

What Could People Expect After National And Provincial Government Elections In South Africa In 2024

Dr. Zamokuhle Mbandlwa^{1*}

^{1*}Department of Public Administration and Economics, the Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa, ZamokuhleM@dut.ac.za, 21240964@dut4life.ac.za, <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7528-3565>

Citation: Dr. Zamokuhle Mbandlwa et.al (2024), What Could People Expect After National And Provincial Government Elections In South Africa In 2024..., Educational Administration: Theory And Practice, 30(5), 11449-11457
Doi 10.53555/kuey.v30i5.4953

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

South Africa, a nation marked by its complex socio-political history, is poised for significant changes following the upcoming national and provincial government elections in 2024. The political landscape, shaped by historical challenges, demands a thorough examination of the potential impacts on governance, social dynamics, and economic development.

Purpose of the Paper: This research aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the expectations and potential outcomes in the aftermath of the 2024 national and provincial government elections in South Africa. By delving into key aspects such as political shifts, policy changes, and societal implications, the paper seeks to offer valuable insights into the trajectory of the nation's future.

Objectives: To evaluate the political landscape and identify major shifts in power dynamics post the 2024 elections. To assess potential policy changes at the national and provincial levels and their implications on governance and public welfare. To analyse the socio-economic impacts of the election outcomes on various sectors, including education, healthcare, and economic development. To explore the role of emerging political parties and their influence on the overall political scenario.

Findings: The research findings reveal a dynamic political landscape characterized by shifts in power structures, coalition formations, and the emergence of new political voices. Analysis of policy changes indicates potential shifts in governance strategies, with implications for key sectors such as education and healthcare. Socio-economic impacts highlight the need for adaptive strategies to address challenges and capitalize on opportunities presented by the election outcomes. The role of emerging political parties is found to be significant in shaping the post-election political discourse.

Conclusion: As South Africa stands at the crossroads of political transition, this paper provides valuable insights into the anticipated outcomes of the 2024 national and provincial government elections. The findings underscore the importance of adaptability in addressing challenges and leveraging opportunities in the evolving socio-political landscape. The research aims to contribute to informed decision-making by stakeholders, policymakers, and the public in navigating the post-election landscape and steering the nation towards sustainable development.

Keywords: South Africa, 2024 elections, Political landscape, Policy changes, Socio-economic impacts

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.

A systematic literature review (SLR) is a research methodology that involves the comprehensive and structured examination of existing literature on a specific topic. It is designed to identify, evaluate, and synthesize relevant studies to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing knowledge on a particular subject (van Dinter, Tekinerdogan and Catal 2021). In the context of this study on the expectations after national and provincial

government elections in South Africa in 2024, applying a systematic literature review is beneficial in several ways:

An SLR assisted in identifying and analysing the existing body of literature related to election outcomes, political transitions, and post-election scenarios. This provided a solid foundation for understanding the historical context and factors influencing post-election expectations. A systematic review allowed the researcher to identify theoretical frameworks and models that have been previously used to analyse election outcomes. This guided this research and helped the researcher to conceptualize this study within established theoretical perspectives. By reviewing existing studies, the researcher gained insights into various research methodologies and data collection techniques that have been employed in similar contexts. This assisted the researcher in designing this robust research methodology for the study (Mohamed Shaffril, Samsuddin and Abu Samah 2021).

An SLR highlighted gaps and limitations in existing research. This helped the researcher in positioning this study in the context of the current state of knowledge and identify areas where further research is needed. Elections and their aftermath involve a wide range of disciplines such as political science, sociology, economics, and more. A systematic review allows for the integration of findings from diverse fields, providing a holistic understanding of the topic. An SLR have shed light on the policy implications of election outcomes and post-election scenarios. This is crucial in understanding the potential impact of government changes on various aspects of society. Systematic reviews typically involve a quality assessment of included studies. This process helps ensure that the evidence synthesized is of high quality and reliability (Thomé, Scavarda and Scavarda 2016).

What people of South Africa expected after 2019 elections vs what really happened.

On May 8, 2019, South Africans participated in a pivotal general election, deemed the most significant since the establishment of democracy in 1994. The ruling African National Congress (ANC), uncertain about securing a majority after a decade of Jacob Zuma's governance, ultimately emerged victorious. Notably, both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) experienced a decrease in support, while the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Freedom Front Plus witnessed a surge. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) staged a comeback with a modest increase in support. However, numerous smaller parties faced a decline in backing, and the majority failed to secure parliamentary seats. In an unprecedented scenario, 48 parties contested the election, with only 11 managing to secure seats, compared to 13 in 2014 (Joubert 2018).

