Appropriating Heidegger's Philosophy Of Dwelling In The Cordillera's Concept Of Ancestral Domain

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
	Culture, in its broadest definition, refers to the entirety of human thoughts, behaviors, and the products of human activities that prompts one to consider within the context of the "hermeneutic turn." This study's primary objective was to provide light on Martin Heidegger's concept of dwelling and to investigate the ways in which it may be appropriated within the Cordillera culture mentality of ancestral domain. The research was carried out utilizing three distinct methodologies: the descriptive qualitative method, the cultural phenomenological method, and the hermeneutical method. These three methodological techniques were utilized in order to conduct the analysis on the data that was provided. A structure of *Dasein* that is ontico-ontological is the concept of dwelling that was developed by Martin Heidegger. When it comes to existing in the world, *Dasein's* method of being is known as dwelling. The collecting of the four-fold element of earth, sky, human people, and a sense of spiritual reverence, which collectively represent higher realities, is a necessary step in the process. Because it both supports and reflects a person's and a group's specific manner of "being-in-the-world," the physical environment as well as the cultural dimensions is an extremely important factor. Ancestral domain as a certain embodied grasp of the world, a certain orientation that reveals qualities of a culture mentality, is one of the characteristics that constitutes the built environment. This releasing, sparing, and preserving mentality that is associated with dwelling is what makes it necessary to have an ethical obligation. **Keywords:** dwelling, hermeneutic analysis, Cordilleran culture mentality, ancestral domain

Introduction

The philosopher Martin Heidegger is often regarded as one of the most significant thinkers of the twentieth century. According to Dreyfus and Wrathal (2005), his work has been stolen by academics working in a wide variety of subjects, including but not limited to philosophy, psychology, literature, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, religious studies, and cultural studies. This is because of the so-called "hermeneutic turn," which, according to Sampaio (2005) and Hoy (1993), has an impact that extends beyond the confines of any academic discipline and encompasses the entirety of the field of human sciences. In the field of hermeneutics, the interpreter is responsible for bringing the path of comprehension to a new horizon and, in addition, leaving it open to further creation in the future (Casambre, 2010). His approach serves as a new framework in the growth of knowledge because it penetrates to the question of human life and existence, which can be traced back to the declaration made by Socrates: "Know thyself." Keeping in mind Heidegger's philosophical duty on the topic of Being, his method serves as a new framework. As Luijpen (1965) puts it, we return to the concept of the unity of reciprocal implication within the subject and meaning. Heidegger refers to the self as belonging to the domain of "being-there," and the self is not a single Cartesian ego; rather, the self's matrix is spatio-temporal. Within the framework of the local, the social, and the historical, it is possible to understand it. The *Dasein* is the self that he considers to be.

As a result of this knowledge of *Dasein*, one is able to engage in thinking that is concerned with the ontological possibility of existence: "What does it mean to be?" In order to take on this challenge, one must not only think for the sake of thinking, but also begin from the very circumstance itself, the "open region," or

the "clearing," as Heidegger refers to it, which is something that a person encounters in their day-to-day life. Dasein is forced to address the question of existence and meaning, as well as the question of what it means to be. The actuality of culture is a concrete "open region." According to Bunnin and Yu (2004), culture is defined as the ways of living, as well as the tools, symbols, practices, and beliefs that are typical of a certain historical group of people. Culture is another term that can be used to describe the set of beliefs and practices that are unique to a particular culture. The phrase "the consciousness of a society" is what this amounts to. The term "culture" can be understood in its broadest definition to refer to the entirety of human thinking, behaviors, and the outcomes of human activity. According to the aforementioned perspective, culture is a fundamental problem that compels us to engage in thought within the context of the "hermeneutic turn." At the same time that cultural activity is permeating the hermeneutic process, it is simultaneously unsettling and reinventing the established systems that are found within culture. Sampaio (2005) refers to this concept as the cultural paradigm, which is a hermeneutic framework for understanding culture.

A novel approach to comprehending cultural phenomena is provided by this cultural paradigm, which makes use of Heidegger's hermeneutic system. According to Sampaio (2005), it poses a challenge to the foundationalist and universalist perspectives, which say that culture is a search for objectivity and universalism of human experience. As an overall explanation of whatever is going on in various cultures, these perspectives merit a privileged standpoint. However, in actuality, cultural change is a process that is ongoing, which explains why there is cultural change.

The function of the human agency, also known as *Dasein*, is at stake in the process of cultural transformation, both on an individual and a collective level. This is due to the fact that *Dasein* is the most knowledgeable person who resides in and interprets his culture. For the purpose of survival, the person who is deeply interested in his area will be the one to decide what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. The challenge of change, stability, adaptation and sustainability, as well as cultural identity, is a part of the ocean of options that the *Dasein* needs to determine in the "open region." Other possibilities include cultural identity.

Those are the things that people treasure, that they regard as valuable, and that they have passed down from one generation to the next. Instances that explain their being geniuses that have stood the test of time include their lavish and elaborate rice terraces, the space designs of their settlements, their socio-political institutions, their cosmology, and their intimate openness to their god as manifested in their literature through oral tradition. All of these things are remarkable. These factors contributed to the improvement of their individual, family, and tribe lives, as well as their commercial engagements with other indigenous communities.

Statement of the Problem

This study's primary objective was to provide light on Martin Heidegger's concept of dwelling and to investigate the ways in which it may be appropriated within the Cordillera culture mentality of ancestral domain. During the beginning stages of the research project, the researcher was tasked with the responsibility of locating this link and rapport.

This requisite of the study was accomplished through the following sub-problems.

1. What is Martin Heidegger's concept of dwelling?
2. How can the concept of Heidegger's dwelling be appropriated in the Cordillera culture mentality of ancestral domain?

Methodology

The research was conducted using three different approaches: descriptive qualitative, cultural phenomenological, and hermeneutical methods of research. The data that was supplied was analyzed using these three methodological approaches.

In the first place, the descriptive qualitative approach focused on the textual analysis of Martin Heidegger's fundamental texts, which proved to be quite helpful in shedding light on the subject of the study. It made use of writings by Martin Heidegger as well as works on him.

Discussions of Results and Findings

Understanding the Concept of Dwelling

One of the topics that Martin Heidegger (1996) addresses in his magnum opus Being and Time (BT), particularly in the fundamental analysis of *Dasein*, is dwelling. This is one of the subjects that he discusses implicitly by mentioning it. The residence of *Dasein* is an ontico-ontological structure that is entirely complete and unbroken from the beginning. With subsequent papers and speeches, he went on to develop it further as a fundamental issue. His idea of habitation, its relationship to caring, and its connection to the philosophy of culture are all discussed in this chapter from his point of view. Within the first place, dwelling is elaborated as *being-in-the-world*, as building, as liberating sparing conserving, and as the simple oneness of the fourfold (mortals, earth, sky, and divinities). Second, it is further discussed as a step back to Heidegger's concept of care (*Sorge*) with his thoughts on facticity, existentiality, authenticity, and sociality in

order to demonstrate the grounding and coherence of his later thought to his previous work from the beginning. Third, within the context of appropriation, dwelling is investigated in relation to its practical implications through the utilization of hermeneutic circles and cultural phenomenology as a framework.

