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Origin And Evolution Of India's Nuclear Policy- A Critical Perspective

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ABSTRACT

India has had an uncomfortable relationship with nuclear weapons. From the early days of independence, Indian leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, took a very public and very vocal stand against nuclear weapons. But Nehru, a modernist, was also convinced that nuclear technology had a role to play in national development. To a lesser degree, he also thought that nuclear weapons technology might have a role to play in national defence if efforts at nuclear disarmament should fail.

Keywords: Nuclear Policy, Energy

India's search for nuclear capability in a sense had begun even before India gained independence from the British Empire in 1947. The first Indian Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, Homi J. Bhabha sought to win for their country all the prestige, status and economic benefits associated with being a nuclear power, including the option on building "the bomb" if necessary. The capacity to master the atom represented for India a transcendence of the colonial past, modernity, potential prosperity, national prowess and international leverage. The civilian nuclear program can be traced to the work of the Indian physicist Homi Bhabha, who had studied with the eminent nuclear scientist Lord Emest Rutherford at Cambridge University in the 1930s. Upon his return to India, Bhabha Persuaded one of India's industrial giants, the Tata family to establish a training and research institution for fundamental research in nuclear physics. This led to the establishment of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay in 1945.[1]

After India's independence, Bhabha was able to convince Prime Minster Nehru of the signal importance of atomic energy research in enabling India to build a industrial base and to tackle the overwhelming problems of entrenched poverty. Atomic Energy Commission was established in the forties through a Government resolution with Dr. Bhabha as the Chairman and the Prime Minster always held the portfolio. Subsequently, the commission was made statutory through an enactment.[2]

Bhabha, as the first head of the Department of Atomic Energy, created in 1954, worked zealously to preserve the Organizational autonomy of India's nuclear energy estate. From the onset the Indian atomic energy establishment, under the direction of the Prime Minister, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and was largely shielded from public scrutiny.[3]

In 1948, the United Nations (UN) grappled with the US inspired attempt to establish international control over fissile materials and the facilities that could mine, process and utilize them, both for peaceful and military purposes. The Baruch Plan, presented by the United States in 1946, proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority. To own and operate all materials, technologies and facilities with Potential nuclear weapon applications. This caused significant contestation for newly independent India. Under this plan, the United States would retain its nuclear monopoly until it was satisfied that the authority was fully established with all the requisite powers necessary to function unencumbered and effectively.

The Soviet Union, as a non-nuclear weapon state (until 1949), saw the Baruch Plan in a different light. From Moscow it appeared to be a necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons while enabling the United States to retain its nuclear monopoly. Hence, the Soviet Union offered an alternative of its own, the Gromyko Plan, which reversed the key aspects of the United States proposal as follows:

First, existing nuclear weapons would be abolished, stockpiles destroyed and commitments made never to build or use nuclear weapons. Only then would the Authority's power extend to non-nuclear states. Moscow was also opposed to the surrender of its national sovereignty regarding civilian use of nuclear energy to an

international authority. India also feared that the Baruch Plan amounted to a colonial strategy by the US that would stifle its atomic future.[4]

India took a stance that would characterize its nuclear diplomacy for decades: it supported the principle of ensuring that nuclear materials and capabilities would be used only for peaceful purposes, but it resisted any measures that would allow some states to retain nuclear weapons while denying others the full freedom to exploit their resources as they saw fit.

Nehru and Nuclear Weapons

Publicly, Nehru opposed the development of nuclear weapons, a position that accorded with his deep-seated opposition to the use of force to resolve international disputes. This conviction, in part, stemmed from the Gandhian legacy of the Indian nationalist movement and also drew from his fundamental fears of the militarization of the Indian society.[5]

Nehru's nuclear decisions were deeply rooted in his scientific temper, abhorrence of nuclear weapons and nuclear allergy after the supreme tragedy at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[6] His policy of complete nuclear abstinence originated from a mind imbued with high idealism, deep sense of history and a worldview and always with a vision of a strong and modern India. His genuinely peaceful intentions are reflected in his speeches. He told the Lok Sabha in 1957, "We have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in and we will not make the bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so."[7]

At the United Nations, India and several other newly independent countries fought relentlessly for nuclear arms control and disarmament as it was thought that otherwise nuclear arms race would escalate, posing a mortal threat to human civilization. As far back as 1954, Nehru raised the question of a test ban treaty, an issue which still remains on the international agenda, more than forty-five years later.[8] India was also the first country to release an official publication in 1955 written by a group of eminent scientists bringing to humanity's notice the devastating consequences of nuclear war and urging effective measures to bring the Frankenstein under control.[9]