The election recorded the lowest voter turnout since 1994, with 65.99% of registered voters participating, marking a decrease from the 73.48% turnout in the 2014 general election. The election campaign was characterized by some commentators as "unpleasant" and "banal." Many suggested that voters were confronted with unappealing choices among the parties. The campaign primarily focused on differences in economic policies, the role of the market, and the level of state intervention. These issues manifested in the parties' positions on nationalization, privatization of land and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (Calland 2016).

Leading up to the election, parties released their manifestos. According to Reg Rumney, who explored the parties' policies, he remarked, "The EFF manifesto sounds like it was dreamt up by students at the university canteen. The DA manifesto looks like it was drawn up by consultants who maximized their billable hours, and I wouldn't be surprised if the ANC manifesto was created by committee."

The ANC's policies and campaign initiatives encompass a commitment to fostering public-private collaboration, a position that some analysts find ambiguous and unclear. The party advocates for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be granted banking licenses and proposes the establishment of mutual banks designed for the benefit of depositors (Bleck and Van de Walle 2019).

Regarding land expropriation without compensation, the ANC has resolved to amend the constitution to facilitate this, emphasizing that the process should promote economic development, agricultural production, and food security. Although the ANC maintains its support for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), it notably downplays BEE in its manifesto, recognizing concerns about its misuse. Instead, the party emphasizes the broadening of ownership and introduces the concept of Employee Share Ownership schemes.

The ANC calls for increased flexibility in the Reserve Bank, urging a departure from a sole focus on inflation targeting to address other issues. The party advocates for a monetary policy that considers objectives such as employment creation and economic growth while maintaining price stability (Jacobs 2023).

During the campaign, the ANC displayed internal divisions, with factions evident within the party. Fikile Mbalula, a former supporter of Jacob Zuma, led the campaign and seemingly shifted allegiance to Cyril Ramaphosa's camp. The former party's secretary-general, a former Free State premier, stirred controversy by discouraging black voters from supporting "umlungus" (white people) and making conflicting promises to different demographic groups regarding land expropriation (Jones and Jones 2021).

Former president Thabo Mbeki, who had distanced himself from ANC campaigns since 2008, publicly pledged support for the party this time (2019 elections). He acknowledged past issues within the ANC but expressed confidence in its direction in 2019.

Business leaders, including influential figures like Peter Bruce and organizations like The Economist and Business Leadership SA, have endorsed Ramaphosa. Their support is grounded in the belief that a Ramaphosa-

led ANC would counteract populist elements, preventing potential economic consequences such as a ratings downgrade, increased borrowing costs, capital outflows, currency instability, and governance paralysis (Friedman 2021).

The DA identifies itself as a liberal party supporting property rights and opposing land expropriation without compensation. It advocates a pro-market stance, pledging to privatize state-owned enterprises, particularly South African Airways and Eskom. The party opposes the nationalization of the Reserve Bank and calls for the protection of foreign investors from legislation that could jeopardize their security or profits (Basson and Du Toit 2017).

Despite endorsing Employee Share Ownership schemes, the DA wavers on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Internal divisions among party leaders, especially on BEE and race policies, were evident leading up to the 2019 election. The party's handling of the expulsion of leader Patricia de Lille, who formed the GOOD party, was also criticized.

In the pre-election period, the DA appeared divided, with internal conflicts between black and white leaders, particularly on issues like BEE, race policies, and the leadership of Mmusi Maimane. Critics argue that the party lacks clarity on principles and values, especially regarding race. According to Carol Paton in *Business Day*, the DA seems to be improvising, engaging in internal disputes over principles and values and struggling to define its stance on race, even introducing the term 'constitutional black' for discussions on election list composition (Malapane 2023).

Leader Mmusi Maimane focused on criticizing President Ramaphosa rather than presenting alternative policies. The party failed to articulate an economic strategy appealing to black voters, emphasizing extensive privatization instead. During the campaign, former DA leaders Tony Leon and Helen Zille took to the field, with Leon highlighting the Western Cape as a model province under DA governance.

The EFF's radical position involves advocating for an extensively interventionist state, pushing for the nationalization of all land, mines, and banks, and advocating for the redistribution of land without compensation. The party strongly urges the nationalization of the Reserve Bank and proposes the establishment of new state banks, despite skepticism stemming from its involvement in the VBS scandal (Jonas 2019).

Despite being implicated in the VBS scandal, where the party was perceived to have played a role in fund looting and the collapse of the bank, the EFF calls for the creation of state banks. In addition, the party rejects Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in favor of state control over all resources. While advocating for women and youth empowerment, as well as black ownership and management of banks, the EFF's stance appears contradictory to its nationalization policy.

