

The Political Repercussions Of The Normalization Of "Israeli"-Emirati Relations On The Palestinian Cause

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed to shed light on the repercussions of signing the Normalization between the United Arab Emirates and the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian cause. The study employed the descriptive analytical approach to answering the objectives and questions of the study, which came to a central conclusion that the "Abraham Agreement" is the greatest danger to the Palestinian cause in light of the state of free normalisation, which is in the interest of the "Israeli" strategic goals beyond the Palestinian cause, It seeks to build a network of relations with Arab countries without linking them to settlement efforts and the rights of the Palestinian people. Therefore, the Normalization is considered a turning point in the Arab position towards the Palestinian issue, encouraging other Arab countries to normalise relations with Israel. The study recommended the need to formulate an agreed-upon national strategy to confront the projects of liquidating the Palestinian cause and to build a Palestinian national front with Arab and international extensions whose core work and interest would be resistance to normalisation and strengthening the boycott of the occupation.

Keywords: Normalization - The Palestinian Cause - Israel - Abraham agreement

Introduction

Relations between the UAE and Israel have strengthened over the past years. The two parties have been getting closer and closer to full cooperation due to the presence of three common denominators: (hostility with Iran, hostility to political Islam, and the shared conviction that peace with the Palestinians is a distant possibility). It seems that the UAE has come to see that there is a new urgent reality that overshadows the logic of the two-state solution, which changed its position on the list of priorities (Al-Barari, 2020). On the other hand, "Israel" sought to exploit the Arab, regional and international environment to achieve its aspirations to establish normal and normal relations with the surrounding environment, and thus relied on exploiting American support and pressures on Arab countries to form a joint alliance to confront Iran, the common enemy, and "Israel" has worked to increase the pace of Its relations with the Gulf regimes, specifically the UAE, by marketing itself as a strong ally capable of repelling Iranian influence, of appearing as a strong economically and technologically advanced ally (Mansour et al., 2019), which was reflected in fundamental changes in its political position Towards the "Israeli occupation" and considering it as its partner in facing the challenges surrounding the political system that it seeks to strengthen and develop. Thus, Emirati-Israeli relations have indeed undergone a significant transformation in recent years. Traditionally, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were considered nominal enemies due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. However, clandestine ties existed beneath the surface, with both countries sharing common interests and concerns. After a historic agreement known as the Abrahamic Accords was signed, the UAE became the third Arab state (after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994) to officially recognise Israel. This agreement marked a significant departure from the past and paved the way for normalised diplomatic ties between the UAE and Israel. These developments signal a shift in regional dynamics, emphasising pragmatism over historical enmity. In summary, the strategic change in Emirati-Israeli relations is rooted in shared interests, diplomatic efforts, and a pragmatic approach to regional stability. Accordingly, the problem of the study centres on examining the

political repercussions of the normalisation of "Israeli"-Emirati relations on the Palestinian cause. Thus, this study goals to answer the main question: what are the political implications of Emirati-Israeli relations on the Palestinian cause?

The study objective

The main aim of this study is to examine the political consequences of the Emirati-Israeli relationship with the Palestinian cause.

Importance of the study

The importance of the study lies in the fact that it is a serious attempt to analyse the impact of the normalisation of "Israeli"-Emirati relations on the Palestinian cause. The study also gains its importance from multiple considerations, the most important of which is that it addresses a vital topic of great importance, and its significance increases due to its direct impact on the Palestinian cause.

Literature Reviews

According to Ayman Youssef's Study (2020): The possible repercussions of Arab-Israeli normalisation on the Palestinian cause deal with the reasons for the tendency of Arab countries, especially the Gulf ones, to normalise their relations with "Israel" before reaching a just solution to the Palestinian issue, believing that normalisation with "Israel" helps it protect its security and bring it closer to Washington, regardless of the position of the Palestinians, and the status of its people on this normalisation. With it, the Arab peoples consider the Palestinian issue as the last colonial issue, the issue of the entire Arab nation, and this is something that the Arab regimes could not change. The researcher used the analytical approach to explain the motives and starting point of "Israel" and the Arab countries for signing the normalisation agreements. The study concluded that the Palestinian rejection of the "Israeli"-Arab normalisation agreements is based on three main pillars, namely: (1. Legitimizing the occupation, 2. Isolating the Palestinian cause, 3. Dropping the Arab boycott as a card of pressure and power in favour of the Palestinian cause). **In the same way, in A study for Youssef Al-Helou (2021) titled: Emirati-Israeli "relations and their impact on the Palestinian cause the author** dealt with Emirati-Israeli" relations in various dimensions and forms in the past years. The study aimed to identify the nature of Emirati-Israeli" relations, analyse the normalisation phenomenon and its development and determine its most prominent goals and fields, whether political, economic or military. The researcher used the analytical approach to describe and define Emirati-Israeli" relations and their impact on the Palestinian cause. The study concluded that "Israel" took advantage of the changes in the region, especially after the Arab Spring revolutions, to establish relations with the Gulf states.