When in 1960s the Third World, came to be recognised internationally as an entity politically and economically different from the first and second worlds, its nuclear concerns were reflected largely those felt and articulated by Nehru and other founders of the non-aligned movement. This movement was given a formal shape at the Belgrade non-aligned summit in 1961, with peace and nuclear arms control as its main slogan.[10]

Neither the concerns of independent developing countries nor the protestations and appeals of the non-aligned movement had however, much of an impact on the superpowers. They did not proceed seriously to negotiated arms control and disarmament and they kept the Third World, out of the exclusive business of the small four national cartel of nuclear powers. Their attitude was that the nuclear divide was none of the business of nations who had neither the technological capacity nor the political will to make nuclear weapons.

However, despite his public opposition to nuclear weapons, Nehru also accepted, albeit reluctantly and ambivalently, the potential military deterrent and international power embodied in nuclear weapon capability. Bhabha being given a free hand in the development of India's nuclear infrastructure should be viewed in this context. Nehru sought to lay the necessary foundations should a political decision to acquire nuclear weapons be made.[11]

In pursuit of this end, Bhabha worked inexorably towards a complete mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and towards a completely indigenous production process. India developed the required infrastructure, trained manpower, resources and external inputs, particularly from the United States, to create programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the period between 1954 and 1963.[12]

However, it remained opposed to the formal acquisition of nuclear weapons and to nuclear weapons tests. During this period, India presented eight separate disarmament initiatives, either individually or jointly, within various bodies of the UN. These included: a draft resolution on "Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy" submitted to the General Assembly at its third session in 1948; a draft resolution on "Declaration on the Removal of the Threat of a New War and the Strengthening of Peace and Security among Nations" at the fourth session in 1949; communication of the Standstill Agreement and proposals containing therein to the UN, Secretary General in 1954; inclusion of the item "Dissemination of Information on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and on the Effects of Experimental Explosions of Thermonuclear Bombs" at the UN tenth session in 1955; note verbale from the Indian representative at the UN to the chairman of the Disarmament Commission proposing steps for "Cessation of All Explosions of Nuclear and other Weapons" in 1956; a draft resolution on the "Composition of the Disarmament Commission" at the twelfth session in 1958; a request for an agenda item "Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests" at the fourteenth session in 1959; and a draft resolution, "Directives on General and Complete Disarmament", also at the fourteenth session in 1959.[13]

Indian ideas articulated during debates at the UN, resulted in the Atoms for Peace program initiated by the US and adoption of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), in 1963, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. India along with seven other non-aligned countries on the Disarmament Commission made a notable contribution to the conclusion of a Test Ban Treaty. These countries submitted to the nuclear powers a joint memorandum in 1962, containing suggestions for negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This memorandum merits special mention in view of its subsequent approval by the General Assembly of the UN.[14]

India signed the PTBT, arguing that the treaty, if universalized, could contribute in some small measure to nuclear disarmament. The PTBT was concluded to ban atmospheric testing but by this time, countries had developed the technologies for conducting underground nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race continued unabated. India's successful establishment and operation of the nuclear research reactor at Trombay and later commissioning of the Tarapore atomic power plant resulted in India being acknowledged as one of the front ranking countries in the international community in the sphere of nuclear technology and its uses.[15]
India voluntarily agreed to submit nuclear reactors which it had constructed with foreign assistance to safeguards and inspections, first bilaterally and then through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While India showed its sense of responsibility and restraint by accepting safeguards and impartial inspections, Nehru was prescient about the possibilities of discriminatory inspection and of disarmament and technological regimes which may be put in place by nuclear weapons-possessing powers. Nehru had clearly anticipated the idea of a discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation treaty, full scope safeguards and restrictive technology regimes which militated against the interest of the developing countries.[16]
These subjects have formed the substance of the deliberations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament procedures which have been, and are being progressively implemented since the 1960s. This has, over the years, remained as the main source of friction between India's nuclear program and the larger international effort led by the US to control nuclear technology and materials.

