

Kant's Faculty Of Imagination And Its Epistemic Function

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Citation: Vaishali, (2024), Kant's Faculty Of Imagination And Its Epistemic Function, *Educational Administration: Theory and Practice*, 30(5), 3617-3623, Doi: 10.53555/kuev.v30i5.3499

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

The very suggestion of giving knowledge function to imagination sounds strange. One might say that imagination is helpful in giving rise to tremendous works of fiction, but imagination's role is not limited to just fictional knowledge but also knowledge of deep elusive sort and matters of practical relevance where it helps us to focus on overcoming the upcoming dangers by raising attention to possibilities. Imagination deals with what could have been the case or what is possible, and how would things have been if not what they actually are. Contemporary philosophers have been keen to understand the role that imagination plays in the constitution of knowledge, especially in the knowledge that deals with the evaluation and investigation of the truth value of propositions that dwells in the realm of possibility, necessity, impossibility, contingency etc.... This knowledge is a part of the modal epistemology in modal logic. Studying the scope and range of modal knowledge is modal epistemology. Since, Immanuel Kant's theory of imagination, philosophers have started to take imagination as an important faculty in the process of cognition rather than just "a play of fanciful images unfit for serious thought"¹. In this paper my aim is to understand Kant's theory of Imagination and to focus on the epistemic role of Imagination, in order to do so I will also have a look into how contemporary debates on imagination are inspired by the works of Kant. I will look into how imagination has a significant role to play in modal epistemology and why its role cannot be eschewed in modal logic. In doing so the main aim of this paper is to figure out imagination's epistemic role in the formulation of knowledge.

Keywords: Imagination, knowledge Kant, possibilities Abbreviations: Cpr - critique of Pure Reason Cpr A - A edition of critique of Pure Reason Cpr B – B edition of Critique of Pure Reason

INTRODUCTION

Imagination is a power that both exhibits and overcomes the limits of experience, its study is relevant to epistemology. Imagination is essential in relating to what is given and what is not given in experience. The intention of this paper is to give a detailed account of Imagination's role in knowledge with respect to critique of pure reason and the contemporary debates in epistemology. We will discuss the role of imagination in re-centering the subject's attention to phenomenal object of knowledge. Philosophers since ages have grappled hardly with the question of the position of imagination in the thinking tendency. The first critique focuses on the faculty of imagination as a productive ability which gives forth schemata for the successful application of categories on the empirically given manifold. Kant's overall theory of imagination plays a crucial role in epistemology and thus displays an outstanding power in the interpretation and constitution of experience.

Contemporary philosophers have been working on the possibilities and necessities, and how the roots of these lie in our imagining the counterfactuals. In order to understand to what extent contemporary debates on Imagination's role in knowledge formation are inspired by Kant we need to shed light on Kant's theory of imagination and its role in the formulation of knowledge.

Aims and objectives:

In this paper my aim is to understand Kant's theory of Imagination and to focus on the epistemic role of Imagination, in order to do so I will also have a look into how contemporary debates on imagination are

¹ Kaag, "Thinking through Imagination," 11.

inspired by the works of Kant. I will look into how imagination has a significant role to play in modal epistemology and why its role cannot be eschewed in modal logic. In doing so the main aim of this paper is to figure out imagination's epistemic role in the formulation of knowledge.

Methodology:

In the first step, the study uses qualitative descriptive research methodology in the task of a complete and thorough analysis of what Imagination is. Using Kant's work as a primary source, this study aims to bring out the connective parts and themes of Kant's theory of Imagination, its productive and reproductive aspects which help in the constitution of experience and knowledge, thus the paper will look into the epistemic roles of this faculty of Imagination. Then, using "Conceptual Analysis: A Model of Detection Analysis" as the theoretical research model, we will dig into the secondary sources i.e, the related books and articles on Kantian theory of Imagination. The paper is based on comparative and critical interpretations and evaluations from extra systematic references on imagination and an analytical study of the contemporary debates on the same. In doing these within system evaluation, we will use critique of pure reason as the foundational text. The methodology will be non-technical in nature.

Section I: Kant's account of Imagination

Kant defines imagination "as a faculty of representing an object in intuition even without its presence" (CPR, B151). Deploying all rhetorical prowess, Kant opens imbricated dimensions of imagination in the following manner: "The synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge, by means of it all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori" (CPR, A118).