A. The Concept of Dwelling
Building Dwelling Thinking" and "Poetically Man Dwells" are the titles of two essays that Heidegger wrote about dwelling. Building Dwelling Thinking (notice the absence of commas) was designed to enforce the identification of the three members of the group, according to Hofstadter (2001), who provides a preface to the project. Throughout his work, Heidegger develops the fundamental continuity of being, building, dwelling, and consciousness. *bauen*, which means "to build," is connected to *buan*, which means "to dwell," as well as to *bin*, *bist*, which are the words for "be." Language is what forms the connection for us. The use of language teaches us that to be a human being is to reside on earth as a mortal, to take up residence, and to engage in the "building" that is associated with dwelling. It involves cultivating things that are growing, constructing things that are built, and doing all of this within the context of mortals who are living on earth and cherishing it, looking up at the sky and to the gods in order to determine the size of their habitation. If man's existence is dwelling, and if man must look to the way the world fits together to establish the measure by which he can decide his dwelling life, then he must dwell poetically. It is inevitable that man will dwell poetically.

Aesthetics, poets who lived in the annals of history, or the artistic process of writing a poem are not relevant to the concept of poetic dwelling. Poetic dwelling is the process of combining thinking with the act of making meaning of one's human life. Language is the medium through which thinking is expressed and structured. It serves as the creative source of the humaneness that is present in the life of man who resides in the world, and it is an essential function for human life. Through the process of thinking through the fundamental creative function, which derives its creativeness from its willingness to pause, listen, hear, remember, and answer to the call that originates from Being, Heidegger uses his creative abilities. According to Hofstadter (2001), one definition of thinking is "to dwell," "to open up," and "to do something of the dimensions of our life."

1. Existence as a means of being in the world
The fundamental concept of residence, as it was used by Martin Heidegger in his later philosophy, continues to speak to being in the world, albeit with some qualifications that are more inclusive. Human beings, in their capacity as dwellers, are never directly present in the world, the only exception being when they are in certain specific conditions. *Dasein* is the concept that represents being present in the world (Dreyfus, 1995). World, as it is portrayed in Being and Time, does not merely refer to the conventional concept of a place where we dwell. Our habitat, our place of employment, and even our mental and psychological space are examples of places that offer a superficial sense of meaning regarding the function that the world plays in the life of the human being. Unless otherwise specified, this is considered to mean that the hyphen is not present in the world. More fundamental than that is the fact. According to Bunnin and Yu (2004), the fact that *Dasein* perceives itself to be present in the world does not imply that it is physically confined inside the world. In this usage, the term "world" does not relate to the universe or the relationships between actual things; rather, it is an existential-ontological concept that refers to the historical and cultural circumstances in which *Dasein* is generated and exists. This universe is not only external, but it also belongs to *Dasein's* own structure. To put it another way, this world is. Given that *Dasein* is a being-there, it must have a location. Through the use of this word, Heidegger emphasized the inseparability of the human being from the world (See BT 1996:60-61) and he was in opposition to the conventional approach that views a human being as an independent subjectivity.

Being-in-the-world, separated by a hyphen, is the fundamental constitution of *Dasein*. In his explanation, Heidegger (BT 1996:50) says that the compound expression *"being-in-the-world"* shows that it speaks for a coherent phenomenon. The goal was not simply to come up with new terminology for the sake of coming up with new terms; rather, it was to dig up a new ontological insight while moving away from traditional metaphysics.

While *being-in-the-world* cannot be broken up into components that may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive structural factors... *in-the-world* means, we have the task of questioning the ontological structure of "world" and of defining the idea of worldliness as such... *being* means we are looking for what we are questioning when we ask about the "who?" We determine who is in the mode of average everydayness of *Da-sein... being-in* is existential. "In" stems from *innan-*, to live, *habitare*, **to dwell**. "An" means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of something. It has the meaning of *colo* in the sense of *habito* and *diligo*. We characterize this being to whom being-in belongs in this meaning as the being which I myself always am. The expression "*bin*" is connected with "*bei*". "*Ich bin* (I am) means **I dwell**, I stay near... the world as something familiar in such and such a way. Being as the infinitive of "I am": that is, understood as an existential, means to dwell near..., to be familiar with...*Being is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Da-sein* which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world (BT 1996:51).

Dreyfus (1995) makes the observation that "inhabiting" is a style of *being-in* that might be referred to as "being-in-the-world." Whenever human beings inhabit something, that thing ceases to be an object and

instead becomes a part of them. This transformation also permeates their relationship to other things in the world. "Dwelling" is the term that both Heidegger and Michael Polanyi use to describe this form of dwelling. According to Polanyi (1964), humans are able to become immersed in their language; they experience a sense of belonging inside it and are able to relate to both objects and other people through it. According to Heidegger, the same is true for the world. *Dasein's* primary mode of being in the world is through the act of dwelling. When viewed through the lens of the relationship between subject and object, the relationship that exists between a person and the environment in which he lives cannot be comprehended. From an anthropological point of view, Heidegger does not have any contentions regarding the existence of the physical world. In his writing, he places a greater emphasis on the "world" of man (*Dasein*), which is constantly active. *Dasein*, which translates to "man," is outside himself and exists in the universe of his concerns. Therefore, the world is because *Dasein* is the one who created it. The presence of man is the only thing that gives the planet any significance. One example of a distinction that might be made is between the description of a house and that of a home. From Heidegger's perspective, the term "world" refers to the world in the sense of "the world of the artist," "the world of the priest," and "the world of the musician." It is evident that none of these worlds would exist if Dasein were not there (Aquino, 2001). In his later writings, on the other hand, *Being-in-the-world* is revealed to have a greater number of consequences about the manner in which *Dasein* behaves. Due to the fact that the ontological structure has already been thoroughly demonstrated in the first division of Being and Time, the significance of this structure is no longer emphasized. Because of this, *Dasein* is no longer the main attraction. Simply due to the fact that they are a part of the day-to-day worries of *Dasein*, there is an acknowledgment of the significance of the physical world of nature and the presence of Other *Daseins*. According to Heidegger, living is a mode of residing on the earth that creates a clearing in which individual things are able to "gather" the world around them into a coherent whole. This clearing is referred to as a "region" or a "play of time-space" (Guignon, 1993:33). It has come to be understood that the *Dasein's* world encompasses the physical environment in which *Dasein* is situated in a very specific space and time, the construction of this physical world that *Dasein* fashions, the manner in which Dasein interacts with it, and simply the *Dasein* as a reference to the straightforward oneness of the fourfold, which consists of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. In Heidegger's view, the world encompasses everything in its path. This is something that people are completely engrossed in, and after all, how could they possibly be anyplace else? The concept of a *Lebenswelt*, often known as a life-world, was something that Husserl had previously discussed (Husserl, 1970) in order to emphasize the solidity of the human capsule within reality. The 'grounding' that Heidegger provided, on the other hand, was more comprehensive (Hornsby, 2011). In his use of the term *"Dasein,"* Heidegger drew attention to the fact that a human being cannot be considered in any other way than as an entity that exists in the middle of the world, among other things (Warnock, 1970). "To be there" is what *dasein* means, and "there" refers to the world. According to Steiner (1978), humanity is defined as the state of being fixed, embedded, and immersed in the concrete, tangible world of day-to-day life.