Critics, such as Paton, argue that the EFF's promises are unrealistic and its vision utopian, highlighting the party's lack of grounding in reality and voter skepticism. Leader Julius Malema announced at the Rand Easter Show that the EFF would not form coalitions with the DA, especially given the focus on the EFF's role in the VBS banking scandal (Bornman, Harvey, Janse van Vuuren, Kekana, Matuludi, Mdakane and Ramphole 2021). In the final election results, the ANC emerged as the winner with 57.5% of the vote, while the DA secured 20.77%, the EFF 10.79%, the IFP 3.38%, and the FF 2.38%. The ANC's victory, despite a nearly 5% decrease in support compared to 2014, is attributed to the replacement of Jacob Zuma by Cyril Ramaphosa, seen as the key factor in retaining the ruling party's position, albeit with a significantly reduced majority. The ANC faced losses in seats both nationally and provincially, particularly in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal.

The DA, serving as the official opposition, secured 20.77% of the vote, experiencing a slight dip of almost 2% from the 22.23% it attained in 2014. Despite losing over 400,000 votes and five parliamentary seats, it maintained its position as the official opposition. The party's initial strong stance against the ANC under Jacob Zuma weakened with the installation of Ramaphosa as the party and country leader. The DA's election strategy focused on criticizing Ramaphosa for allegedly overlooking crimes committed by Zuma during his tenure as deputy president. However, the party struggled to attract the anticipated support from black voters and alienated conservative white voters, resulting in a loss of support to the FF+ (Bank and Hart 2020).

In provincial elections, the DA retained the Western Cape but with diminished support (55.45% compared to 59.38% in 2014) and lost two seats. Support also decreased in Gauteng and several other provinces, but it gained traction in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Additionally, the party experienced a decline in support in various townships.

Moving on to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the party demonstrated significant growth, securing 10.79% of the vote, a notable increase from the 6.35% in 2014. The EFF gained 19 additional seats in Parliament, totaling 44 MPs. Despite the absence of the corrupt Zuma administration as a target, the EFF's focus on land redistribution and expropriation without compensation resonated with voters. The party became the official opposition in Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and North West provinces (Mehale 2022).

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) experienced a modest increase, obtaining 3.38% of the vote, nearly 1% higher than the 2.4% in 2014. The party gained four more seats, reaching a total of 14, with most gains in its stronghold, KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP's support in Gauteng was limited, securing only one seat, and it lacked a significant presence in other provinces.

The Freedom Front Plus (FF+) achieved remarkable success, increasing its vote share from 0.9% in 2014 to 2.38% in 2019. The party secured 10 additional seats, becoming the fifth-largest party in Parliament. The FF+

attracted white conservative voters, particularly from the DA, by opposing land redistribution and utilizing the campaign slogan "Fight Back."

Among the smaller parties, six secured two seats each in Parliament, including the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the National Freedom Party (NFP), both experiencing a decline in support compared to 2014. COPE secured two seats despite losing considerable support. The African Transformation Movement (ATM) surprised many by securing two seats with 0.44% of the vote (Mancebo 2019).

Two parties, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and Aljama, each secured one seat in Parliament, with PAC experiencing a decline in support compared to 2014. Aljama secured a seat for the first time with 0.18% of the vote.

Jacob Zuma, the former president of the ANC and the country, seemed to lend his support to several parties associated with state capture. Notably, these included Hlaudi Motsoeneng's African Content Party, Mzwanele "Jimmy" Manyi's ATM, and Andile Mngxitama's Black First Land First (BLF).

Among these, only Manyi's party managed to secure enough support to enter Parliament, obtaining 48,107 votes (0.28%) and securing 2 seats. The BLF received 19,796 votes (0.11%), while the ACM garnered 4,841 votes (0.03%). Manyi had connections to state capture through his association with the Gupta family and their ANN7 TV channel, which he took over when the family left the country (Manyapelo and Motswaledi 2023).

Before the election, Zuma appeared to endorse the BLF, with its leaders visiting him in late March. Zuma was reported by Business Day as saying to the BLF: "To us who understand what RET [radical economic transformation] is, it is important that you [BLF] are talking about it. I am certain that you will get enough votes so that you can talk about and raise these issues in the National Assembly. Without economic empowerment, we are doomed and we will amount to nothing."

Two new parties with explicitly left-wing or right-wing ideological stances participated in the election. On the right, the Capitalist Party of SA (ZACP), led by Kanthan Pillay, former CEO of radio station YFM, advocated for a free-market economy, liberty, meritocracy, and equality of opportunity, and opposed affirmative action. However, the party failed to secure a seat, receiving only 15,915 votes (Schulz-Herzenberg 2020).