"Imagination (Einbildungskraft) is a faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition" (CPR, B151). Kant writes: "imagination is a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination" (CPR, B152). What exactly is the faculty of imagination? When the faculty of Imagination is using its schematic activity of the universal procedure of image construction to give rise to an object that we had previously experienced then it is taking aid from the reproductive synthesis of Imagination, where the object we had already experienced in our intuition in actuality is reproduced again, for example...I am in an art museum receiving the fresh vivid impressions of a sculpture and after few hours when I go back home and try to form an image of that sculpture in my mind, then I am reproducing the impressions of what I have already experienced (Hume calls such reproduction of Impressions as '*Ideas*'), this reproduction of imagination happens in accordance with a standard normative fabric that we are accustomed to receive (Kant is influenced here by the Humian habituation and custom which according to him is an associative principle of ideas worked in by Imagination, due to repeated occurrences and constant conjunction), the following constituents are to be considered for an efficient applicability of the term Bird as an empirical concept, (a) the specification of a standard normative fabric (b) the understanding of instances, accounts and case histories of different birds that were encountered in experience (like, Emerald toucanet, Gloster canary or Hyacinth macaw) (c) the capacity to acknowledge the association between sensibility and understanding of same kind i.e., the pure understanding when can be applicable to a particular determinate kind of phenomena. An empirical object's standard normative fabric is governed by understanding's capacity to explicate the basic qualitative conceptual structure of a bird and determine their kind i.e., the kind of empirical intuitive manifold whose representations are fit to be generically determined by not specifying particular instances or examples such as toucanet or macaw. The possibility of the image of innumerable instances with their described a priori generic features and their possible connection with each other is created by the faculty of Imagination. The essential nature of any phenomenal object is its reproducibility and this reproductive synthesis is determined by the given schema and through the a priori time determination.

Empirical concepts elucidate their objects and possible state of affairs using the faculties of sensibility, apperception, reproductive schematic imagination and understanding, it can be thus said that, "they have a referential ability using which they refer to instances and examples, they denote to imagination as a rule of synthesis and they ascribe a standard normative fabric according to the structurization has to take place. Empirical concepts are thus inexplicably dependent on imagination for their formulation. Therefore, the schema of an empirical concept is empirical in nature and their images are possible. Kant defines schema as follows,

"Schema are the formal and pure condition[s] of sensation to which the concept of understanding is limited, they are the representations of a universal method of imagination in providing a picture for a thought, nothing more than a priori temporal judgments based on rules but the genuine and solitary circumstances under which these notions acquire relation to objects and thus contain significance, they are the pure synthesis, specified by a rule of that unity, in line with the notions, to which the category gives expression, they are the transcendental product[s] of the imagination, product[s] that concern the [determination] of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time) in respect of all representations, to the extent that these representations are to be connected a priori in one concept in accordance with the unity of apperception" (A142/B181).

From providing a detailed account of the empirical concepts, Kant moves on to the pure sensible concepts, abstract mathematical concepts of figures in pure space and time intuitions, such as the concept of a triangle or a circle. What is the schema of a pure sensible concept? In the schema of the pure sensible concept, the images of pure sensible concepts cannot be given, here the distinction between the image and the schema can be drawn. Kant says, "No image could ever be appropriate to the concept of a triangle in general, a general image such that its validity holds for all the triangles (such as right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled triangle) in the world is not possible. A generic universalizable image is not possible for pure sensible concepts, their schema exists only in the mental space" (A141/B180). As the features cannot be generically described in this case, so all triangles will only be successful in partially representing what a triangle is, because images of triangles can be conveyed in our empirical intuition without implying that our empirical intuition has caught the schema of the pure sensible concept in the particular figure presented. Although the image of the pure sensible concepts cannot be given but still, they are a result of the activity of imaginative synthesis because schema in itself is a product of the transcendental synthesis of Imagination. We have defined above what empirical and pure sensible concepts are, what their schema is and the status of their image formations. Now the question is, what are pure concepts? What is the schema of the pure concept and are their images possible? The empirical and the pure sensible schema are ultimately based on the Transcendental schema. Pure concepts are the concepts which are a priori in nature, they are absolutely free from intuitions, they are rules which organizes and categorizes the empirical intuitive manifold that they receive, but free from that manifold content pure concepts are just empty functions, they are abstractions of the instantiations. For instance, let's say causality as a pure concept in itself is free from empirical nature because it cannot be warped in spatio-temporal instances but when it is instantiated then we can say there is smoke in the building because of that fire in kitchen, here the abstract generic/universal nature of the causality is derived in an instance and restricted in a particular spatial locus and temporal position, thus making the latter a case of empirical knowledge and phenomenality. Empirical concepts are the instantiations of the pure concepts, that is why their images are possible. Images can only be formed when over a period of time succession, we observe the phenomenality in our experiences and give it some unity. As we are encountered with empirical objects in our experiences, so only their images are possible. We have never encountered an actual perfect triangle or a circle in our experience, so their images i.e., the images of the pure sensible concepts are not possible, they can only be known and drawn in mind. Pure concepts as we know are free from space and time intuitions, we can never have impressions of pure concepts in our experiences (Hume said, we can never have an impression of pure concept such as causality) as we cannot encounter them in experiences therefore, we can only have images of their repeated occurrences in forms of instances in space and time, thus no images of pure concepts are possible.

