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How Should Spatial Planning Deal WITH Forced Immigration IN THE Turkish Case?

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
	During the last twelve years, one of the hot topics on Türkiye's public agenda has been Syrian forced immigration. In this period, Türkiye welcomed over 3.1 million Syrian immigrants who freely choose to settle in various cities. They have presented significant concentrations in certain cities and caused socio-spatial impacts. The Turkish spatial planning practice is not capable of coping with these impacts. In this framework, this study focuses on the question of how spatial planning should deal with forced immigration and discusses what kind of qualities spatial planning should have concerning forced immigration, at both regional and urban levels. Resilience is the key concept in these discussions. To make the proposals for resilience more concrete and operational, the German case, as the best spatial planning experience, is analyzed. This analysis offers valuable insights into how Turkish planning practice should address both the existing and the possible the waves of forced migration. **Index Terms**—forced immigration, regional and urban level, resilience, spatial planning.

I. INTRODUCTION

The most general definition of forced migration is displacement under coercion due to the different socio-political, economic, and environmental factors [1], [2]. These factors[1] trigger the fear of harm and death and force people to engage in involuntary movements. Although the boundary between migration and forced migration is not very clear, the distinctive feature of forced migration is that those who face it do not have the freedom or power to decide whether to leave or continue to stay [3, p. 261].

The history of forced migration is as ancient as human history. Although there have been drastic consequences of these migratory movements, their intensity has increased, and large numbers of people from different regions of the world have experienced forced displacement over time, especially in the last century. The First and Second World Wars, the separation of Pakistan from India, the dissolutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Yugoslavia have led to the most well-known forced migration movements of this century [3]–[7].

Forced migrations have also continued into the 21st century. One of the most drastic examples of forced migration in this century was the Syrian forced immigration. Due to the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, more than half of the Syrians have emigrated to other countries. Approximately 3.7 million Syrians[2] have arrived in Türkiye in ten years. This high number has been the result of the historical neighborhood ties between the two countries, the legal legislation in Türkiye, its open door policy, and its critical location that allows people to continue their migratory movements to Europe [8], [9]. Since this migration wave is the biggest one in the Republican era, it has become one of the most important items on Türkiye's public agenda in the last few years.

Due to the insufficient capacity for temporary accommodation centers in Türkiye, this huge immigration wave has been directed to cities to meet their daily needs. Since there was no resettlement policy for Syrians, this forced immigration could not be spatially controlled, and Syrians settled in the cities of their choice without any restrictions.[3]

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[1] Please check the website "Concern Worldwide US" [34] for the most frequent causes of forced migration.
[2] The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey is 3,684,488 on June 23rd, 2022 [35].
[3] The first legal regulation restricting Syrians' right to travel and requiring permission to move from one city to another was a circular issued by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. It entered into force on January 5th, 2016.

Syrian immigrants have not been equally distributed to every Turkish city. Their absolute numbers are small in some cities and quite high in others. It is possible to say that in cities where the population of Syrian immigrants is relatively high compared to the urban population, Syrians and their problems have become very visible. In such cities, public institutions and non-governmental organizations have tried to find solutions to their problems such as language barriers, inadequate participation in social networks, difficulties in accessing public services, and limitations in fulfilling their daily needs due to insufficient economic capacities have achieved some success stories. However, this is not the case for the spatial planning institutions of both central and local governments, which have been unresponsive to the urban problems associated with Syrian immigrants. The spatial plans produced by these institutions have generally been blind to Syrian immigrants and do not propose any specific plan decisions concerning them. However, in cities with high concentrations of Syrian immigrants, social topographies have significantly changed, new residential density surfaces have been formed differently than the ones proposed in the existing spatial development plans, new land use patterns have emerged, and processes of urban decay and decline have been increased, especially in residential areas where low-income Syrian immigrants are concentrated.