2. Dwelling as Building

Martin Heidegger explores the etymological definition of dwelling and building in his essay titled "Building Dwelling Thinking," which was initially given at a convention for builders. In this article, Heidegger reclaims the deeper meaning of the word. Following that, he provides an additional elaboration on them within the context of the degree of thinking (Johnson, 2000).

"What is it to dwell?" and "How does building belong to dwelling?" Heidegger defines, the Old English and High German word for building, *buan*, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb *bauen*, namely, to dwell, has been lost to us. But a covert trace of it has been preserved in the German word *neahgebur*; *neah*, near, and *gebur*, dweller. The *Nachbar* is the *Nachgebur*, the *Nachgebauer*, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby. The verbs *buri, buren, beuren, beuron*, all signify dwelling, the abode, the place of dwelling. Now to be sure the old *buan* not only tells us that *bauen*, to build, is really to dwell (Heidegger, 2001:144-145).

His concept of dwellings and building does not refer to an art or a technique of architectural designs and constructions, but rather "to the domain to which everything that is belongs," he warns in a solemn manner. The construction of a dwelling is the sole way to acquire a dwelling. One could also say that building and dwelling are two sides of the same coin. This is because the act of building is synonymous with the act of dwelling, which indicates that in order to have a dwelling, one must construct something. Nevertheless, it is regarded to be a type of being within itself. The modalities of presence and activity of a person who always resides in a place and space and within a place and space are referred to as dwelling and constructing, according to Heidegger (2001).

Individuals are able to comprehend and, to a certain extent, predict everything that may occur to them since they are a part of the world in which they live. Through this process, they acquire the ability to organize the items in their environment in accordance with their significance, value, and understanding. Because of this, the landscape and everything else in the environment become natural emblems of the people's lived history. This is because the experiences of the people are encapsulated in it. In addition, residence is not the same thing as living alone; rather, it is the act of living with other people who are considered to be neighbors.

Heidegger (2001) asserts that individuals engage in activities within this geographical setting, so becoming a component of the worlds of other people. The human way of life on earth is inextricably linked to residence, as he stated more than once. Thinking or reflecting on one's position in the world and determining one's actions within that context is what it is to be human. Humans are primarily able to relate to their surroundings through the act of dwelling, which involves both the engagement of mind and the use of action. The way that they are on earth is the way that they are. The existence of humans on earth is referred to as *buan*, which means residence. This is the "you are and I am" approach. In order to be a human being, one must be present on earth in the form of a mortal. What it implies is to dwell. To dwell is to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, and more precisely to till the soil and grow the vine. Dwelling is a combination of these three concepts.

Heidegger warns once more that during the time that humans are fully engaged in the world, they have a tendency to overlook the fundamental meaning and fundamental character of building as dwelling because of the daily activities that they engage in, which include constructing. There is a gap between the concept of dwelling and the concept of construction, which is where the true meaning of dwelling lies. The distinction between "dwelling" and "inhabiting" was illustrated by Heidegger through the use of an example. "Dwelling" refers to the act of constructing a place where one feels spiritually and physically at home, while "inhabiting" refers to the act of taking shelter or simply occupying a house. Dwelling is the foundation upon which he builds his identity. The individual is molded by the environment, and the environment is molded by the person.

3. Dwelling as Freeing Sparing Preserving

More specifically, Heidegger (2001) provides an explanation of the implications of residence by asking, "What does it mean to remain and to stay in a place?" Existence is a prerequisite for tranquilly and liberty. There is a more specific way in which this remaining is experienced, as stated by the Gothic *Wunian*. The way to be at peace, to be brought to peace, and to continue to be at peace is what *Wunian* means. *Friede*, which is the German word for peace, also means "free," or *das frye*. Additionally, the word *"friede"* denotes "protected" or "protected from harm and danger, from something," or "safeguarded." In reality, to be free implies to be sparing.

What constitutes the act of sparing itself is not limited to the fact that individuals do not cause harm to the one who is spared. Genuine sparing is a constructive practice that occurs when individuals leave something in its natural state before they do so, when they return it specifically to its being, and when they "free" it in the truest sense of the word in order to ensure the maintenance of peace. To reside, to be set at peace, means to continue to be at peace within the free, the preserve, and the free sphere that protects everything in its natural state. The principles of frugality and preservation are the cornerstones of the housing lifestyle. It is pervasive throughout the entirety of the dwelling. This range becomes apparent to them as soon as they realize that the human person is comprised of habitation, which is the place where mortals reside on earth. The description of residence that was been presented is more ontological than ontical. In order for man to be at peace so that he can dwell in the world, his freedom must be practiced to the fullest extent possible. This freedom is described by Johnson (2002) as "letting beings be," and the act of letting things be is ultimately an interaction with the things themselves. When individuals interact with the things that are in their immediate environment in a negative manner, they make a demand of those things in terms of what they can obtain from those things. Through manipulation, they cause harm to it. Heidegger emphasizes the importance of "letting be" as a form of genuine sparing. This is something that occurs when they leave something in its natural state before returning it to its original state of existence. The easiest way to understand freedom from the perspective of man's experience is to regard it as open comportment, which means that one does not do what they like or force themselves on objects that are present in the universe. The term "freedom" refers to the degree to which an individual is involved in the world. Because of his independence, man is able to differentiate himself from the environment around him. Freedom is the means by which man establishes his independence from himself and recognizes the world as his own, despite the fact that it is distinct from him. The distance that separates man from his universe constitutes an infinite distance. Consequently, this indicates that an individual is merged with his or her own consciousness of reality, thereby blending with the world.