If there is no image of a pure concept then what is the schema of the pure concept? The empirical and the pure sensible concepts are ultimately based on the pure concepts for their actualization, similarly the empirical and pure sensible schema is rooted in the schema of the Pure concepts. If images are not given of the pure concepts, then their schema cannot be the Universal process of image formation. What is the schema of the Pure concepts? The schema of Pure concept is Transcendental in nature, it is The Transcendental Schema. If the transcendental schema is not the Image giving Schema then what is it and what makes its nature Transcendental? Kant says, "The schema of a pure concept of understanding and it can never be brought into any image whatsoever" (CPR, B151). It is Transcendental because it is the underlying synthesis for all the appearances and the phenomenal object, it is the synthetic process itself. This schema of the pure concept is the reason why the pure intuitions and pure concepts can bridge together to make sensible intellectual and the intellectual as sensible. The transcendental schema is the a priori time determination or the transcendental synthesis of Imagination, also referred by Kant as, The Productive synthesis of Imagination. As it is the a priori knowledge of synthesis in time so it has an inner sense which belongs to the family of Pure Intuitions and as it has the synthesizing power, so it goes through, organizes, orders, associates and is rule guided thus has a spontaneous activity to it as well, so it belongs to the family of Pure Concepts as well, therefore it has both the elements of pure intuitions and pure concepts, it is homogeneous with both and can act as a mediator to unite them. It is the Transcendental synthesis of Imagination which is uniting them through its schematizing function.

As the schematism is rooted in Transcendental activity of the Imagination, so Kant calls it the Product of the faculty of imagination. It is the transcendental synthesis of Imagination which is making the object of experiences possible.

The productive (Transcendental) synthesis of Imagination differs from the Reproductive synthesis because in the reproductive aspect of imagination, there was the presence of the image of the object which once was experienced by the subject, it is a sort of imagination by recreation or reproduction of the experienced impressions, but on the other hand, in the productive or the Transcendental synthesis of imagination, the Image is originally given, the image does not belong to an already experienced object, the image is a result of "original exhibition" (A100). Hume says, we are never encountered by the impressions of causality, modality or relations but we form an idea of them by association and constant conjunction (due to habit and custom) because of Imagination. Therefore, due to the original synthetic activity of Imagination we use associations and relations of ideas to form modal worlds with possible state of affairs and new imaginary entities. Productive synthesis of concepts/categories is embedded in a function of imagination. Kant says, productive synthesis of

Imagination is the real and solitary conditions under which these notions [the categories] establish relation to things and thus have significance.

This is the capacity for a new creation and representation of a not-being and that too not necessarily in the form of an image with a sensory qualitative content but also expresses the non-sensory stipulative assigned modal imaginability. It is therefore clear that, the image creation is the function of the reproductive activity and synthesis of imagination, on the other hand the synthesizing process in general whether it's the intuitive or the conceptual synthesis, which leads to new possibilities in the modal imagination are the result of the transcendental synthesis of imagination faculty. The a priori determination of how the time synthesis is going to occur in the possible scenarios is the transcendental productive action of Imagination.