By taking the aforementioned socio-spatial impacts as its starting point, this study focuses on the question of how spatial planning should deal with forced migration and what kind of qualities spatial planning should have concerning forced migration, at both regional and urban levels. The study has five parts. Following the introduction part that discusses the aim and scope of the study, the second part of the study focuses on a historical outline of the forced migrations to Türkiye. This outline helps to understand the extent of Syrian forced immigration. The third part focuses on the regional and urban distribution of Syrian immigrants in Türkiye. The analyses of these spatial distributions attempt to identify the cities where Syrian immigrants are concentrated and then define the socio-spatial impacts of Syrians in these cities. These definitions are used in the fourth part of the study to delineate the qualities of spatial planning for the cities under the pressure of forced immigration. This part first explains why the pressure of forced immigration creates a need for spatial planning that targets resilience. To make the proposals for resilience concrete, the German case, as the best spatial planning experience, is analyzed to extract lessons learned for the Turkish case. As the most important part of the study, it makes the study more than a description of the existing situation and helps to develop different recommendations at the concrete/operational level instead of the abstract/discursive level. The evaluations in the fifth and final part of the study open a new window on forced immigration and provide insights into how Turkish planning practice should address the waves of forced migration that are still ongoing and are expected to appear in the future.

II. Forced Immigration in Türkiye

Forced immigration and its general consequences have been one of the most significant items on the national agenda since the early Republican period. This significance stems from the fact that many rural and urban settlements have faced forced immigration.

The forced immigration movements, which especially started during the decline period of the Ottoman Empire, continued after the proclamation of the Republic. These movements, supported first by the imperial and then by republican policies, were mainly from the Balkan countries to Turkey. Since those policies aimed to create a kind of Turkish social structure in Anatolia, those immigrants were mostly Turks and people of Turkish culture. Up until the Second World War, these immigration movements primarily targeted rural areas in western and northwestern Anatolia. Then, the cities in the same region became the main destinations of immigrants from similar origins [10]. In the post-1980 period, Turkey became a country where people of different nationalities and cultures started to immigrate. In this period, Bosnians, Macedonians, Kosovans, and Romanians from Balkan countries; Georgians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Afghans, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs from Central Asia; and Iranians and Iraqis from Middle Eastern countries immigrated to Turkey and chose to settle in developed cities [11]–[13]. Although these immigration movements were significant, none of them reached the intensity of the Syrian forced immigration movement following the civil war in Syria. With this movement, approximately 3.7 million Syrians[4] settled down in Turkey in a very short period of time.

Until the Syrian forced immigration, almost all these immigration movements were very apparent; yet, their socio-spatial impacts in rural and urban areas are not very well known due to the lack of adequate records on immigrants' regional and urban distributions and the limited number of academic studies. Not only their impacts but also the planning studies concerning these immigration movements were unclear, except for the provision of immigrant houses in limited cases.

Since there are lots of studies on Syrian forced immigration, it is possible to put this immigration movement forward differently than the previous movements so that a new definition of urban and regional planning focusing on forced immigration can be achieved.

This circular aimed to register Syrians in their places of residence. Therefore, it did not aim to change their existing spatial distributions of Syrians, but to fix those distributions [36].

4 The highest number of Syrians was 3,737,369 in the year 2021 [34].

III. SYRIAN IMMIGRANTS IN TÜRKIYE: A REGIONAL AND URBAN CONSIDERATION

The lack of a national resettlement policy controlling the regional and urban distributions of Syrians until 2016 allowed Syrians to live in the cities of their choice [14]. In this unregulated context, Syrians have been distributed to Turkish cities neither evenly nor homogenously but have presented significant concentrations in certain cities (Figure 1).


Figure 1. UNHCR Türkiye: Provincial Breakdown Syrian Refugees in Türkiye (as of 5 October 2023). Available: https://reliefweb.int/map/turkiye/unhcr-turkiye-provincial-breakdown-syrian-refugees-turkiye-5-october-2023. [Accessed: 1 April 2024].

There are two main tendencies in the regional distributions of Syrians. The first one can be defined as the concentration of Syrian immigrants in Turkish metropolitan cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, and Konya. Such cities offer a high level of cosmopolitanism, diversity of economic activities, tolerance for cultural differences, and acceptance/adoption by local communities as cities from other countries [15], and these qualities mean a smoother daily life for Syrian immigrants. This is why a significant number of Syrians have been living in these cities. In these cities, the absolute numbers of Syrians are high, but their proportions relative to the urban populations are considerably low. These low proportions make Syrians partly invisible to the members of the local community, even if they are concentrated in certain neighborhoods of the cities. The second tendency is the concentration of Syrian immigrants in cities close to the Syrian border, such as Gaziantep, Antakya, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mersin, and Kilis. The relatively short distances to Syria enable Syrians to have more contact with their home country for different purposes. They can maintain and develop cross-border trade relations or continue social relations with their relatives. Syrian immigrants constitute a significant proportion of the urban population in this group of cities; sometimes they even approach the number of local community members, as is observed in Kilis. The significant increases in populations in these cities create problems for local governments. Since they are legally expected to serve immigrants, their costs of the providing technical and social services start to increase. What makes the group of cities interesting from a spatial planning perspective is that the urban populations in these cities have enormously increased in very short periods.

