2020). Why do inequality and deprivation produce high crime and low trust? <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/p2aed>
  51. Eck, J. E., & Weisburd, D. (1995). Crime Places in Crime Theory. In J. E. Eck & D. Weisburd (Eds.). *Crime and Place: Crime Prevention Studies*, 4, 1–33.
  52. Ekblom, P., Armitage, R., Monchuk, L., & Castell, B. (2013). Crime prevention through environmental design in the United Arab Emirates: A suitable case for reorientation? *Built Environment*, 39(1), 92–113. <https://doi.org/10.2148/benv.39.1.92>
  53. Feghali, E. (1997). Arab cultural communication patterns. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 21(3), 345–378. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767\(97\)00005-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767(97)00005-9)
  54. Felson, M. (1995). Those who discourage crime. In J. Eck & D. Weisburd (Eds.), *Crime and Place: Crime Prevention Studies* (Vol. 4, pp. 53–66). essay.
  55. Felson, M. (2006). *Crime and nature*. Sage Publications.
  56. Fernando, M and Jackson, B (2006) The influence of religion-based workplace spirituality in business leaders' decision making: an inter-faith study, University of Wollongong, Faculty of Wollongong, working papers, 12,1, 23-39
  57. Field, S. (1992). The effect of temperature on crime. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 32(3), 340–351. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a048222>
  58. Fussey, P., & Murray, D. (2019). Independent report on the London Metropolitan Police Service's trial of live facial recognition technology.
  59. Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabularies Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS). (2020). An

- inspection of the service provided to victims of crime by Greater Manchester Police. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-the-service-provided-to-victims-of-crime-by-greater-manchester-police.pdf>
59. Hilotin, J., & Pulikkal, V. (2021, March 13). UAE approves facial recognition in some key sectors: How the technology is Changing Our World. Special-reports – Gulf News. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from <https://gulfnews.com/special-reports/uae-approves-facial-recognition-in-some-key-sectors-how-the-technology-is-changing-our-world-1.1613489780323>
  60. Hurriez SH, 2011, *Folklore and Folklife in the UAE*, Routledge, NY.
  60. Jones, J. S., Alexander, C., Wynn, B. N., Rossman, L., & Dunnuck, C. (2009). Why women don't report sexual assault to the police: The influence of psychosocial variables and traumatic injury. *The Journal of Emergency Medicine*, 36(4), 417–424. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemermed.2007.10.077>
  61. Juma, A. A. Z. O., Perumal, P. A., & Mansoor, N. (2022). Exploratory Analysis of Risk Management Process of UAE Police Department. *International Journal of Sustainable Construction Engineering and Technology*, 13(4), 30-43.
  62. Khalaf Al Mazrouei, F. (2022). Abu Dhabi Police... A Modern Vision that Keeps Pace with Development and Future Foreseeing. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 16(2), 233-235.
  63. Kennedy, K. C. (1983). A critical appraisal of criminal deterrence theory. *Dick. L. Rev.*, 88, 1.
  64. Laycock, G. (2013). Preventing crime in the United Arab Emirates. *Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention*, 25–32. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3_4)
  65. Lipsey, M. W., Wilson, D. B., Cohen, M. A., & Derzon, J. H. (2002). Is there a causal relationship between alcohol use and violence? Recent Developments in Alcoholism, 245–282. [https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47141-8\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47141-8_14)
  66. Martin, S. E. (2001). The links between alcohol, crime and the criminal justice system: Explanations, evidence and interventions. *American Journal on Addictions*, 10(2), 136–158. <https://doi.org/10.1080/105504901750227796>
  67. Moir, E., Hart, T. C., Reynald, D. M., & Stewart, A. (2019). Typologies of suburban guardians: understanding the role of responsibility, opportunities, and routine activities in facilitating surveillance. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, 21(1), 1-21.
  68. Na, T. (2022). Anti-money laundering regulation of cryptocurrency: UAE and global approaches. *Journal of Money Laundering Control*. (ahead-of-print).
  69. Naffis-Sahely A, (2017) *The Promised Land: Poems from Itinerant Life*, Penguin, Harmsworth
  70. National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). (2017). Better understanding demand policing the future. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from: <https://www.npcc.police.uk/2017%20FOI/CO/078%2017%20CCC%20April%202017%2024%20Better%20Understanding%20Demand%20Policing%20the%20Future.pdf>
  71. Owen, M., & Greeff, A. P. (2015). Factors attracting and discouraging adolescent boys in high-prevalence communities from becoming involved in gangs. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 15(1), 1-32.
  72. Paternoster, R. (2019). How much do we really know about criminal deterrence? In *Deterrence* (pp. 57-115). Routledge.
  73. Rengifo, A. F., Slocum, L. A., & Chillar, V. (2019). From impressions to intentions: Direct and indirect effects of police contact on willingness to report crimes to law enforcement. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 56(3), 412–450. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427818817338>
  74. Salama, S. (2018, November 7). UAE police forces to become community police. *Government: Gulf News*. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-police-forces-to-become-community-police-1.2207110>
  75. Shaali, A., Rashid, K., & Kibble, N. (2000). Policing and police accountability in the UAE: The case for reform. *Arab LQ*, 15, 272.
  76. Snowden, D. L., Oh, S., Salas-Wright, C. P., Vaughn, M. G., & King, E. (2017). Military service and crime: New evidence. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology*, 52(5), 605-615.
  77. Stevens, P., & Nydell, M. K. (1989). *Understanding Arabs: A guide for Westerners*. *The Modern Language Journal*, 73(3), 348. <https://doi.org/10.2307/327016>
  78. Taylor, S., Mair, G., & Cross, N. (2008). The community order and the suspended sentence order: the views and attitudes.
  79. Tolley, G. (2021, October 30). Abu Dhabi named World's safest city in 2021 safety index.
  80. The National. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/abu-dhabi-named-world-s-safest-city-in-2021-safety-index-1.1152708>
  81. UAE Justice and Vision, 2021, Dubai, UAE
  81. Webber, C. (2021). Rediscovering the relative deprivation and crime debate: Tracking its fortunes from left realism to the Precariat. *Critical Criminology*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-021-09554-4>
  82. Yoon, S. (n.d.). *Why Do Victims Not Report?: The Influence of Police and Criminal Justice Cynicism on the Dark Figure of Crime*. (Thesis). Retrieved January 6, 2022, from [https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2209&context=gc\\_etds](https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2209&context=gc_etds)
  83. Ziadah, R. (2021). Surveillance, race, and social sorting in the United Arab Emirates. *Politics*, 02633957211009719.