Post 1962: A Rethinking

It was the 1962 Sino-Indian border war that forced Nehru to reappraise his defence strategy and his most cherished ideals.[17] In the aftermath of the 1962 debacle, India significantly increased its military spending and preparations.[18] But Nehru had to face a demoralized nation and a vehement opposition that asked whether India would forever eschew a nuclear deterrent.[19]
Nineteen sixty-four (1964) brought pivotal changes to India's nuclear policy, spurred by the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor on October16, 1964 and Nehru's death in May 1964 China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war dealt a further blow to India's national security.[20]
Following China's test, segments of India's political and scientific establishments evinced a greater interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Dr. Homi Bhabha fervently advocated in favour of India exercising its nuclear option.[21] However, Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri tried to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the nuclear weapon states. This search ultimately turned futile when both, the US and the Soviet Union, refused to embrace this approach in any thoroughgoing way .[22]
A second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir broke out in 1965. During this conflict China provided diplomatic support to Pakistan and threatened to open a second front against India's Himalayan border.[23] This spectre of Sino-Pakistani collaboration against India forced India into a tougher foreign policy mode. Just before the war ended, a hundred members of the Lok Sabha wrote to the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, calling for India to exercise the nuclear weapons option.[24] it was amidst growing public and political pressure that Shastri inaugurated a policy of ambiguity by declaring that India had the capability to make nuclear weapons, but the government was not keen to exercise this option. At the same time, it kept its option open on conducting peaceful nuclear explosion.[25]
During this period India's apprehensions continued to mount as increasing evidence emerged about China's growing nuclear capabilities. Shastri's successor, Indira Gandhi continued the quest for nuclear guarantees from major powers but they could offer only qualified guarantees that failed to satisfy India's requirements. [26]
This was also the period when India's global disarmament approach could not keep pace with the changing international scenario and began to fade. This was manifested in the fact that India presented only four disarmament initiatives to the UN during this period.[27]
It was around this time that the US and the Soviet Union, exercised by the Chinese nuclear tests, sought to forge a multilateral treaty to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons.[28] In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons.
But in 1965, when the UN Political Committee adopted a resolution detailing the guidelines for a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, this balance of rights and obligations was absent. The discussions underway at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to formulate a non -proliferation treaty had a significant impact on India's disarmament and security plans.[29]
When the major powers agreed on a draft nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India was quick to register its protest. The NPT came into force in March 1970. India refused to accede to the terms of the treaty because it failed to address India's misgivings; specifically the continued nuclear abstinence of the non-nuclear states was not linked to explicit reciprocal obligations by the nuclear weapons states. Although India's argument was couched in moral terms, a more pragmatic consideration namely keeping its nuclear weapons option open guided its decision not to sign the NPT.[30] The discriminatory terms of reference governing the NPT have remained the guiding principles of all the international security regimes that have subsequently been put in place, be it the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), or the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Pokharan-1: A Jolt to the NPT

India's failure to influence the creation of a global regime that would address its security concerns pushed it further down the nuclear path. It has also been argued that the US pressure on India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war also convinced Indira Gandhi for the importance of developing India's nuclear capabilities. [31] However, the decisive factors that led to the detonation of India's first nuclear device in May 1974 were Indira Gandhi's sense that India would gain confidence in itself as a nation and her as a leader and the Atomic Energy Commission's determination to prove its mettle.[32]

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) received a severe jolt with India's nuclear test. India's policy remained the same during and after the test period as it was before testing: denunciation of the nuclear arms race, opposition to the NPT, denial of any intention to build nuclear weapons but a refusal to foreclose the nuclear option in the future. India after 1974 formalized the nuclear option strategy which argued that India possessed the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons if security interests required it, but it would refrain from exercising this military option. By adopting this strategy India tried to satisfy twin objectives of retaining a moral high ground on disarmament while providing enough military potential to give adversaries pause. However, India did incur the penalties of the international non-proliferation regime [33] and at the same time also spurred the development of its most immediate adversary, Pakistan's nuclear program.[34] And the resulting transformation in the US-Pakistani relations gave a new twist to the security situation in South Asia.[35] Growing evidence of Chinese collusion in the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme fuelled Indian concerns and India had to revaluate its nuclear policies.[36] India was forced to give greater attention to the security dimension in its nuclear policy, with a corresponding de-emphasis of disarmament policies.