Similar to their regional distributions, the distributions of Syrians in the cities are neither even nor homogeneous in the cities where they are concentrated. These heterogeneous urban distributions of Syrians create several socio-spatial impacts on cities that need to be addressed by spatial planning.

The first of these impacts is the significant concentration of Syrians at certain locations within the cities. These concentration patterns emerge regarding the levels of their financial resources. Syrians with higher levels of financial resources prefer to own or rent a residential unit in neighborhoods where upper-income members of local communities choose to live. Since the number of these Syrians is relatively small, they cannot form any distinct concentration patterns in the cities. It is, actually, very difficult to detect them locationally. Syrians with medium-levels of financial resources are generally concentrated in housing areas that include formal or informal services for them. Formal services are mainly health and education services, most of which were present in cities before Syrians. Education services, namely the schools, are especially critical to Syrians' locational preferences since they want their children to have a proper education. Informal services are unregistered ones, generally provided by Syrians. The nonexistence of language barriers during the provision of these services makes them very accessible to Syrian immigrants. The tendency to concentrate on and around these services results from the demand to sustain their old living standards in Syria. However, the number of Syrians with medium levels of financial resources is also not very high. The largest group is the Syrian immigrants, who have low levels of financial resources. The locational preferences of these groups are for informally produced residential areas where rents are below average levels. These processes are observable in cities such as Mersin [16], Gaziantep [17], Kilis [18], and Antakya [19] and the indirect impact of these

processes is the increase in the rents of residential units for low-income groups.

The locational preferences of Syrians for certain residential areas increase population densities in those areas more than expected. One of the reasons for this increase is the average household size of Syrians. This number is 6.2 persons for Syrians outside the camps [20], which is quite higher than the average household size for Türkiye, which is 3.23 [21]. Another reason for the increase in population densities is the fact that two or more Syrian households share the same residential unit [19]. Although the number of these cases has decreased over time, this practice is still a survival strategy in cities with high numbers of low-income Syrians. It not only increases the density of residential areas but also leads to problems such as insufficient social facilities, technical infrastructure, and green areas. All these problems create a quality of life problem in parts of the cities where Syrians have been concentrated.

The increase in population densities in certain residential areas leads to the emergence of new land use patterns, including mostly commercial units. These commercial units are unregistered, yet they offer goods and services that are popular among Syrians. In certain parts of cities, these commercial uses are very concentrated, and these commercial concentrations appear as new elements of the systems of the urban centers that were not proposed in spatial development plans. Sometimes, these new commercial centers can reach a size that can affect daily commuting relations in the cities.

The concentration of Syrians in certain residential areas also means a kind of domination of those areas, and this domination pushes the existing users towards different residential areas, mostly the peripheral ones. The intertwined processes of domination and dislocation are very similar to the invasion and succession processes described by the Chicago School [22]. These processes, especially those caused by low-income Syrians, produce symbolic boundaries within cities that are difficult to cross over. What is observed within those boundaries is, firstly, the process of the degradation and deterioration of the buildings since neither the property owners are willing to invest in their houses nor the Syrians have sufficient financial resources to maintain the houses they live in. The accumulation of these processes sometimes results in urban decay and decline in very short periods.

IV. SPATIAL PLANNING CONCERNING FORCED IMMIGRATION

What has been experienced in Türkiye concerning forced immigration in the last few years is a rapid development and radical change in certain cities. These development and change can also be considered an urban crisis since it is difficult to manage with the existing resources, procedures, laws, structures, and mechanisms [23], [24]. Another reason why the cities under the pressure of forced immigration are in crises is the fact that the common characteristics of crises, such as high-level uncertainties and surprises, high levels of change and turmoil, high risks and threats, complex effects of expected impacts on the whole system, insufficient information about solutions, difficulties in social consensus, and the observation of urgency for solutions due to the high cost of delay [15] are quite observable in them.