Section II: Epistemic role of Imagination

As we have seen the difference between faculty of productive and reproductive imagination above in the last section, we therefore know that reproductive synthesis is that which involves the images of the content that is reproduced, images of all empirical concepts are given by reproducing them in intuition. So, here the images are possible but on the other hand, the images of pure concepts and the images of the pure intuitions are not possible, only an image of their instance is possible, so the productive imagination is the process itself, it does not involve images. From the above it is very much clear that not all imagining comes in the form of imaging or mental pictures and images. Williamson says, "not all imagining necessarily have mental imagery."² Chalmers says, "certain propositions are plausibly conceivable even if they are without imaging."³

In order to understand how imagination is not just images, we must understand the basic difference between the perceptual and imaginative experience. The perceptual experience like my experience of sitting in this room right now, I am presented with various perceptual objects that actually exists in an external world which we are aware and conscious of, in this perceptual experience I am presented with objects that have some basic observational properties in a 3-D egocentric space and time. These properties are the primary and secondary qualities, discussed since the philosophy of the empiricist's John Locke. So, in a perceptual experience P, if you perceive an F, then there is an F, that you perceive. As compared to the perceptual experience, in an imaginative experience on the other hand, there is no actual word. I am sitting in my room right now and imagining that I have 3 dragons and they are sleeping next to my bed. There are no dragons in real next to my bed, but I can have a mental picture of them, I can think of their colors, their skin texture, the way they respond when I call them by their assigned name such as Drogon or Viserion etc..... it is very much clear that even imaginative experiences have some basic observational qualities, but these exists only in an imagined space and not an actual space. We can therefore say that, in an imagined situation I, if you imagine an F, then there is no F, that you imagine.

From the above drawn distinction between a perceptual scenario and an imagined scenario, imagined experiences lacks some details as compared to perceptual experience because the imagined experience is not actual in nature. The lack of this actuality is fulfilled and compensated by our mind itself by filling the gaps in the imagined scenario. This gap is basically a lack of context and background details. So, in order to imagine any situation, we have to set a stage on which the sensory images have to take place with some basic observational qualities, so my being able to imagine a dragon is because of the sensory qualitative content but my being able to call it by a particular name or able to make differences between the two dragons is via stipulating some propositional assignments about the background information. This content is called "Assigned content"⁴ by modern epistemologists.

The two types of content thus are, "sensory or qualitative content" and "propositional or Assigned content." The former involves images, and those images presents an imaginative case, while the latter does not involve imagery but instead involves propositional claims and stipulations about the image, that are not depicted by the image itself. Chalmers says that the former content leads to a case of the perceptual imagination and the content of the latter is the case of modal imagination, it is modal in nature because it deals with the alethic content of possibilities and necessities. We can draw the parallels between the Kant's transcendental synthesis of imagination and the modal imagination with the assigned stipulations. We can also say that, it is the Kant's transcendental synthesis of imagination that inspired this content distinction and a necessary reflection on assigned propositional stipulations. Modal imaginability is a necessary part for the evidence and justification in the modal epistemology. Discerning propositions as being conceivable or not is what modal knowledge is ultimately based on. If we think of explicating conceivability by means of imaginability, proposing to do so is going to make modal epistemology more practicable and feasible; doing so will throw light on Imaginability of Impossible propositions.

² Williamson, "knowing through Imagining," 16.

³ Chalmers, "Does conceivability entail possibility," 151.

⁴ Kung, "Imagining as a guide to possibility," 15.

'Imaginability of impossible propositions' has been of interest ever since Kripke's most prominent work 'naming and necessity', in this work there has been examples that came from a posteriori necessity.

This very famous example of imagining counterfactual scenario is water being constituted of XYZ molecule instead of H₂O, this will fall under imagination of impossible case. Similarly, other impossible propositions like, me being awarded with the Fields medal for proving the falsity of Goldbach's conjecture or I can even imagine going back in time with Dr. WHO to Vincent van Gogh's house and save him from his inner demons. Now, these scenarios that are absolutely impossible are unimaginable as well and they just appear to be just some arbitrary mixture or combination of the mental imagery and thought processes. This whimsical and erratic combination makes no claim to objectiveness and extensiveness of reality. Kripke's response to such impossible scenarios is that, that which is metaphysically impossible cannot be imagined at all. This account of Kripke was inspired by his desire to save the relationship between Imagination and Metaphysical Modality and he accomplished his desire of saving this relationship by imposing restrictions on the faculty of imagination. But that's not what our aim is, we will look genuinely into the power of this faculty of imagination by not restricting it to facilitate our desires. Just like Kant, we will explore the functions and capabilities of what imagination can do and what it cannot do.