During Rajiv Gandhi's prime-ministership, India pursued seemingly contradictory policies on the nuclear question. On the one hand, he proposed a comprehensive plan for the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, popularly referred to as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. This plan, presented by him in an address to the UN General Assembly at its third special session on Disarmament in 1988, called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals by the year 2010. It spelled out particular stages and targets that were to be achieved by all nuclear weapon states and imposed reciprocal restrictions on all nuclear threshold powers.[37]

On the other hand, it was under Rajiv Gandhi that India made the decision to acquire missiles and other technology to form an effective nuclear deterrent.[38] Rajiv Gandhi apparently managed to reconcile the lofty aims of global disarmament with India's ongoing programme of nuclear weapon and missile capabilities.

Post-Cold War Scenario

The end of the cold war did not change the discriminatory and self-aggrandizing attitude of the nuclear weapon powers on non-proliferation issues. This static and self-serving approach of the nuclear weapon states was manifested in all the discussions related to non-proliferation of every category of weapons held after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

India's disarmament initiatives also got muted in the light of the controversy over possible nuclear weapons in South Asia. Frequent counter-proposals made by Pakistan, such as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia, mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities and a bilateral test ban, also forced the west to perceive a dichotomy between India's global disarmament initiatives and the nuclear reality of South Asia. India rejected these proposals arguing that they were conceived in the narrow context of South Asia, ignoring the global reach of the nuclear disarmament issue.[39]

In May 1995, more than 170 countries, led by the US, chose to extend intimately the NPT, and pledged themselves to real progress on the treaties to ban nuclear testing (CTBT) and Fissile Material Production (FMCT). The NPT conference focused [40] predominantly on the indefinite extension of existing treaty rather than the negotiation of a new disarmament instrument.

India was now isolated and faced potential global treaties that it thought would foreclose its nuclear weapon option. Therefore, India struck out defiantly against it on the grounds that the NPT extension meant the eternal legitimization of nuclear weapons and the system of "nuclear apartheid".

The extension of the NPT and the passage of Brown Amendment, which led to a renewal of up to $368 million in the US military assistance to Pakistan inevitably, provoked Indian security concerns. Additionally, moves towards the finalization of the CTBT, were also under way at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Final negotiations of the CTBT posed an enormous challenge to India, as the political class rallied cohesively against the treaty while the international community pressured India to sign it.[41]

India could not block the reporting of the CTBT, from the UN Disarmament Conference to the General Assembly. Its efforts to modify the treaty text or to prevent its adoption by the General Assembly also proved futile. The treaty was passed in September 1996 by an overwhelming majority of member states.[42]

Apart from the CTBT, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), was being evolved to extend the discriminatory restrictions on nuclear technological capacities of developing countries. There was also a general orientation to impose additional inequitable discriminatory regimes on the transfer and additional development of dual-use technologies by developing countries.

In fact, the development during the 1990s as the consequence end of cold war has been the tightening and deepening of the non-proliferation system and erosion of support for nuclear disarmament in the policies of European and North American governments. The indefinite extension of the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), guidelines of 1992, [43] the "93+2" safeguard system of the IAEA,[44] submissions by nuclear

weapon states to the International Court. In May I997, the Board of Governors of the IAEA [45] adopted a Model Protocol, supplementing existing safeguards agreements. Whereas the previous agreements were designed to verify that a state is not using its stated material or equipment to develop nuclear weapons, they did not check whether the statements offered a complete and true picture of nuclear activities.

The New protocol (the Programme 93±2 safeguards) has 3 types of provisions:

a) Measures to strengthen IAEA access to information;
b) Increased physical access to sites, including agreed access beyond nuclear sites on a case-by case bases;
c) A rationalization of the safeguards system through closer cooperation between the IAEA, its member states and international organizations, such as the European Atomic Energy Community, Justice Wassennaar Arrangements, [46] expansion of the scope of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines,[47] the CTBT, the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and a host of national laws and political moves have been brought into force to expand the scope and depth of the iniquitous non-proliferation order.

Pokharan-II and Beyond

India, consequently, had to fashion a practical and effective deterrent oriented response to this evolving international situation, particularly in the light of the deteriorating regional security environment. And this was the objective that India sought to fulfil by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998 that virtually shook the foundations of the international arms control regime.[48]

With the nuclear tests of India, the strategic equipoise of the post-cold war world got significantly unsettled and questions of fundamental importance to the entire non-proliferation regime and the future of the disarmament debate got placed at the forefront of international agendas. India emerged as a classic case that the international community will have to deal with in order to complete the global nuclear architecture.