This consideration is not only valid for academic scholars but also for local community members who have had a strong negative belief that Syrians have decreased average wages, have increased the level of competition in the labor market, and consequently unemployment rates for the local community members; have raised housing rents since they have created a huge demand for the housing market; have been the source of certain diseases threatening public health; have used public resources without working; and have brought the effects of terrorism and war to the [9]. Due to this consideration, local community members consider Syrians as the main factor reducing the overall quality of their lives and believe that the hospitality towards Syrians should come to an end. Within this context, social tension and conflict between Syrians and local community members, especially low-income ones, have increased. On the other hand, a large number of Syrians live in vulnerable conditions. They mostly have low incomes and, consequently, live in limited quality of life conditions. Adult and elderly Syrian women still have difficulties accessing public life due to language barriers. Since they do not have the qualifications for the local labor market, Syrian men work for very low wages in jobs that require physical strength, such as construction work, and children work as informal waste collectors in unhealthy conditions, while Syrian women are housewives or sometimes work as beggars [25].

Conceptualizing the impacts of forced immigration as the source of an urban crisis and associating Syrian immigrants with vulnerability raises the question of how this crisis and vulnerability can be overcome. The process of overcoming this crisis and vulnerability has two dimensions: the policy dimension and the planning dimension.

On the policy dimension, central and local governments have developed various strategies towards Syrians. The main strategy of the central government is to encourage the voluntary returns of Syrians to their home country. However, the rate of return is quite low. Syrians believe that it is difficult to meet basic daily needs and restore acceptable living conditions due to the high level of damage to rural and urban areas in Syria. The second strategy of the central government is to support Syrians, especially by accessing public services provided by the central authorities. Similarly, local governments, especially in cities with considerable concentrations of Syrians, have focused on humanitarian aid such as food and shelter. They also provide certain social services, such as language courses, for immigrants [9]. However, the levels of local support are not the same in every city, and those levels depend on the economic capacities and financial resources of municipalities and local governments. This means that Syrians have varying opportunities in different cities.

What is quite clear regarding the policy dimension is the necessity of a new and just policy structure for Syrians at both the central and the local levels.

It is more difficult to overcome the crisis and the vulnerability in the planning dimension. This difficulty stems from the uncertainty and unpredictability that appeared with forced immigration. The uncertainty arises from inadequate registration during legal entries, illegal entries, the magnitude of forced immigration, and uncontrolled displacements within the country. In this context of uncertainty, it becomes almost impossible to make predictions for spatial planning. Yet, spatial planning has to confront this uncertainty and unpredictability, and this confrontation should be related to basic planning issues such as the carrying capacity of settlements, the increasing need for housing and public services in settlements, and their impacts. Although it is possible to conduct studies on the carrying capacities of settlements, it is not clear how to calculate the need for increased housing and public services in cases where it is not possible to control the content, type, and timing of urban growth generated by new immigrants [15].

Conventional spatial planning in Turkey, which can produce acceptable solutions for relatively stable periods, is insufficient to produce solutions to short- and long-term basic problems for rapidly developing and radically changing cities under the pressure of forced immigration. In such a context, there appears to be a need for a new planning approach to cope with the crises and vulnerabilities arising from forced immigration. Resilience can be a pivotal concept in this approach since resilience can be defined as the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, economic activities, and systems to survive no matter what kind of chronic stresses or acute shocks they experience [26, p. 6].

Concerning the relevant studies, resilience is related to certain attributes such as flexibility, adaptability, diversity, strength, interdependence, cooperation, redundancy, efficiency, interconnectedness, capacity development, and autonomy [27], [28], [29, p. 10]. Although those studies mention that these attributes should be taken into account in spatial strategy and plan decision-making processes, it is not easy to translate them directly into urban space and spatial planning. However, this translation is a must for cities under the pressure of forced immigration, since forced immigration produces vulnerabilities, and vulnerability also has spatial consequences.

One of the best ways for this translation is to evaluate the best experiences of different countries that have faced similar levels of forced migration and to draw lessons for Türkiye from these experiences. The critical point here is the selection of the countries to extract lessons learned. These countries have to be the ones faced with high-intensity forced immigration.