The stages of development of "Israeli"-Emirati relations

The features of the development of Emirati-Israeli relations began to appear publicly since the absence of the President of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, in 2014 due to his illness and the emergence of his brother, Mohammed bin Zayed, in the political scene of the UAE as the de facto ruler of the UAE (Arab Post, 2019).), which prompted a change in the form of the relationship between "Israel" and the Emirates from a secret form to take on an overt character (Rahman, 2019). It included security, military, commercial, economic, and technological fields.

Another diplomatic cable, which was leaked by WikiLeaks documents in January 2011, stated that the Emirati Foreign Minister, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, had good personal relations with his Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, which helped the two parties normalise their relations (Al-Waa'i Magazine, 2016).

As part of the development of relations, Israel opened, in September 2005, a diplomatic and commercial representative in Dubai without announcing it officially. The UAE is among the most attractive places for "Israeli" businesses! According to the Israeli newspaper "Haaretz", quoting "Israeli" sources, a secret "Israeli" diplomatic mission resides in Dubai, whose members are business people, which carries out the coordination process between the two sides, security and trade. These sources believe it is necessary to hide the normalisation between them to avoid criticism of the Islamic and national opposition in the UAE for this step, as it refuses to establish any relations with "Israel"! (Al-Said, 2017).

The process of normalisation witnessed remarkable growth, and this was evident during the participation of the Israeli Minister of Infrastructure in the International Renewable Energy Conference as the first official visit of an Israeli official to the UAE, which was held in the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi, in 2015 (BBC Arabic, 2015). The Israeli Minister of Culture and Sports, Miri Regev, visited Abu Dhabi in October 2018, during which she toured the Sheikh Zayed Mosque in traditional Emirati dress (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 2018). At the same time, the Israeli Minister of Communications, Ayoub Kara, participated. At the Plenipotentiary Conference for Communications, held in Dubai, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence, Yisrael Katz, also participated in the environmental conference organised by the United Nations in Abu Dhabi in July 2019. An Israeli Ministry of Justice delegation visited Abu Dhabi in December 2019. They were chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, Dina Zilber, to participate in an international anti-corruption conference (The Arab Center,

The Abraham Accord, Normalization of Relations or Announcing an Existing Alliance between the (UAE & Israel, 2020).

Followed by an official agreement regarding the participation of "Israel" in the "Dubai Expo" and began preparing the "Israeli" pavilion of the exhibition (Al-Jazeera Net, 2019).

As for intelligence and security, In 2008, the Authority for Critical Facilities and Facilities in Abu Dhabi signed a contract with AGT International, a Swiss company owned by a business person. Israeli" to purchase monitoring equipment for critical infrastructure, including oil and gas (Hoath, 2008). The same company provided Abu Dhabi with three drones to enhance its intelligence and security capabilities. It also offered Abu Dhabi Police a central security monitoring system (Blau & Scharf, 2019) known as (Falcon Eye), which officially began operating in July 2016 A.D. (El-Sayed et al., 2021). In addition, in August 2018, the UAE purchased advanced technology for hacking mobile phones from the "Israeli" NSO Group. In the same context UAE joint military manoeuvres known as "Exercise Red Flag" were conducted in 2016 in Greece under the leadership of the U.S. administration, in which the UAE Air Force participated (Saeed, 2017).