On the left, trade union leader Irvin Jim headed the new Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party, which also failed to secure a seat after receiving 24,439 votes (0.014%). The party, linked to the metalworkers union Numsa, was unable to garner the support of the union's 339,000 members.

Several parties experienced declines in their support. Agang, launched by Black Consciousness stalwart Mamphela Ramphele, received just 13,856 votes (0.08%), a significant drop from the 52,350 votes it secured in 2014, losing both of its seats (Africa 2020).

AZAPO, another party linked to the Black Consciousness Movement, also saw a decline in its small support base, receiving 12,823 votes (0.07%), compared to 20,421 votes in 2014.

The African People's Convention (APC), led by Themba Godi, lost its only seat in Parliament after receiving 19,593 votes (0.11%), down from 30,676 votes in 2014. The Minority Front, led by Shameen Thakur-Rajbansi, received just 11,961 votes (0.07%).

Twelve parties received between 10,000 and 27,000 votes, failing to secure seats. Additionally, 22 parties received less than 10,000 votes.

The election marked the lowest voter turnout since 1994, with only 65.99% of registered voters casting ballots. Commentators had predicted this disillusionment, especially among youth, after the decade of Zuma's rule, as evidenced by a 47% drop in the registration of 18-to-19-year-olds. The voter turnout of 65.99% was a substantial decrease from the 73.48% recorded in the 2014 election. Only 74.6% of the 35.86-million eligible voters were registered to vote, and just two-thirds of those registered actually voted, leaving almost half of eligible voters abstaining from the polls (Runciman, Bekker and Maggott 2020).

According to Section 52 of the Constitution, following an election, the initial meeting of the National Assembly is to occur within a period determined by the Chief Justice, not exceeding 14 days from the declaration of the election results. On Wednesday, May 22, the post-election proceedings commence with the inaugural session of the National Assembly. During this session, the Chief Justice or an appointed Judge oversees the swearing-in of Members of Parliament, with groups of MPs taking their oaths in alphabetical order, pledging allegiance to the Republic and adherence to the Constitution (Levy, Hirsch, Naidoo and Nxele 2021).

The Chief Justice also presided over the election of the President, chosen from among the MPs. The President, initially a Member of Parliament, assumes office within five days of the election. Subsequently, the Speaker was nominated and elected, with a secret ballot held. The Chief Justice oversees the ballot counting, and the results were announced in the House.

Following the election of the Speaker, nominations were invited for the Deputy Speaker position, overseen by the newly elected Speaker. The first sitting of the Sixth Democratic Parliament was attended by diplomats, guests of the Presidency, leaders and representatives of political parties, and members of the public.

Throughout this process, the mace, symbolizing the Speaker's authority, remains upright until the newly elected Speaker was escorted to the presiding officer's chair by the sergeant-at-arms. The horizontal placement of the mace marked the official commencement of the new Parliament. The first sittings of Provincial Legislatures were tentatively set for May 22, with the Chief Justice announcing the specific date later. Judges President of High Court divisions presided over these sittings, where Provincial Premiers, Speakers, and Members of the Provincial Legislatures were elected and sworn in (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2021).

On Thursday, May 23rd, the Chief Justice overseen the initial session of the NCOP, including the election of the National Council of Provinces' Chairperson from the permanent delegates. Subsequently, the newly elected Chairperson presided over the selection of the Deputy Chairperson, House Chairpersons, and Chief Whip.

Shifting to Saturday, May 25th, the presidential inauguration was deviated from tradition by taking place at Loftus Versfeld Stadium. The decision aims to enhance public participation in this significant national event, with the theme being "Together celebrating 25 years of freedom: Renewal and Growth for a better South Africa." Anticipated attendees include Heads of State, royalty, religious representatives, political parties, and delegates from various regional, continental, and international organizations.

Following the inauguration, the President was expected to promptly appoint a Deputy President and Ministers for the Cabinet, with the Deputy President and Cabinet Members selected from the National Assembly, while a maximum of two Ministers can be chosen from outside the National Assembly (Bank and Hart 2020).

Moving into June 2019, the Parliament had two State of the Nation Addresses (SONA) during a general election year, with the provisional date for SONA being June 20, 2019. SONA marks the commencement of the Sixth Parliament.

Promises made to people before 2024 elections in South Africa

The leader of South Africa's third-largest political party, known for stirring controversy, pledged on Saturday to generate employment opportunities for millions of the nation's unemployed citizens and revitalize its economy. This commitment is part of his strategy to garner more support in anticipation of the upcoming general election.

Julius Malema, the founder of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, delivered his address at the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban, attracting a crowd of enthusiastic supporters as he unveiled the party's election manifesto.