This liberty is a call to conduct oneself in an ethical manner. Centeno (1999) elaborates that according to Heidegger, ethics or ethos in its etymological sense refers to habitation, which may be defined as a dwelling space or an open region that allows for what corresponds to man's essence; it holds and maintains the advent of what belongs to the person's essence. Further, he emphasizes that ethics is fundamentally a fundamental aspect of the human person insofar as he exists, which means that it is standing in relation to another in whose proximity one is allowed integrity in the sense that one achieves a feeling of his being. In other words, ethics is a fundamental aspect of the human person. Having a place to call home is synonymous with having a human identity. Being human takes place within the framework of the open region, which can be defined as the space shared with other people in which everyone is permitted to realize what it is that they want to happen to themselves. It is only possible for this to occur when residents and neighbors are able to make place for one another and, as a result, allow for the growth of each other. For this reason, ethics is the focal point of everyone's efforts to rekindle their sense of what it means to be human.

To preserve anything is, first and foremost, to keep it in such a way that it will continue to exist for a long time while maintaining the quality of its state. Genuine liberation involves frugality and conservation. What are men willing to reserve and protect? What matters is that they continue to exist as mortals, that they interact with their surroundings on a daily basis, and that they have relationships with other people who live on earth. Men are mortals on earth, yet they have the potential to be the source of problems on multiple fronts, including the physical, psychological, social, political, and economic fronts. Additionally, they are restless and homeless on the inside. It is therefore the state of being at peace with one's location and, more crucially, with one's identity in the world that constitutes dwelling. In the condition of being known as dwelling, men are able to answer the existential question of whether or not they should be themselves.

4. Dwelling as Simple Oneness of the Fourfold

The term "fourfold" refers to the straightforward unity that exists between the four elements: earth, heaven, mortals, and divinities. To dwell means to be at home with oneself and to be engaged in one's everyday activities with what occurs, the possibilities that this life has to offer. Rather than being a place where one can retire from the chaotic public into the private realm, it is a place where one can just be in the oneness of the fourfold. Mortals are human beings who reside; they are the ones who save the land; they are the ones who accept the sky as sky; and they welcome the divinities as divinities. Heidegger expresses this idea in a lyrical manner by emphasizing the straightforward oneness of the fourfold, which men tend to overlook due to the routine worries they face in their daily lives.

Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.

The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the of the stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether. When we say sky, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.

The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment. When we speak of the divinities, we are already thinking of the other three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.

The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities. When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four (Heidegger, 2001:147-148).

In the gathering of the fourfold, Guignon (1993:33) explains it as humans generally come to be treated more as facilitators and participants in the wider event of a "fourfold" in which mortals, gods, earth, and heaven are gathered in the "belonging-together" of a world. The term *Dasein* now refers not only to humans but to "the self-opening medium of the interplay of calling-forth and belongingness. Humans are at the deepest level participants in a wider scheme of things. Their function is to articulate and preserve a clearing in which things can become manifested in their simplicity and greatness. Genuine care (*Sorge*) is needed, then, in order to be simply 'for the sake of being', not for the sake of man but for the sake of being of entities in totality (Guignon, 1993:35).

Heidegger (2001) puts up a challenge that mortals would never be capable of dwelling if dwelling is narrowly understood as just merely staying on earth under the sky, before the divinities, among mortals. To spare and preserve means: to take under our care, to look after the fourfold in its presencing. What men take under their care must be kept safe, nursed and nurtured. According to Johnson (2000), Heidegger attempted to philosophize on the problem of dwelling during his time, the housing shortage. He 'saw', conversely that the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in the lack of houses. Heidegger (2001) expounds this further. It was even much deeper that the world wars with their destruction, older than the increase of the earth's population and the condition of the industrial workers. The real dwelling problem is that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as *the* plight? As soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is no longer a misery. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling. But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their part, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling.

B. The Concept of Dwelling vis-à-vis Care

Care (*Sorge*) is the state in which *Dasein* is concerned about its Being. In order to expose care as the being of *Dasein*, one has to arrive at the appropriate ontological foundation of the being men themselves as actually are and which they call human being (the pointer to Being).

For Heidegger (1996), the meaning of something becomes bound with the ground for the possibility of something and this, in turn, signifies that meaning is bound up with the Being of something. Being is transcendental. To say that something has meaning is to say that it has become accessible in its Being. We

are to gain access to the Being of *Dasein*, and this Being is exhibited as *Care*. Since *Dasein*'s essence lies in its existence, that is, in fulfilling its possibilities, its concern with the movement from any present actuality to another future condition must raise the question, "What shall I do?" This is care, which lies in the capacity of *Dasein* to choose its Being (Bunnin and Yu, 2004:99).

Care itself exhibited the structural moments of existentiality, facticity and fallenness. In describing *Care* as such, men have to fully show what makes these structural moments into a unity - they have to disclose what makes unity possible necessary for the structural whole of *Care*.

1. Facticity in Relation to Dwelling

For Heidegger (1996:52) facticity is *Dasein's* thrownness into the world. The way in which every *Dasein* actually is, is its factuality. The concept of facticity implies that an "innerworldly" being is being-in-the-world which means it can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny" with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world. *Dasein* becomes aware of itself as already-in-the-world.

The world does not only refer to the physical environment, but to the totality of man's involvement. *Dasein* realizes itself associated to the world. Hence, there is no such expression as worldless existence or (wo)manless world. The world is always referred to as the world of *Dasein*. This follows that man is at every moment of his existence being involved in the world. Man is absorbed in the world. To better understand this, men's ground lies on the diverse human standpoints in relation to man's world. For example, the buzzer is rang by the bell ringer in order to call a person's attention that it is supper time. However, the sound that he heard is always in reference to his ears and not to any other sense organs of his body. In other words, the world of sound that he got involved with is in relation to his world as a person who has ears. Similarly, that sound he heard is also in reference to his attitude as a student. The sound is meaningful to him since it warns him that he has to go to the classroom and attend to his subject. People, outside the vicinity of the school, who heard the sound, may not understand the meaning of what they have heard but how they give a different meaning to it. Thus, the attitude or human standpoint of man from another man may vary according to cultural limitations and interests with the way they are involved in the world.

Facticity is understood in terms of one's culture, language, race, religion, nationality and others because these are already given the moment a person is born in this world. Bunnin and Yu (2004:246) substantiate what comprise the concrete situations and the cultural and historical contexts into which *Dasein* finds itself thrown *a priori*. This embraces the concrete limitations of human possibilities. In contrast, Heidegger called what is merely material and non-human conditions factuality. *Dasein* exists not factually, but factically. Its facticity indicates that *Dasein* cannot transcend its concrete situations as a free-floating spirit, but must have its being in the world. Sartre asserts the same thing that facticity is the set of facts relevant to the person, for example, his physical characteristics, his parents, and his unique position. It represents the contingency of human existence and belongs to being-in-itself. According to Sartre, this finitude of human existence does not determine men's freedom or their fundamental project. Instead, it is the basis upon which they make their free choices. An infinite being does not need to exercise choice. Human choice consists precisely in discovering a person's facticity and seeking to surpass its limitations toward existing as an ideal self-determining being.