The recent waves of forced immigration have mainly been directed towards Middle Eastern and East African countries. Although they are the main destinations for a high number of forced immigrants, it is not possible to access their spatial planning experiences. The first reason for this inaccessibility can result from the low levels of institutionalization of spatial planning and the lack of specialized spatial planning experiences focusing on forced immigration in these countries. In certain Middle Eastern and East African countries, there can be such experiences; yet, due to the lack of academic studies on these experiences with widespread impacts and the problems of dissemination, it does not become possible to extract lessons learned from these experiences.

On the other hand, European countries have also become targets of forced immigration. Yet, forced immigration is not a critical problem for many European countries since the numbers of accepted immigrants in these countries are considerably low. Those immigrants do not put significant pressure on settlements.[5] Under such conditions, in many European countries that have properly institutionalized spatial planning, the agenda does not prioritize forced immigration. There are, however, exceptional European countries with high numbers of forced immigrants, such as Germany, Sweden, and Austria. Among them, the best experience to be studied is Germany, which accepted the highest number of immigrants during the Migrant Crisis in 2015.[6] What makes the German experience also interesting is their consideration of forced immigration as a spatial planning problem and the production of academic studies on this consideration from which generalized conclusions and lessons learned can be drawn.

A. The German Case

In the case of Germany, due to the idealization of a homogeneous society, integration is the main motivation for considering immigrants. The reason to follow integration as the central concept is the assumption that integration may reduce vulnerabilities. Although it is a controversial concept in the social sciences, it has reflections on spatial planning, and spatial planning practice in Germany focusing on immigration aims to integrate immigrants into local communities [30].

The first step of these planning activities in Germany is related to the regional distribution of immigrants across the settlements. These regional distributions of immigrants are based on a quota system called Königstein Key. Although this system was developed how the federal states should be involved in co-financing

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[5] On February 24, 2022, this situation started to change with the Ukraine-Russia Crisis. A large number of Ukrainians are directed towards different European countries. Their numbers are especially high in Ukraine's neighboring countries which may force planning efforts for these forced immigrants soon. However, as of now, no significant planning practice has been achieved [37].

[6] As of the year 2017, there were 530,000 Syrian immigrants in Germany, nearly five times the number of refugees in Sweden, which ranked second [38].

regional infrastructure investments, it is also useful to determine the proportion of immigrants that the federal states (and settlements within the federal states) can accept. The quotas in this system are determined concerning the tax revenues and local shares from the central budget (2/3) and population size (1/3). Since these fiscal and demographic values are dynamic in nature, the central government defines these quotas every year. In this system, federal states with higher tax revenues and larger populations contribute more to co-financing regional infrastructure investments and accept more immigrants, while the ones with lower tax revenues and smaller populations contribute less and accept fewer immigrants [30], [31].

In addition to the spatial distribution of immigrants, there are also legal regulations that restrict the movement of immigrants from the cities they first settled down to other cities (except for formal work and education) for at least three years. These regulations aim to prevent spatial concentrations and the formation of possible parallel societies in the metropolitan cities, which are considerably attractive due to the existing/experienced immigrants' presence and their social networks [31].

Although this system has been formed quite rationally, it has been criticized for certain weaknesses, such as ignoring the federal states' land resources, the urban/technical infrastructure of the settlements in the federal states, the qualifications for the local labor market, especially for shrinking cities and rural areas, and urban social profiles, which have potentials by understanding the tolerance levels of local community members towards immigrants [32].

The second step focuses on how to achieve integration at the urban level. Integration is a multi-dimensional issue. Reducing the language barrier, participating in the labor market, accessing social services, and having contact with counselors are some of these dimensions. Overcoming problems related to these dimensions is a management problem [16]. Central and local governments can establish financial and institutional bases to achieve integration of the immigrants through these dimensions. The dimensions of integration that are directly related to spatial planning are reception and accommodation. These dimensions are central to successful integration, as they are quite influential for immigrants in accessing information, resources, and social networks.

The reception is mainly related to the services that should be provided in the temporary accommodation centers to immigrants on their first arrival in the new country. In the case of Germany, there is a public consensus among all stakeholders on the location and size of temporary accommodation centers. According to this consensus, these centers should be located on the periphery of the city, neither too isolated from the city nor surrounded by urban fabric, so that immigrants can be kept under control while providing the services they need. Additionally, these centers should not be large camps as they are observable in the Global South, but small centers like in the Global North, since that small scale is more supportive for immigrants to experience everyday life in a relatively normal way [30], [31], [33].