Malema emphasized that their manifesto goes beyond mere promises; it embodies a set of dedicated commitments. As the election season unfolds in South Africa, political parties yet to present their manifestos are expected to do so in the coming weeks. However, the election date has been officially announced as the 29 May 2024 (Dlakavu 2022).

Given the various challenges faced by the long-standing ruling African National Congress, which has governed the country since Nelson Mandela's historic election in 1994, the upcoming election is anticipated to be fiercely contested.

During the event, EFF party supporters, donned in red party attire featuring Malema's likeness, expressed their fervour with lively renditions of struggle songs and liberation slogans as Malema made his entrance into the stadium (Walsh and Mnyandu 2023).

The EFF has gained popularity among disenchanting South Africans, particularly the youth, due to its radical policies, such as the expropriation of white-owned land and the nationalization of mines and banks.

Julius Malema, a divisive figure with radical proposals for solving the country's issues, continues to see an expanding popularity in South Africa and beyond. Formerly an ANC youth leader expelled from the party, Malema has become one of the ruling party's strongest critics, challenging the ANC and President Cyril Ramaphosa.

In the 2019 elections, the EFF secured 10% of the national vote, making it the third-largest opposition party. Fuelled by the declining support for the long-ruling ANC, the EFF anticipates a boost in the upcoming elections (Sebola 2022).

Recent polls by Ipsos suggest that the EFF could outperform the Democratic Alliance and become the second-largest party in the country. The same polls indicate a potential drop in ANC support to below 50%, marking a challenging election for the ruling party.

Malema unveiled the party's slogan for the upcoming elections as "Jobs and land now! Stop loadshedding," addressing issues like high unemployment, slow land redistribution, and the electricity crisis. He emphasized the manifesto as one focused on the struggles of people in poverty.

Malema pledged to end power blackouts affecting the economy, create jobs through initiatives like social housing and road infrastructure, and combat corruption by holding implicated politicians and public servants accountable. He also promised to enhance police visibility to address the high crime rates and increase social welfare grants, including a basic income grant for the unemployed (Ibrahim 2019).

Supporters expressed confidence in the party's chances, citing the EFF's commitment to changing the economic situation for Black people in South Africa. Some highlighted the party's focus on land redistribution and economic benefits for Black individuals. As the elections approach, smaller parties led by former members of major political parties are also expected to participate.

Former President Jacob Zuma of the ANC and South Africa has revealed the establishment of a fresh political party called Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), which has completed its registration to participate in the upcoming elections this year.

Mmusi Maimane, the previous head of the opposition party Democratic Alliance, has initiated a new political entity named BOSA, aiming to enter the political arena for the first time. Simultaneously, Action SA, led by former Johannesburg mayor and ex-DA member Herman Mashaba, is gearing up for its inaugural national election participation (Shangase 2022).

The year 2024 signifies the 30th anniversary of South Africa's inaugural inclusive elections. Despite the political strides outlined in the Economic Freedom Fighters' (EFF) Founding Manifesto, the promised political inclusion has not translated into tangible economic benefits for the previously oppressed population under colonialism and apartheid. Black individuals remain landless, marginalized in economic production, and excluded from meaningful economic participation, often relegated to low-wage and disposable labor roles. The pressing challenges facing South African society today include unprecedented levels of landlessness and joblessness among black citizens (Cilliers 2017).

South Africa is ensnared in a detrimental cycle of underdevelopment, poor performance, and an uncertain future, largely attributed to an inefficient, directionless, and lacking government. In 2024, the country grapples with a load shedding crisis, a consequence of the government's inability to ensure reliable electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.

For the 2024 general elections, the EFF's focal points are LAND, JOBS, and ELECTRICITY, encapsulated in their theme: OUR LAND AND JOBS NOW. STOP LOAD SHEDDING! The urgency surrounding LAND arises from the stark reality that 80% of the population still occupies less than 10% of South Africa's land. The emphasis on JOBS stems from the persisting issue of over 11 million capable South Africans being unemployed, with little hope for change under the current government (Düvenhage 2023).

The emphasis on NOW underscores the prolonged period since political freedom was attained and the immediate need for resolution. The EFF contends that the political change in 1994 did not bring genuine liberation, perpetuating economic and social apartheid. The demand for land and jobs now is a call for true economic emancipation.

The plea to STOP LOAD SHEDDING highlights the government's failure to deliver a dependable electricity plan, exacerbating economic challenges. The white minority still controls key sectors of the economy, maintaining economic apartheid, while post-1994 governments have failed to transfer economic power to the black majority.