2. Existentiality in Relation to Dwelling

Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself is existentiality. As a mode of being, it is accepting one's facticity and transcending it. This is, however, drawn and provided from the insight of understanding. According to Carman (2003:580), Heidegger bases existentiality on the phenomenon of purposive, future-directed practical understanding. Men understand themselves in reference to the possibilities, the constituted world in which they find themselves situated. What is given without their their choice endure the present in which they encounter objects, persons and entities. *Dasein's* dwelling then has a temporal structure which Heidegger (1996) describes as 'thrown projection'. The entities they encounter, by contrast, show them the horizon of the present, either as 'available' (ready-to-hand) in their practical activity or as 'occurrent' (present-at-hand) as objects. What men do with the 'available' and the 'occurent' is a project.

Existentiality is *Dasein's* project. A person transcends what is there. One discovers that he can create something for himself. He is capable of molding his own life because he discloses himself in the different horizons of possibility. Therefore, he is a transcendent being who wants to know what he is and what he can be. It is rising above facticity. Mondin (1985:196) expresses it as that characteristic and exclusive movement of the human person with which he continually surpasses himself, all that he is, all that he wishes, and all that he has. An insight taken from here is about changing men's limiting beliefs into empowering ones so that they can move out from the comfort zones they once lived and risked for their betterment.

Simultaneous with *Dasein's* engagement in the world while projecting its possibilities, Heiddeger (1996) also speaks about death as the greatest possibility of *Dasein*. Death reveals itself as a possibility which is one's ownmost; it is non-relational which is not to be outstripped. Everyone dies his own death.

In Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*, death exposes the 'until' of existence. In saying this, he also claims that it is here that men find the ground of their authentic existence. Death is an individualized experience which cannot be shared. This experience makes one focus on one's finitude, on one's uniqueness, and on one's determinate self. The analysis of death is not only the ground of authenticity and freedom, but also the

ground for the totality of *Dasein*. The end of *Dasein* can be reached when one is dead. The greatest possibility is when death takes place. Nevertheless, men may provide an account of the required sort from the first-person standpoint by being aware that "I am going to die." Death is characterized as being-towards-the-end. This Being is the way one comports oneself in pondering when and how this possibility of death may be actualized. Its actualization can be ambiguous: it can be inauthentic or authentic; who determines this ambiguity is no other than Dasein (Bunnin and Yu, 2004:160).

3. Authenticity as a Mood of Dwelling

As modes of Being, Heidegger (1996) distinguishes authenticity and inauthenticity as both grounded in any *Dasein* whatever is characterized by mineness. Bunnin and Yu (2004:61) explicate that each person has his potentialities to fulfill and has to face death as his own. If one has a resolute attitude in facing this condition, that person is said to lead an authentic existence. That person holds a responsible position toward one's uniqueness and individuality. One becomes aware of what this condition means. Authenticity holds on both the future and the past and provides a constancy of the self. It also requires *Dasein* to accept its own death. Indeed, Heidegger claims that the real authentic self is revealed when one encounters his own death. In authenticity, "I" always comes first, although this "I" is not a subject. If one is led by anxiety to protect oneself through absorption into the mass and the anonymous "they," as people generally do, then that person leads an inauthentic existence. In inauthenticity, "they" comes first, and one's own existence is lost. This attitude is what Heidegger calls "fallingness." This means *Dasein's* turning away from itself and allowing itself to be engrossed in day-to-day preoccupations. It drifts along with trends of the crowd. Carman (2003:851) describes *Dasein's* tendency to lapse into an 'inauthentic' or disowned mode of existence. Oftentimes, a person fails to come to grip with the concrete particularity and finitude of his individual existence. In contrast, to exist authentically is to recognize the 'groundlessness' of one's being. One anticipates his/her eventual death in a mood of anxiety, but with an attitude of openness and resolve.

4. Sociality in the Context of Dwelling

Schatzki (2005) interprets Heidegger's *Dasein* as essentially social in character. *Dasein* is not a subject that is encapsulated in its own sphere against the objective world. It is essentially in-the-world; as such, it is inescapably enmeshed with others. Being-in-the-world is being-with (*Mitsein*). Human existence is essentially being-in-the-world. It is equally essentially being-with.

Being-with is not something added to these modes of being-in-the-world. It is not that *Dasein* is in the world and then finds out that it coexists; rather, being-in-the-world implies that *Dasein* coexists, and *in* coexisting Dasein is in the world. That is to say: *Dasein* is in the world with others (1996:118), and *Dasein* coexists in the world. As Heidegger (1992:7) asserts, *Dasein* as this being-in-the-world is at once therewith *being-with-one-another*, being with others. Being-in-the-world and coexistence are coordinate aspects of the single, unified basic structure of *Dasein's* existence. There are four basic ways other *Daseins* bear on a *Dasein's* existence: one encounters them out of the world; one acts toward them; one shares with them the world in which one lives; and worldhood is largely the same for all involved.

Froese (2006) points out that an individual's particularity can only be developed in relation to Being as well as in relation to other beings. A person becomes himself not only by going outside himself but also by providing an opening for other things 'to be'. Herewith, *Dasein* realizes that life in the world is a life with others. Marcel would describe this as an 'invocation', a calling that presupposes the presence of others. Institutions, communities and societies exist because *Dasein* is with his fellowmen. Thus, life is not only a consumption but also a relation-with. One is involved in activities so that communities and families will continue to exist. In one's dealings, he realizes that other people are different from objects and from himself. Buber makes a reminder that man has two primary attitudes and relations: "I-thou and I-it". The former is the primary world of relation. Directness, mutuality, presentness, intensity and ineffability characterize it. It is only within this relation that personality and the personal really exist and develop. As they always say, "Life's beauty unfolds in the eyes of love", and there will never be an unfolding if there is no recognition of another. The latter, on the contrary, is the primary words to mean shallow experiencing and rooted using. It takes place within man and not between him and the world. It is a relation in which one person uses the other as a thing of manipulation and control. Hence, it lacks mutuality.

When *Dasein* relates, it always has a standpoint in view of others. In other words, the dwelling of *Dasein* is a relational dwelling. One cannot manipulate the freedom of fellowmen. The person becomes himself in communication with others. In other words, he respects everything that may arise from the otherness of the other because the other is completely other than himself – his decisions, choices, opinions, views of life and everything. These social values he manifests are the results of his learning from social institutions such as the school, the workplace, the church, and others. He is also working for the common good of these institutions in view of the good of the society.