The accommodation is not as clear-cut as the reception. Although accommodation is critical for the everyday practices of immigrants, two interrelated quantitative factors make accommodation quite challenging. The first one is the high demand created by the high number of immigrants; the other one is the limited supply of accommodation units due to economic constraints.

In the German case, the first demand-related factor that makes the provision of accommodation difficult is the higher number of immigrants than expected. At the beginning of the European Refugee Crisis in the year 2015, local administrations in Germany did not want to send the immigrants to unused airports, underutilized accommodation units, hotels, tent camps, or gymnasiums for long periods, but tried to place them in social housing within the existing housing stock. However, when the number of immigrants increased too high and quick solutions for them became a necessity, they started to return to the idea they had initially rejected, and they preferred to provide accommodations in non-residential buildings for immigrants without questioning their qualities. At this point, sports halls, old schools, and disused factories were transformed into dormitory-like accommodation units to solve the crisis. There were tent camps, modular housing projects, and container villages in metropolitan cities where the number of immigrants has increased significantly [30]. They thought that these solutions had to be temporary; yet, with the inability to provide a sufficient amount of social housing for immigrants, the duration of this temporality became too much [31, p. 143].

The second supply-related factor that makes accommodation challenging emerged when immigrants were directed to the cities where there had already been an existing demand for social housing. The German experience shows that when immigrants are directed to cities with a significant number of higher education students and/or to cities with a significant immigrant population, accommodation for new immigrants becomes a difficult planning challenge because of the high levels of occupation of the social housing in these cities [31, p. 143].

In the case of producing social housing for immigrants, local governments are expected to ensure certain qualities. These qualities are related to location, functional setting, size, and spatial layout.

The location of accommodation for immigrants is a critical subject for their integration processes. Unlike reception centers, accommodation units should be located within the urban built environment, preferably close to the city center, since their distant location from the city center creates more reluctance among immigrants to participate in urban public life [30], [31]. Additionally, proximity to the city center is significant since this proximity facilitates access to urban services and infrastructure, reduces travel times for supporting local institutions, and increases the possibility of building social networks and accessing support services. This proximity is also critical for volunteers who are willing to take care of immigrants [31, p. 146].

By considering accommodation, it is also important to pay attention to the land uses of their immediate surroundings. In the German case, there are accommodations for immigrants located in different functional settings. Some of them are in industrial and commercial areas, isolated from residential areas. Due to this isolation, these examples do not usually have adequate social spaces where immigrants socialize with the local community members. By considering these negative aspects, it is easy to claim that the most suitable accommodation units are the ones located in residential areas, which allow immigrants to experience everyday life in a relatively normal way. However, this suitability is not equally valid for all residential areas. The socio-economic and socio-political profiles associated with the residential areas are critical in determining this suitability, as not all socio-economic and socio-political groups have the same attitude towards immigrants. In Germany, upper-income groups and middle classes are generally more tolerant and welcoming towards immigrants and more interested in their daily lives. On the other hand, in residential neighborhoods with low-income groups, there may appear to be intolerant attitudes towards immigrants since there may be high-level struggles for urban services with them. In these and similar residential neighborhoods, where it is imperative to invest in accommodation investments for immigrants, the possible spatial relationships between immigrants and local community members should be reduced through convenient urban design solutions [31, p. 146-7].

The size of accommodation for immigrants is also important, as it determines with whom and at what density immigrants can establish relationships. Large units facilitate access to information, resources, and services. They are also preferred by volunteers since they can easily help a lot of immigrants in a short period of time. Such large units are, additionally, more advantageous by forming social networks. However, there are disadvantageous aspects of large accommodation units. Certain groups and individuals may develop social control over the resources, or the possibility of having conflicts during the use of these resources is higher in these large accommodation facilities. It is also difficult for immigrants to achieve a sense of privacy and a sense of belonging. On the contrary, small units can be advantageous in terms of achieving a sense of privacy and belonging but disadvantageous in terms of accessing different needs [31, p. 149].