The EFF asserts itself as the only political movement capable of effecting real economic change in South Africa, rooted in a decade of interventions and leadership. Their manifesto for the 2024 elections outlines clear action plans aligned with their commitment to achieving ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN OUR LIFETIME, guided by the seven cardinal pillars of their movement and informed by public input and parliamentary experience (Lieberman and Lekalake 2022).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The legislation entails modifications to the Electoral Act of 1998, as mandated by the Constitutional Court's ruling on June 11, 2020, following the case of *New Nation Movement NPC & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others*. The court declared the existing Electoral Act unconstitutional due to its provision that restricted access to the National Assembly and provincial legislatures solely to members of political parties.

In response to the court's judgment, Parliament was directed to rectify the identified issues within 24 months. The court based its decision on principles of association, dignity, and Section 19 Political Rights, while leaving the choice of electoral system to Parliament without expressing a specific preference for principles.

The Electoral Amendment Bill underwent extensive public consultations by both houses of Parliament – the National Parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Parliament sought two deadline extensions from the Constitutional Court, with the final deadline for passing the bill set for February 28, 2023. The National Assembly approved the Bill on October 20, 2022, sending it to the NCOP for further consideration and concurrence. The NCOP, after approving it with additional amendments, returned the Bill to the National Assembly on November 29, 2022, for further processing.

On February 23, 2023, the National Assembly passed the Electoral Amendment Bill, adopting the Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs along with amendments proposed by the NCOP. Consequently, the Electoral Amendment Act came into effect in June 2023.


In summary, the electoral system in South Africa remains unchanged with the preservation of the two-tier multimember compensatory proportional representation system. Members of the National Legislature and provincial legislatures are elected through a party-list PR system, ensuring representation based on electoral support. The Electoral Amendment Act introduces accommodation for independent candidates within the existing system.

Specifically, the National Assembly retains its 400 seats, with 200 allocated to the national list contested by political parties and the remaining 200 distributed among nine regions, contested by both parties and independent candidates. The regional seat distribution is determined by the Electoral Commission before each election, considering voter numbers in each region. Independent candidates can compete for regional seats alongside political parties, with the compensatory 200 seats ensuring overall proportionality for political parties.

Provincial legislatures maintain a single-tier multimember proportional system, with elections determining 30 to 80 seats per province. The Electoral Commission decides seat numbers before each election, with the Western Cape's number set by its provincial legislature. For the other eight provinces, seat numbers are determined by the Commission based on population size, using Census data. The allocation method remains

consistent since 1994, adjusted to accommodate independent candidates. Seats are assigned by calculating a quota, dividing valid votes by the number of seats, and using the highest remainder method for additional seat allocation. Independent candidates are limited to one seat per region, even if contesting in multiple regions.

Figure 1: 9 regional ballots for national assembly and quota for seats



Source: Independent Electoral Commission, 2024.

Figure 1 shows that amongst the 400 seats of the National Assembly in South Africa seats are divided into 200 regional list seats and 200 national list seats. The allocation of seats follows a specific process: The distribution of the 400 seats among political parties is determined proportionally using a quota system, as illustrated in figure 1. The allocation of the 200 regional list seats is based on quotas calculated for each region according to the allocated number of seats, as outlined in figure 1 above. The determination of the 200 national list seats involves subtracting the total regional seats allocated to a party from its overall seat allocation.

The study found that, in the new electoral system, a vacancy occurs when a political party or independent candidate passes away, resigns, or loses membership in the assembly. If a political party candidate departs, the party selects a replacement for the vacant position. If an independent candidate leaves, a recount of the votes is conducted to determine which party or independent candidate from the previous election is eligible to receive the vacated seat.

This process means that votes for the departing independent candidate are ignored, as well as the votes and seats held by independent candidates already in office. In simpler terms, votes for the departing independent candidate and those for independent candidates currently in the legislature are not considered (Acheampong, Basedau and Grauvogel 2024).

There are dual elections conducted concurrently to select representatives for both the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures. Despite being distinct, these elections take place simultaneously on a single day. In the upcoming 2024 election, voters will be presented with three ballots instead of the usual two.

The initial ballot is designated for the election of the compensatory 200 members of the National Assembly, exclusively contested by political parties on a closed list basis.

The second ballot pertains to the regional elections for the 200 members of the National Assembly, with variations depending on the parties and independent candidates participating in each regional election. Only the names of those who meet the requirements for each regional contest will be listed (Sinyonde 2024).

The third ballot, known as the provincial ballot, is intended for electing members of the provincial legislature in each province. This ballot includes the names of political parties and independent candidates meeting the requirements for each provincial election.

It's important to note that National and Provincial elections, although distinct, occur on the same day nationwide. The National Assembly formulates and enforces laws and policies for the entire country, while Provincial Legislatures focus on laws and policies affecting their respective provinces.