C. Appropriating Heidegger's Concept of Hermeneutics to Culture

How should Heidegger's idea be appropriated into the culture mentality of the Cordillera on ancestral domain? Is there a privileged branch of knowledge that should only be applied for appropriation? What are possible ways to think with him? According to Falcouner and Wrathal (2000:2), each philosopher who

makes an attempt to appropriate Heidegger's philosophy deals with him differently. They share, however, the belief that a philosophical response to Heidegger's work is always more than a scholarly reconstruction of the best interpretation of the philosopher's texts. In this case, it is more of picking up jewels of Heideggerian insights into the culture mentality of the Cordillera on ancestral domain. Indeed, scholarly work is the spadework that makes appropriation possible. So, the better question to start with: What is a person's reference point in appropriating Heidegger?

Appropriating his ideas is a purposive scholarly work because one deals with the loaded implications that may arise from it. The answer can be traced back to no other than Heidegger himself who gave a paradigm shift especially on his idea of hermeneutics from a traditional method of interpreting authoritative texts (Schleiermacher and Dilthey) to interpretive understanding as the central mode of human existence or *Dasein* (Hoy, 1993:170) (See Sections 31-32 of BT, 1996). Interpretation is just as significant as reasoning out. Beneath the heart of understanding is a poetry of interpretation. According to Lafont (2005), hermeneutics has become a way of understanding human beings themselves. Heidegger's question of being, boils down to the question 'what do we understand when we understand that and what entities are, including ourselves?' (Carman, 2003). How does being unfold through us who ask what it means to be? In later Heiddeger (1938), 'Being essentially unfolds as *appropriation (Ereignis)'*.

Heidegger's (1969:24) *Ereignis* is "Appropriation appropriates" taken to mean that the only way for Being to be known is to disclose itself - through language. It can be disclosed through *Dasein* for Heidegger himself asserts that the language (of *Dasein*) is the house of Being. In Polt's (2005) reading, he comments that *Ereignis* seems to have taken various meanings. Early on, it means a kind of experience in which he finds himself intimately involved; then from 1936-8, it means the possible happening in which a new dwelling may be founded—a place and age in which people could cultivate significance. Later on, it means an ultimate source or *'ownness'* that has always already granted a person's time and being. Entities find a significant place within his life and world. The *Ereignis* happens to him and he makes it his own. This implies meaning and truth that require involvement. It also suggests that they can never truly be detached from the world and become timeless, placeless observers (Walther). The world opens up for them only because they are engaged in it. If *Ereignis* is not a thing above and beyond Being, but is Being's own way of occurring, then to say that Being *Wesen* as *Ereignis* is to say both that Being is an event, a happening, and that Being involves owning, or appropriation. It is an event tied to the idea of "ownness" or "appropriation", and so suggesting "an event of coming-into-its-own" (Guignon, 1993:18).

Sheehan (2000) argues the same that the "event" is not the ordinary and usual sense of the term, rather the presupposition of all human events. The already-opened-ness constitutes the ultimate circularity of human being and is the basis of all the other circularities that characterize thinking and acting. It is therefore the basis of Heidegger's thinking: "become what you essentially are." This exhortation indicates the final goal of his work: to re-appropriate one's opened-ness in the sense of embracing both man's facticity and possibility that makes him human.

1. Hermeneutic Circle

In Heidegger's essential ontology, the hermeneutic circle is the primary approach that is utilised (Bunnin and Yu, 2004:302). In spite of the fact that this probe is going in circles, it is not a vicious one. Through it, philosophy brings to light something that is already known in a more covert manner in everyday life. Due to the fact that *Dasein's* inquiry and justification are contextualized by a pre-understanding that is established in tradition and culture, the hermeneutic cycle becomes an essential component of all human activity. Since this is the case, males have a preconceived notion of what it means to be, which is formed from the customs and language of their society. The purpose of this classification is merely to serve as a guidance for further inquiry because it is still incomplete.

As a result of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, a man's conception of understanding shifts from being a phenomena that is derived from experiences to becoming the primary characteristic of human experience. Gadamer makes the following observation: "Heidegger's temporal analytics of Dasein has shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the many possible behaviors of the subject but rather the mode of being of Dasein itself." (1993, Hoy year). Gadamer (1960) established the concept of Heidegger in order to address the underlying circumstances that are the basis for understanding and interpretation. All forms of comprehension and interpretation are predicated on preconceived notions and require a combination of the interpreter's current perspective and the historical perspective of the text. With the help of interpretation, he is able to establish the impression that it is both a historical process and a virtual   discussion.

In his work from 1960, Gadamer provides further elucidation on the fact that the process of comprehending involves a genuine merging of horizons. When the historical horizon is projected, it is concurrently withdrawn, which means that this is the end result. The argument that humans live and understand within perspectives, which give a framework for the possibility of meaning, is one that he follows in the footsteps of Husserl and Heidegger. Within the context of interpreting a historical text, there exists a tension between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the present and of the interpreter. This tension exists despite the fact that a horizon is produced within the context of tradition and culture. In order to comprehend, it is necessary for them to obtain the historical perspective. At this point in time, it is also impossible for them to get rid of

their own standards and biases. Having an awareness of the particularities of both horizons and overcoming those particularities by building a relation that brings them together is something that they should do. This kind of fusion of perspectives is necessary for any genuine comprehension, as it is through this process that tradition is given a new lease on life and individuals' own preconceived notions are put to the test. This is according to Bunnin and Yu (2004):274.

From the perspective of their everyday comprehension, the world of human existence is the cultural horizon that they move across. When it comes to it, the things that individuals come across are understandable to them and have the potential to be useful for a particular goal. An illustration of this would be to devise a particular totalization or a form of generalization and abstraction in order to attain an understanding of human conditions. The reason for this is that the cultural horizon of their society is predominantly characterized by "meaning-giving." This is a sense in which they are always changing, and as a result, it is typically something that is always a given in a particular way (King 1966:7). According to Osborne (2000:18), this horizon is an opening of a cross-disciplinary type of generality in the sense that it is a representation of universal elements of social practices. This is not only at the level of the content of these practices, but also at the level of the modes of human social existence that are produced by the constitutive relations between these practices. According to Heidegger, it is possible to say that it is on the existential plane. Nevertheless, Osborne considers it to be historical in the sense that their universality is defined by the conditions of existence that have existed throughout history. To put it another way, regardless of the degree of universality and intelligibility that they may project, they continue to function within the hermeneutic circle. This is an opportunity for the fields of philosophy and cultural studies to come together.