India's Justification of its Nuclear Tests

For many, the test represents India's misplaced sense of priorities. Its attempt to secure great power status through military means rather than by attending assiduously to the economic well-being of its citizens seems misguided. The nuclear tests also appear to represent a decisive break with the best moral intimation bequeathed by Gandhi and Nehru, who for all their failings articulated an idealism that could have been the basis of a more morally exemplary foreign policy. Internationally, India's tests have challenged the privileges of the established nuclear order and seem to have dealt a blow to hard-won successes to combat nuclear weapons proliferation. It has also been argued that the compulsion behind the testing was primarily driven by domestic concern. The BJP's concerted efforts to portray itself as moderate, centrist party had left it without a clear ideological direction. Conducting nuclear tests was a way to show up the government's credibility and demonstrate its decisiveness. While it is difficult to determine the government's motive, it would be a grave mistake to view India's nuclear tests simply as a product of short-term expediency. The tests had an almost 80 percent approval rating among the Indian public and despite some protest by peace activists, enthusiasm for them seems not to have abated significantly. [49] Arguments put forward to explain why the Indian Government chose to conduct tests are:

- Supposed changes in the international security environment or perception about such change, i.e. Pakistan and China have become threatening and belligerent by going nuclear. Although China formally acceded in March 1992 to the NPT, it is not a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG is an informal body of major nuclear supplier countries first organised in London in 1975, which delineates the guidelines calling for restraint in exporting sensitive technologies like production of heavy water; enrichment and reprocessing. China is also not a member of 28-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which bars the transfer of certain technologies and missiles with the capabilities of delivering a 500 Kg warhead to 300 Kms. [50] China appears disinclined to forgo tactical nuclear weapons, unlike many other nuclear powers.
- Nuclear hypocrisies of existing Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and their reluctance to move rapidly to full nuclear disarmament has finally drawn India out of impatience into their club.
- Changed self-perceptions and domestic factors behind such changes, that is, the changing character of the elite. Indian nationalism and the role of Sangh combine in bringing about such changes as well as in pushing its own distinctive agenda.

Implications of India's Nuclear Tests

India's move to nuclearise has broad implications. Firstly, it has questioned the non-proliferation order that had been painstakingly built up by the five nuclear weapon states led by the US and its allies. While India supported the concept of non-proliferation, it did so only as a part of larger and immutable goal of universal disarmament. Unfortunately the focus has been only non-proliferation and not disarmament. Only vague open-ended promises of disarmament at an undefined point in a distant future were held out. Most Indians question the very rationale and reliability of nuclear deterrence. Even acquisition of nuclear weapons by India, therefore can be seen only as an interim step till total abolition of nuclear weapons becomes a reality. A nuclear weapon-free world would enhance India's security, both politically as well as militarily. On the other hand, if there is little or no movement towards disarmament, the risks of proliferation will increase.

Secondly, it is argued that India's nuclearisation will start an arms race, intensify India-Pakistan rivalry at the minimum and possibly lead to a nuclear war. Curiously some arguments were being heard after Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1987, although India had not acquired nuclear weapons. The reality is that, there has been no 'race' between Pakistan and India, even in conventional area. India has been cutting back its defense spending from 3.6% of the GDP in 1987 to around 2.4%. Pakistan's defense spending has also been coming down, though more gradually, since 1993. Tests do not have to lead to an armament race. They may in the end prove to be more of a stabilizing factor than an imitation of conflict. Having shown its capabilities, India may have prevented less welcome development. In addition, being a member of nuclear club may facilitate India's joining international agreement on the policy of equality. [51]

Thirdly, the possession of credible nuclear deterrent capabilities by India, China and Pakistan has virtually eliminated the probability of war in the region. If war does take place in the region, it will remain limited because of the risk of rapid escalation and impact of the nuclear weapons as a factor.