The legislation commits South Africa to undergo Electoral reform, encompassing the 2024 elections and subsequent ones. The Electoral Commission is swiftly progressing to finalize the requisite business applications for the Act's implementation in the upcoming 2024 election. Key aspects of this process include: Modifying the Candidate Nomination System to enable the participation of independent candidates and unrepresented political parties. This involves creating a portal for candidates to input details of voters

supporting their candidacy. Revamping the Results System to facilitate the recording of votes cast in favour of independent candidates and converting them into seats if the relevant threshold is met (Alence and Pitcher 2019).

Reforming the system includes updating platforms and communication methods with parties to accommodate independent candidates. Reviewing Political Party Funding legislation to incorporate funding for elected independents.

The enactment of consequential amendments and regulations is crucial for realizing the Act's objectives. For those considering running as independent candidates. Accordingly, independent candidates can contest in multiple regions but are restricted to winning only one seat in the National Assembly. Nomination is limited to the province where candidates are registered. Independent candidates can serve either in the National Assembly or a provincial legislature, but not simultaneously in both. Eligibility criteria include South African citizenship, age 18 or older, residence in the intended contesting province, no history of bankruptcy or unsound mind declaration, and no prison sentence exceeding 12 months post-1996. Submission of a prescribed nomination form to the Commission within the election timetable is mandatory. The Electoral Commission may request acceptance and identity documents. Adherence to the Electoral Code of Conduct, similar to political parties, is required. Deposit amounts for independent candidates in provincial legislatures are lower than those for the National Assembly, with variations based on the Electoral Commission's consultation process (Paret and Runciman 2023).

For political parties, the Act introduces changes in the nomination process: Candidates on the provincial list must declare their registration within that province. Parties without prior National Assembly or provincial legislature representation face signature requirements identical to independent candidates, needing 15% of the previous election's quota in supporter signatures for seats in legislatures.

CONCLUSION

In 2019, approximately 50 political parties participated in the national and provincial elections, resulting in 14 parties securing seats in Parliament. Notably, eight of these parties had two or fewer representatives. Additionally, 28 parties, while not represented in Parliament, had a presence in provincial councils. Each province witnessed the participation of 25 to 35 parties in their respective provincial elections, with some variations across regions. Since 2019, several new parties, including BOSA (Mmusi Maimane), ActionSA (Herman Mashaba), PA (Gayton McKenzie), Rise Manzi (Songezo Zibi), Change Starts Now (Roger Jardine), Arise South Africa (Mpho Dagada), MK Party (Mr. Khumalo), among others, have been registered.

To summarize, there are approximately 100 parties and party leaders at both national and provincial levels scattered across the country.

Looking ahead to the 2024 elections, four pivotal questions arise:

1. What will be the voter turnout?
2. Which party will voters choose?
3. Which leaders will gain credibility?
4. Will the focus shift towards forming Coalition Pacts/Alliances rather than individual leaders and their parties?

Regarding voter turnout, in the 2019 election, StatsSA reported that the Voting Age Population was 37,800,000, with 75% registering (26,756,649) and 66% actually voting (17,772,851), resulting in a turnout of 49%. This placed the country 48th out of 50 in a survey of reasonably significant nations. Despite this, given the challenges faced in the past five years, such as the Zondo Commission's revelations on state capture, widespread political corruption, local government failures, persistent load shedding, SOE collapses, infrastructure deterioration, substantial budget cuts in education, and ongoing socio-economic challenges, there is speculation on whether there will be an increased voter turnout and changes in voting patterns in the upcoming elections.

REFERENCES

1. Acheampong, M., Basedau, M. and Grauvogel, J. 2024. Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2024.
2. Africa, C. 2020. Do election campaigns matter in South Africa? An examination of fluctuations in support for the ANC, DA, IFP and NNP 1994–2019. In: *Reflections on the 2019 South African General Elections*. Routledge, 7-25.
3. Alence, R. and Pitcher, A. 2019. Resisting state capture in South Africa. *J. Democracy*, 30: 5.
4. Bank, L. J. and Hart, T. G. 2020. Land reform and belonging in South Africa: A place-making perspective. In: *Reflections on the 2019 South African General Elections*. Routledge, 47-62.
5. Basson, A. and Du Toit, P. 2017. *Enemy of the people: How Jacob Zuma stole South Africa and how the people fought back*. Jonathan Ball Publishers.
6. Bleck, J. and Van de Walle, N. 2019. *Electoral politics in Africa since 1990: Continuity in change*. Cambridge University Press.