The imagination of the impossible is facilitated by imagining the modal world. So, in order to imagine an element called transparent iron, we have to think of a modal world, in that modal world we can form the mental imagery of a Harvard scientists making an award acceptance speech for the discovery of this element never thought of before and that is transparent iron. In my imagined situation I can think of the scientists and of the stage on which the speech is delivered, I can also think of the award, I can think of the dressing of the scientists as well, I can even imagine an auditorium full of people, now this is possible because of the reproductive synthesis of imagination due to this synthesis what has already been experienced by the subject or perceived by the subject, when that is brought to mind again in the form of the image in intuition, then that is reproducing the content again. All that of which the images are possible, they therefore come through the reproductive synthesis but something that we have never experience before or perceived before, we cannot form an image of that, like we cannot think about what transparent iron looks like. So, in such cases where we cannot think of the qualitative content of the image, there we have to rely on the stipulated assigned content. By assigning some names, stipulations and propositions, we assign the conceptualization to the impossible as well. This assigning has to be very specific in nature and instead of imagining the material object determinately we have to determinately imagine the material object, so the specification is inherent to the nature of imagined scenario especially when it comes to assigning. We can say that, the qualitative content is about the imaginative scenario itself, because it depicts the face value while on the other hand there is a talking about the thing itself, about that thing in the imagined case on which assignments are to be made. The former reflects a *de dicto* case of imagining and the latter, a *de re* case. So, we can say that, assigned content is *de re* in nature.

After having this fruitful discussion about assigned content of the imagined scenario, we can say that, we have enormous power in assigning imaginative content. To a very specific level of detail, we can do fixations of our imagined scenario via making stipulations and in doing so we bring into picture a modal world, which verifies the content of the assigned stipulations.

From the above made claims, one may argue that, if all we have to do, to avail oneself of use of alethic imagination is to think of a modal world and if all we have to do in thinking of a modal world is making assignments about the world then any world whatsoever is modally imaginable, then we can literally imagine anything, the counterfactuals and the impossible. The interesting point to be noted here is that, it is the assigned content that paves way and smoothens the process for imagining the latter. It is because the assigned content to be unconstrained absolutely, it seems to be free from all sort of restrictions as compared to the sensory or qualitative content. In the qualitative content of the imaginability there comes a point where we cannot go further with our mental imagery and picturization, which is not the case with assigned stipulated content of the imagination. Therefore, we can say that qualitative content as compared to assigned content has a lot of restrictions, but are there any constraints on the assigned content of the modal imagination?

Although assigned content seems to be as free as suppositions, but there seems to be only one major principal restriction or constraint that applies on the assigned content, and that is certainty. Suppose, P be a proposition, whose truth value I am absolutely certain about for example... if I am sure that p is true then no matter what I cannot imagine P to be false. The absolute certainty has to do with knowledge, I must have enough evidence to determine the truth value of any proposition. My having true belief along with enough justificatory evidence will make me certain about the truth value of a proposition, which then is a case of knowledge. When I am not in the best knowledge or epistemic scenario, when I am short of knowledge, then I am not certain about the truth value of any proposition and when I am not certain then I look for possible answers about P's truth value. This running into the realm of imagination and modalities to look for possible answers using counterfactuals and impossibilities as an aid to serve an answer to this problem, we end up in assigning content in imaginative space. From the above argument, it is clearly visible that, it is the lack of absolute certainty that leads to cases

of assigning stipulations in the imagination. Think about an indexical proposition like, 'I exists', I am absolutely certain about my being, about my presence. So, if I am certain about my existence, then according to the above argument I should not be able to imagine otherwise. But we can imagine a counterfactual scenario where I do not exist. I imagine my non-existence a lot of times, but what kind of imagining is it? Let's try to analyze it. So, when I imagine, I am dead, I picturize my mom and dad crying, I have this mental image of my friends giving a farewell speech on my funeral, I can even think of my body not responding but even if I can imagine all these things, there is something that I cannot take away and that is, I cannot take away the experiencer of the imagining from the imagined situation itself. I have no idea what not experiencing feels like so I cannot have a mental image of myself not experiencing, we are capable of doing so only by assigning non-existence. So, I can only assign my non-existence and cannot actually picturize or have a mental image of the same. But as, I am absolutely certain about my being so assigning not being would be flawed and will merely be counted as only an act of supposition and not imagination. Therefore, assigning content like non-existence in my imagination would be fallacious. We can thus say that, "certainty is a major constraint on assigned content."