India's Post-Test Policy

One May 11, 1998, soon after conducting the three tests, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, in a Press statement, said:

India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities. [52]

India declared a moratorium on Nuclear Tests on May 21, 1998. Announcing this, Mishra said, "As was announced on May 13, the planned tests are over. Now there is a moratorium on tests. We would like to convert the moratorium into formal obligation within a possible dialogue with key 'Interlocutors' on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

On May 27, 1998, the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated in Parliament on India's nuclear tests, he said "India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied... It is not a conferment we seek, nor is a status for others to grant." [53] In a paper laid on the floor of the Lok Sabha on May 27, 1998, the Prime Minister expressing concerns at the modernisation of nuclear weapons by the P-5, said the country was left with 'little choice'. He further said:

India had to take necessary steps to ensure that the country's nuclear option developed and safeguarded over the years, not be permitted to erode by voluntary self-imposed restraint. The only touchstone that guided the government was national security. Tests conducted on May 11 and 13 are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and actions. [54]

Stating that the tests were not country-specific, Vajpayee reiterated the 'no first use' agreement with Pakistan as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum said that India believed that 'global elimination of nuclear weapons would enhance its security as well as that of the rest of the world. [55] Even after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests; there was no change in the moratorium announced. India has resisted pressures from the P-5 and others like Japan and Germany to unconditionally sign the CTBT.

The conducting of tests by India has definitely given a decisive shift to India's nuclear policy in general, and the test ban policy in particular. Clearly the treaty was targeted against India (and, to an extent, China).

Conclusion

India's nuclear policy has evolved gradually rather than dramatically. This is unlikely to change. Indian leaders and the political and administrative system are cautious and risk-averse. And India faces no existential insecurities and is indeed a fairly confident and secure state that dominates its region. Thus, there is little domestic political or international reasons to expect rapid changes in India's nuclear policy. But just as it is cautious in advancing its nuclear weapons arsenal, it will also be cautious in advancing on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda. The conducting of tests by India has definitely given a decisive shift to India's nuclear policy in general, and the test ban policy in particular. Clearly the treaty was targeted against India (and, to an extent, China). Considering that the Non-Nuclear Weapon States by virtue of their membership of the NPT cannot test, and Israel because of its small size could not have tested.

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33. Braluna Chellaney, *Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), pp. 74-75; Also see Robert L. Beckman, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 229.
34. For a detailed account of the impact of India's nuclear test in 1974 on Pakistan's nuclear programme, see Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 194-197.
35. *Ibid.,* pp. 221-232.
36. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
37. Government of India, *Disarmament: India's Initiatives,* Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1988.
38. K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy 1964-1998: A Personal Recollection", in Jasjit Singh (ed.), *Nuclear India* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 44.
39. See Abha Dixit in Cort right and Matto (eds.), *India and the Bomb,* pp.57-58.

40. Lewis A. Dunn, "High Noon for the NPT", *Arms Control Today,* Vol. 25, No. 6, (July/August 1995), pp. 3-9.
41. For a detailed discussion on India's rejection of the CTBT, see Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb,* pp.378-403.
42. 42 For a detailed discussion on India's rejection of the CTBT, see Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb,* pp.378-403.
43. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is an informal group of 34 nuclear supplier countries which "seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of weapons through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related activities. Its guidelines can be viewed at URL<http://www.iaer.org>
44. In May 1997, the Board of Governor the IAEA adopted a model protocol supplanting existing safeguards agreements were designed to verify that a state is not using its sated material or equipment to develop nuclear weapons, that did not whether statement offered a complete access of information.
45. See verbatim excerpts of oral statements to the International Court of Justice by the USA, the UK, France and Russia, available at <http://wagingpeace.org>
46. In 1996 the Wassennaar Arrangement on Export controls for conventional Arms and duel use of goods and technologies was established by 33 states, it seeks to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfer of conventional arms and dual use of goods and technologies. The agreements are implemented through national export and import control mechanism.
47. The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among countries, which share a common interest in stopping certain kinds of missile proliferation. The MTCR was originally concerned only with nuclear capable delivery systems. In January 1993, the MTCR guidelines were expanded to cover delivery systems capable of delivering all NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons. Details at URLhttp://sipri.se/projects/amtstrade/mtcrguidelines. Html
48. For Details See Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb,* pp. 405-443.
49. 49.Pratap Bhanu Mehta: "India: The Nuclear Politics of Self Esteem", *Current History,* Vol. 97, No. 623, December 1998, p. 403
50. India-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Background Status and Issues for US Policy, *CRS Reports* for Congress (Washington D.C.: Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, December 16, 1996), p. 20.
51. *International Herald Tribune,* May 13, 1998.
52. Text of the Press statement made by Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.
53. Text of Suo Moto Statement made by Prime Minister of India, in the Parliament on May 27, 1998, p. 2.
54. Paper laid on the Floor of the House by the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy on May 27, 1998, p.4.
55. Paper laid on the Floor of the House by the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy on May 27, 1998, pp. 5-6.