7. Bornman, E., Harvey, J., Janse van Vuuren, H., Kekana, B., Matuludi, M. F., Mdakane, B. and Ramphele, L. 2021. Political engagement and opinions of youth in post-apartheid South Africa: a qualitative study. *Politikon*, 48 (3): 372-390.
8. Calland, R. 2016. *Make or Break: How the next three years will shape South Africa's next three decades*. Penguin Random House South Africa.
9. Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G. and Willis, J. 2021. *Why Do Elections Matter in Africa?: Democracy, Voting and Virtue*. Cambridge University Press.
10. Cilliers, J. 2017. *Fate of the Nation: 3 Scenarios for South Africa's Future*. Jonathan Ball Publishers.
11. Dlakavu, A. 2022. South African electoral trends: prospects for coalition governance at national and provincial spheres in 2024. *Politikon*, 49 (4): 476-490.
12. Düvenhage, A. 2023. Coalition politics in South Africa: The art of the (im) possible? *Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe*, 63 (1): 99-121.
13. Friedman, S. 2021. *Prisoners of the Past: South African democracy and the legacy of minority rule*. Wits University Press.
14. Ibrahim, M. 2019. Governance lags behind youth expectations and needs. *Friday, January*, 11 (2019): 198.
15. Jacobs, E. K. 2023. "The ANC will rule until Jesus comes": The determinants of loyalty, switching and exiting for the African National Congress in the 2019 elections.
16. Jonas, M. 2019. *After dawn: Hope after state capture*. Pan Macmillan South Africa.
17. Jones, B. and Jones, B. 2021. Story of South Africa's Democracy, 1994–2019. *Elections and TV News in South Africa: Desperately Seeking Depth*: 45-82.
18. Joubert, J.-J. 2018. *Who Will Rule in 2019?* Jonathan Ball Publishers.
19. Levy, B., Hirsch, A., Naidoo, V. and Nxele, M. 2021. South Africa: When strong institutions and massive inequalities collide. *Endowment for International Peace, Cape Town: Carnegie*,
20. Lieberman, E. and Lekalake, R. 2022. South Africa's Resilient Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 33 (2): 103-117.
21. Malapane, A. T. 2023. The Electoral System and Accountability in the Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform. In: *Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa: The Quest for Political Transition*. Springer, 171-189.
22. Mancebo, A. 2019. Parties' motivations for electoral reform under the democratic transition in South Africa. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, (50): 43.
23. Manyapelo, O. C. and Motswaledi, T. R. 2023. A Feminist Forecast to South Africa 2024 Elections: ANC Women in Leadership. *Gender and Behaviour*, 21 (1): 20874-20886.
24. Mehale, M. F. 2022. Electoral campaigns and political communication: a comparative analysis of EFF and ANC's framing of the land question and unemployment during 2019 elections.
25. Mohamed Shaffril, H. A., Samsuddin, S. F. and Abu Samah, A. 2021. The ABC of systematic literature review: the basic methodological guidance for beginners. *Quality & Quantity*, 55: 1319-1346.
26. Paret, M. and Runciman, C. 2023. Voting Decisions and Racialized Fluidity in South Africa's Metropolitan Municipalities. *African Affairs*, 122 (487): 269-298.
27. Runciman, C., Bekker, M. and Maggott, T. 2020. Voting preferences of protesters and non-protesters in three South African Elections (2014–2019): Revisiting the 'Ballot and the Brick'. In: *Reflections on the 2019 South African General Elections*. Routledge, 26-46.
28. Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2020. The Decline of Partisan Voting and the Rise in Electoral Uncertainty in South Africa's 2019 General Elections. In: *Reflections on the 2019 South African General Elections*. Routledge, 98-116.
29. Sebola, M. P. 2022. "Land Expropriation without Compensation:" Populist Political Charade and Electioneering Slogan in South Africa's 2019 National Elections. *African Journal of Development Studies*, 12 (1): 297.
30. Shangase, M. 2022. Local government elections and the illusion of pragmatism. *Politikon*, 49 (4): 382-395.
31. Sinyonde, B. 2024. South African Politics and Online Electioneering Discourses in Selected Social Media Sites in Phuthaditjhaba. *African Journal of Inter/Multidisciplinary Studies*, 6 (1): 1-13.
32. Thomé, A. M. T., Scavarda, L. F. and Scavarda, A. J. 2016. Conducting systematic literature review in operations management. *Production Planning & Control*, 27 (5): 408-420.
33. van Dinter, R., Tekinerdogan, B. and Catal, C. 2021. Automation of systematic literature reviews: A systematic literature review. *Information and Software Technology*, 136: 106589.
34. Walsh, M. and Mnyandu, P. 2023. Democracy at Stake in South Africa.