2. Cultural Phenomenology

To a large extent, *Dasein's* dwellings is culturally constrained. Because it makes it possible for individuals to interact with other creatures, it is the most fundamental of all phenomena. It is about the history of culture. Every culture has what is known as a "dwelling of Being" that holds the secret to understanding all of history. This dwelling comprises a sequence of transformations of the way in which it makes a difference to *Dasein* (to other *Daseins*, to a community of *Daseins*, and to a society constitutive of *Daseins*) that beings be, rather than are not (See Heidegger on Contributions 27-28; Polt on Heidegger 147-148). *Dasein* is a term that refers to the concept of beings. In Heidegger's view, history is not merely a succession of events that have occurred throughout the course of human civilization. Instead of viewing it as a process that is happening right in front of them, they forget about it as if it had never occurred in the first place. They do not consider it to be currently occurring.   Among the phenomena that occur in habitation are events, experiences, occurring, and ownership. Being is encountered in this habitation, and it is there that it is found. Due to the fact that Being is an event, rather as a process that occurs in the current moment, but rather as a sending that is thrown to them, it involves ownership. Being is not something that is infinite and universal; rather, it is something that belongs to them, as the fate of their particular society; in the same way that Being is something that belongs to them, they are also a part of Being. As opposed to being brutes or things, Being takes possession of them and transforms them into *Dasein*. Being is the one who appropriates them. Because of this, they are able to have control over Being. They take it in their hands and allow it to develop into a question for them to consider. Not only do they ask in order to find answers, but according to Heidegger, their inquiries also provide the groundwork for a way of thinking. Whenever people act in this manner, history is made. The establishment of a culture and an era can be attributed to such really significant occasions. A new foundation for a community is established when human beings appropriate Being through creative endeavors in the areas of education, sociopolitical engagement, and cultural expression (Polt, 148). Dwelling is where *Dasein* understands and interprets itself. It is the open region where appropriation takes place. To borrow the explanations of Brock (2006),

we have the *Dasein* that is able to build, to take residence and to think. In both cases it means to be situated as part of upholding a number of attentive capacities. It is not openness and determination, as such, but more on what comes out in the term *Befindlichkeit*. *Dasein* is thrown ahead of itself. It has its future at stake in its more immediate attentive sensibility, and it not only manages to preserve and develop itself through this situation. It is this ability to keep on situating or positioning oneself time and again. Being thrown is in this sense mediated by the ability to throw some sketches of oneself. It is also that instance that the fourfold takes its oneness. *Dasein* in a sense listens to being, and learns to dwell within it by means of developing a sense for its own makings. Considering that comprehension is the fundamental characteristic of human existence (Hoy, 1993), this is the subject matter that hermeneutics is all about. Sampiao (2011) asserts that hermeneutics has shifted towards a different way of comprehending the world. It already makes reference to a cultural paradigm in addition to a philosophical movement that is currently taking place. As a cultural paradigm, it does not assert that there is a universal and objective interpretation and understanding of culture; rather, it provides a clue that interpretation and understanding are always a process that is in a state of constant change. Interpretation is the act of self-interpreting events. Self-knowledge was always the foundation of understanding.

The self towards selfhood is the movement of the cultural world of *Dasein*. King (1966:8) points out that,

Meaning is that which enables us to understand things as they are, i.e., in their essential being. Meaning does not originally lie in words, or in things, but in the remarkable structure of our understanding itself. We move

in advance in a horizon of understanding, from which and in reference to which the things we meet are intelligible to us in diverse ways. The world of our existence is the horizon from which we primarily understand things as relevant to a purpose.

At this point, it is reasonable to assert that *Dasein* is conditioned by both cultural conditions and historical circumstances. Despite this limitation, *Dasein* is able to pick itself up in order to transcend its facticity and thrownness on account of this constraint. The self, the issues, questions, and worries of *Dasein* are the point of reference from a methodological standpoint. This is done in order to highlight what *Dasein* is busy with in its many life-world activities. Alterations or adjustments can be found inside the playing field, which can be also referred to as the circle or the life-world. The alterations that occur in the scope of men's comprehension make it easier for them to comprehend both themselves and the world around them in a variety of different ways. Nevertheless, in every instance, they are only seen in one or more of the possibilities that they have. Sampaio (2011) asserts that hermeneutics demonstrates to humans that all meaning is contingent on context and, as a result, unstable. Consequently, the conception of culture that emerges is one that is phenomenologically creative while yet being rooted in its history. That is to say, it goes beyond the scope of ethnography. It is not just a description of the culture and way of life of the group of people who are being researched in a manner that is as accurate as possible to the way in which they perceive it themselves and to the social circumstances in which their behavior occurs (Mcneill and Chapman, 2005:89). Despite the fact that ethnography makes use of phenomenology and interpretation in such a way that both of these approaches consider social behavior to be deliberate, they do not focus on determining the reasons and explanations behind why it occurs in the manner that it does. Putting that into perspective is what hermeneutics does. The study of culture from a phenomenological point of view fits in perfectly with this paradigm. To put it another way, individuals choose to act in the manner in which they do because, at their core, they are the ones who are interpreting and comprehending their identity, which is to say, who they are as a people. As a result of the horizon where *Dasein* discovers its potential, they are able to have a greater understanding of social life and to investigate social interaction, particularly the social meanings or interpretations that people attach to their behavior. There are two ramifications that might be drawn from this: a criticism and a confirmation of cultural tradition.

a. As Critique

An excellent instance of this argument may be found in Heidegger's perspective on the cultural tradition, and more specifically, in his ideal of a destruction (Destruktion) of their cultural inheritance. Heidegger suggests, in his book Being and Time, that the history of ontology should be obliterated in order to eliminate the "concealments" that have been brought about by its "hardened tradition" and to revert back to the "primordial experiences" that are the foundation of ontology. The destruction is referred to as a "critical dismantling" (of old notions and as a recuperation of their original origins), and it is described as such. This does not imply that a theory of culture that is founded on the myth of the superiority and purity of origins may be considered valid. People will slide into ethnocentrism if this does not occur. It is more of a criticism in the sense that cultural traditions should not just be accepted because they have been handed down from one generation to the next; rather, they should be alive because of the relevance they have to the present and possibly to the future. For example, Alviar (1997, 210), who made this observation, said that the Cordillerans place a great value on material prosperity due to the ceremonies they practice. The pervasiveness of his faith in nearly every aspect of his life can provide an explanation for this almost preoccupation with wealth the individual possesses. The only way for him to be able to thank, honor, and appease his gods through the use of periodic feasts is for him to be wealthy. Recently, however, excessive ritual feasting in Cordillera communities has been reduced. This is due to the economic difficulties that have arisen as a result of a number of circumstances, including the transformation of agricultural fields into residential and industrial grounds, as well as the shifting cash economy. When it came to matters of social relations, the culture of headhunting and tribe warfare was a practice that exemplified manhood, courageousness, and justice. But if the people themselves believe that some of their cultural practices are no longer that significant to continue, then change is unavoidable regardless of the circumstances. A significant transformation took place in the lives of indigenous peoples as a result of their adoption of Christianity and the education they received. This is the precise manner in which the cultural *Dasein* engages with the various facets of its overall environment in order to generate and actualize itself in order to guarantee its possibilities. To strengthen its sense of self-identity in the process of building its culture. There is a connection between culture as a horizon and *Dasein's* selfhood, which is self-determination.