Will it be ok to imply that, 'the lack of certainty of a proposition P's truth value is evidentiary enough for imagining the P's possibility?'

No, in itself, it's not good evidence for P's possibility. 'A proposition P is conceivable via imagining if mere lack of certainty of p and making assigned stipulations about P (which make P true in the imagined situation), is not good enough evidence for P's possibility.'

If I thus assign content P to an imagined situation S by virtue of not being certain then P cannot provide evidence for S's metaphysical possibility. From all the above we can conclude that, 'Imagining something P will never be evidence for P's metaphysical possibility if the truth of P in the imagined situation S follows only from the assigned content.'

We have established some premises so far that we found plausible to secure and establish a modal epistemology based on the theory of imagination. P, as we know is the proposition whose metaphysical possibility, we are demanding in an imagined situation S.

P1: A proposition P is imaginable if and only if one is able to form a qualitative sensory mental image and assign some content to it such that in S, P is the case.

P2: Without the qualitative sensory content Q, it would not be possible that in S, P is case.

P3: The possibility of proposition P via imagination will be the case only if P does not follow from the assigned content alone.

From the above propositions we can conclude that, C: The proposition P is modally imaginable and possible in the imagined situation S.

There can be an argument in the counter for the third premise saying that, The proposition P can follow from the assigned content alone, if the following conditions are satisfied (i) there should be independent evidence for the assigned content A (ii) all the constituents of A should be coherent with each other.

For example, while considering a Gettier case, we have to make sure that in the imagined cases of Gettier, the constituents are themselves possible and coherent at the same time, if that is the case only then establishing a successful Gettier case will be possible.

If these conditions are satisfied then it means that we have independent evidence for the content of the assigned stipulated imagined thing, and if that is the case then we already have a justification with a true belief which means we are already certain about the case. Certainty as we discussed earlier, if exist, then we can derive the truth value of any proposition. So, considering this argument would be baseless because that's not the case of an imaginative space anymore, instead it deals with knowledge then. Therefore, the above argument can be countered, and the metaphysical possibility of any entity cannot be entailed from assigned content alone. From the above analysis of the contents of imaginative space, we can now look into which imagined entities are metaphysically possible and which are not. By doing so, we can eliminate the cases of supposing or conceptualizing from imagining. There have been a lot of discussion about the zombie world, let's see if it's metaphysically possible or not. But, before that we must address the question, what is zombie world?

A zombie world is a world, which is physically similar to our world, but there is no consciousness in it. Is it metaphysically possible?

P1: If I can think of the sensory qualitative imagery of a zombie world and assign content to it, then I can imagine a zombie world. $[(Q.A) \supset I]$

P2: I can imagine the sensory qualitative imagery of a zombie world and I can assign content to it. (Q.A)

From P1 and P2, using the Modus Ponens rule, we can conclude, C1

C1: I can imagine a zombie world (I)

P3: If a zombie world is imaginable then it is possible metaphysically. $(I \supset M)$

From C1 and P3, using Modus ponens again, we can conclude, C2

C2: A Zombie world is possible metaphysically. (M)

In a similar fashion, we can analyze other impossible scenarios like water can consist of XYZ molecule instead of H₂O, there is a possibility for the existence of transparent iron, etc... Imagination has a necessary task to fulfil in modal knowledge and its role thus cannot be eschewed.

Conclusion

Imagination's ability to represent objects in intuitions even without their presence in actuality is thus very important for bringing our attention to the possible scenarios and is useful in uncertain conditions and it does so by preventing us from the upcoming dangers. Imagination picks out the little bit that we know and fills in the entire picture. Reproductive synthesis is that which involves the images of the content that is reproduced, images of all empirical concepts are given by reproducing them in intuition, so the images are possible but on the other hand, the images of pure concepts and the images of the pure intuitions are not possible, only an image of their instance is possible, so the productive imagination is the process itself, it does not involve images. From the above it is very much clear that not all imagining comes in the form of imaging or mental pictures and images. The new possibilities in the modal imagination are the result of the transcendental synthesis of imagination faculty. The a priori determination of how the time synthesis is going to occur in the possible scenarios is the transcendental productive action of Imagination. Imagination as we saw in this paper has an important role in the epistemology because it constitutes knowledge by gathering, differentiating, ordering and organizing sensory content manifold at the level of sensibility and it is a basic faculty in the constitution of experience as well. Kant resolves the problem arising from Hume's epistemology by using a priori synthesis of imagination.

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