The spatial layout of accommodation units, as an urban and architectural feature, is also important. In times of massive waves of immigrants, converted factories, warehouses, gymnasiums, and schools can become a shelter for immigrants and solve short-term accommodation problems. However, such arrangements should be temporary since, in terms of urban and architectural space, they are not very successful. Accommodation should also be able to offer not only social facilities and public spaces for an acceptable living environment but also certain residential qualities such as room designs and sizes [31, p. 149-150].

V. Conclusion

In countries with a relatively high number of forced immigrants, forced immigration has always been an important item on the public agenda. Although it is not possible to know the exact time of immigration movements due to political, economic, and social reasons, consistent predictions state that a large number of people will be displaced due to environmental reasons. The high possibility of immigration movements in the future indicates that forced immigration will be one of the most important discussion subjects. Considering that waves of forced immigration may be increasingly directed towards Türkiye due to its strategic location, this subject becomes even more prioritized for Türkiye.

Although Türkiye has experienced a significant forced immigration process in recent years, it is not possible to say that Türkiye has been successful in coping with the problems that arise with forced immigration. In the policy dimension of coping with forced immigration, central and local governments have focused on fulfilling the urgent humanitarian needs of Syrians and removing all socio-economic, cultural, and political barriers that prevent Syrians from accessing resources and opportunities. These actions are easy to identify, yet their widespread impacts fundamentally depend on the amount of economic resources allocated directly or indirectly to the immigrants. Independent of the amount of economic resources, there has been success in the policy dimension in Türkiye, at least in certain cities.

However, the same success is not observable in the planning dimension. The planning institutions have been inadequate in managing the socio-spatial impacts of forced immigration in Turkish cities. The main reasons for this inadequacy are the uncertainty and unpredictability produced by forced immigration. However, there is a goal −resilience- towards which spatial planning can proceed. Although resilience can usually be defined as a quality for individuals, communities, institutions, economic activities, and/or systems related to their capacities for coping with chronic stresses and acute shocks, aiming for resilient regions and cities as a goal for spatial planning has a potential to widen the horizons of spatial planning.

It is not so easy to translate resilience into space and spatial planning; yet, evaluating the best experiences to achieve resilience may be the path to be followed by Turkish spatial planning practice. At the very moment, the only best experience is the German experience, from which lessons learned can be extracted.

Similar to the German case, integration, instead of assimilation, separation, and marginalization, can be considered the key concept for the Syrian immigrants in Türkiye since they are not willing to go back to their home country. It is also a kind of backcloth for the resilience of immigrants.

In the first step of achieving resilience, there is a controlled distribution of immigrants to the settlements instead of allowing their free movement across the settlements. Controlled distribution can, on the one hand,

help to predict the needs of immigrants in each settlement and, on the other hand, allow the costs of these needs to be shared equitably among settlements. To ensure a controlled distribution of immigrants in Türkiye, a contextual quota system at the regional level should be established without waiting for new waves of forced immigration. Yet, this quota system should not only consider the economic and demographic aspects of the settlements but also their social and cultural profiles. The inclusion of social and cultural profiles in the quota system is not so easy since there are lots of minority groups in Türkiye; however, it may help decision-makers to direct immigrants from specific parts of the world to specific settlements where they can easily participate in daily practices due to the similar cultural codes.

After determining rational spatial distributions of immigrants into the settlements, in a second step, spatial planning should address issues of reception and accommodation. There is a worldwide consensus on how the reception of immigrants should be organized, and Türkiye can follow this consensus. Reception centers should be located on the peripheries, but in relation to the cities. They should serve as welcoming environments. They should not be in the form of large-scale centers so that the immediate needs of immigrants can be met easily. Accommodation, on the contrary, is not as easy to comprehend as reception. There is no panacea solution for the organization of accommodation for immigrants that fits all countries. Especially in countries like Türkiye where there is no sufficient amount of social housing stock under the ownership/control of central and local governments, the production of accommodation, by also considering immigrants, becomes a must. During this production, the locations, functional settings, sizes, and spatial layouts of accommodation units should be taken into consideration. Addressing these issues in planning studies has the potential not only to increase the resilience levels of Turkish cities against the acute shock and chronic stresses of forced immigration but also to reduce the vulnerability of immigrants and increase their integration levels into the hosting local communities. The Turkish planning practice has to consider the inclusion of these discussions for all the cities; yet, there is an urgent priority, especially for cities such as Kilis, Gaziantep, Antakya, Adana, and Mersin where there is a high concentration of immigrants.

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