b. As Affirmation

When it comes to the concept of destruction, the idea of retrieval is closely related. The destruction involves, indeed, a retrieval of some aspects of their cultural tradition. To retrieve must be understood here as a creative and active process:

Retrieval is a fundamental problem of disclosure of primordial and until now hidden possibilities; the working-out of these possibilities transforms the problem and constitutes the only way to preserve its content. To preserve a problem means, however, to release and to keep awake the interior forces, located at the ground of its essence that make it possible as a problem (Sampaio, 2011).

The concepts of destruction and retrieval introduced by Heidegger do not imply a simple return to roots that have been forgotten and are seen to be prestigious. Men are encouraged to change and artistically adapt the contents of cultural traditions through the use of these invitations. It is important to make an effort to appreciate the socio-cultural characteristics of the Cordillerans. When it comes to value systems, they are characterized by the presence of a collection of values that influence various aspects of their connections with one another. They have a sacred relationship with their gods and ancestors, as well as with the natural world. They have a strong focus on family. Family ties serve as the foundation of their political structure. The community's leaders are the headmen or the council of elders, depending on the context. The law that rules them is an unwritten code that is just as legally binding as any law that has been issued by any lawmaking authority in these modern times. According to Alviar (1997), they have a variety of ways of expressing taboos, which are subject to the social traditions that they have. All of these are handed down from one generation to the next, but with significant alterations to accommodate the ever-evolving present. As a best case scenario, the value systems are maintained.

Heidegger had previously said in Being and Time that interpretation is not the process of obtaining information about what is understood; rather, it is the process of working out possibilities that are projected in understanding. It is precisely a reflex of the hermeneutic movement towards a vision of culture as a domain of unstable and ambiguous possibilities that is waiting for further research and new interpretative perspectives. His conception of destruction and retrieval includes both of these concepts. In its most fundamental form, Heidegger's cultural ideal can be understood as an unending process of active and creative interpretations of previous creations. The idea behind the cultural tradition is that it is a storehouse of living forces that can only be experienced by men if they are liberated from the constraints that have been placed on them in the past. Due to the fact that they are important to them, they are looking forward to constructing a new identity and a residence that they can always claim as theirs to protect and cherish throughout their lives.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

It is further thought carefully relative to Heidegger's concept of care (*Sorge*) vis-à-vis facticity, existentiality, authenticity, and sociality to show the grounding and unity of his later thought to his earlier work. First, dwelling is an ontico-ontological structure of *Dasein* which is primordially and constantly whole. Secondly, dwelling as building is not pure habitation and construction; rather, it is a mode of presence and activity of a person. Building is an engagement of thought as well as action; it is the primary way in which humans relate to the environment. Thirdly, dwelling is freeing sparing preserving. Real sparing is when we leave something in its own nature. To free is to preserve from peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, and the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature.

Second, dwelling is care. Genuine care (*Sorge*) is needed not for the sake of man alone but for the sake of being of entities in totality. Care shows the structural moments of existentiality, facticity and fallenness. Facticity in relation to dwelling is *Dasein's* thrownness into the world. Existentiality in relation to dwelling is the phenomenon of purposive, future-directed practical understanding. Authenticity is grounded in the fact that any *Dasein* is characterized by mineness. Each person has his own potentialities to fulfill and has to face his death on his own. Sociality in the context of dwelling is *Dasein* as essentially social in character. *Dasein* as this being-in is therewith being-with-others. Care is both an interpretive horizon, on how men interpret their relations with others; but the goal of being-with must be in an authentic sense. This is experienced through the practice of ethical formation in relation to the question of what it is to be human.

Third, appropriating Heidegger's concept of dwelling to the Cordillera culture mentality of ancestral domain involves hermeneutics. Through the hermeneutic circle, interpretive understanding becomes a fundamental feature of all human activities because *Dasein's* inquiry and justification are contextualized by a pre-understanding rooted in tradition and culture. This being the case, a cultural-phenomenological understanding is employed since *Dasein's* dwelling is essentially culture-bound. With the phenomenological study of culture, *Igorot Cordillerans* who dwell-in-the-world choose to behave the way they do because they are themselves interpreting and understanding their identity. Social life and interaction can better be understood and examined especially the social meanings or interpretations that people attach to their behavior because of the horizon where *Dasein* discovers its possibilities. This has two implications: it is a critique at the same time an affirmation to culture. As a critique, cultural traditions should not just be accepted because they are passed on from generation to generation; rather, they are accepted and are still being practiced because of their relevance to the present and perhaps to the future. As an affirmation, it involves a retrieval of some aspects of the cultural tradition not only materially but more importantly the values, the spiritual beyond the physical. The notions of destruction and retrieval invite people to transform and to appropriate creatively the contents of cultural traditions. The cultural tradition is a reservoir of living forces that can be experienced by freeing the impositions made in the past and conceiving a new identity and a dwelling which people can always claim as theirs to keep and preserve because they matter to them.

After an in-depth study of appropriating Heidegger's concept of dwelling to the Cordillera culture mentality of dwelling, the researcher recommends the following:

First, the use of hermeneutics and phenomenology of culture to study specific practices like *cañao*, *chumno* and other indigenous ritualism, body tattoos, gongs, material symbols, and aesthetics among others, help

enhance indigenous knowledge and worldviews. A phenomenology of inculturation in the Cordillera, for instance, can be a good study to tackle on *Kabunianism* vis-à-vis recent religious affiliations that entered the Cordillera. Other cultures, traditions and cultural practices of the different indigenous peoples of the Caraballo mountain range, Sierra Madre mountain range, the indigenous communities of the different island groups in the Visayas, and Mindanao can also be studied with the employment of hermeneutics and cultural phenomenology as a method to harness their traditional knowledge and practices. The method of deconstruction is also a viable tool to study Philippine textbooks on history, social studies and others texts that have direct bearing on the socio-historical background of the different indigenous peoples of the Philippines. These methods can be of help to future writers to enlighten students on their cultural identity and minimize, if not correct ethnocentrism and other prejudices which were previously written on textbooks and other similar materials.

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