Signing the "Abraham" Agreement

On August 13, 2020, the White House announced that a peace agreement had been reached, which it described as "historic" between the United Arab Emirates and "Israel". Accordingly, on the evening of September 15, 2020, the White House witnessed the signing ceremony of the "Abraham" peace agreement between the United Arab Emirates and "Israel", and "Benjamin Netanyahu" attended the signing ceremony on the "Israeli" side, while the UAE was represented by its Foreign Minister, "Abdullah bin Zayed." (Russia Today, 2020). Accordingly, "Netanyahu" announced (that the signing of the peace agreement with the UAE ushers in a "new era" of relations between "Israel" and the Arab world) (Al-Jazeera Net, 2020).

According to the "Abraham" agreement, the UAE will establish diplomatic, commercial, and economic relations with "Israel", which it has not fought a war against before, and the deal will strengthen an informal alliance between them (Al-Arab, 2020). We can say that the signing of the agreement represents the culmination of a lengthy process of relations between the two parties.

Meanwhile, the signing of the "Abraham" agreement and the successive and rapid announcements that followed about plans, programs and intentions for joint action between the UAE and "Israel", and in all fields, gave strong impressions that the agreement is an expression of an alliance with "Israel", and not a deal to end A conflict between an Arab country and "Israel", especially in light of the long preparation for this alliance, which the parties sought under American auspices for years, within the framework of a vision that almost coincides with the issues of the region, and efforts to confront what the two parties see as common threats (Al-Hajj, Emirati-Israeli normalisation... the roots Motivations and Effects, 2020). This was followed by the inauguration of the Israeli Foreign Minister, and the "Israeli" embassy in Abu Dhabi (Al-Jazeera Net, 2021), UAE opened its embassy in Tel Aviv officially two weeks after (CNN Arabic, 2021). Accordingly, the agreement strengthened Netanyahu's idea that it is possible to normalise relations with the Arab countries without resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The political effects of the normalisation of the Palestinian cause

The process of normalisation during the past years aimed at consolidating the legitimacy of "Israel" within the borders of occupied Palestine in 1948 and a safe homeland for it. From them in exchange for the Arab countries giving peace to "Israel" (Al-Mahmid, 2005).

The "Israeli"-Gulf normalisation agreements are changing the game's rules, but in the wrong direction regarding resolving the Palestinian issue, contrary to what the Palestinians need (Palestinian Affairs Magazine, 2020). Therefore, they will lead to more "Israeli" intransigence towards the conditions for settling the issue. The Palestinian side thus neutralises it as a determinant of the "Arab" – "Israeli" Gulf relations, which pushes the Arab regime to a further state of scattering and division (Abu Hilal, 2021), and the Palestinian side loses the ability to influence the positions of the countries of the world due to its lack of tools and interests that can be presented (Alhamd, 2020).

Methodology

To give a more detailed explanation of the research's meaning, questions, and objectives, this study employed qualitative methods. The study used documentary analysis as its main approach to achieve its objectives. According to Kutsyuruba, B. (2023) Document analysis, also known as documentary analysis, is a systematic method of reviewing or evaluating documents. The method involves examining various types of documents in detail to extract themes or patterns that are relevant to the research topic.

Qualitative research often involves document analysis, which enables researchers to explore historical, social, legal, business, media, and educational contexts by analyzing existing documents (Prior, 2012). By providing valuable insights into the past, contextualizing the present, and serving as a baseline for future studies, this analysis is of great value. It's particularly helpful in case studies and when direct observation is not feasible (Bowen, 2009).

Wharton, C. (2006) states the process of documentary analysis involves a structured process that begins with the preparation phase, which involves selecting and evaluating relevant materials. Following this is the review

phase, which involves thoroughly examining the materials, taking note of relevant information, and formulating insightful questions. In the final phase, the gathering of information is discussed with stakeholders and requirements are organized. Documentary analysis is different from other research methodologies in that it focuses on scrutinizing documents and statements to obtain data and insights relevant to the research subject (Kutsyuruba, 2023). The advantage of this method is that it can provide an in-depth understanding of the subject matter through existing written materials, which eliminates the need for new data collection via experimental or observational means. Therefore, the study depends on this approach as the most appropriate method to address the problem of the study, as it is used to study the implications of the UAE signing the "Abraham Accord" on the Palestinian issue.

The findings:

Depending on the methodology of the study and the cognitive framework, the study produced results for its main objective of looking for the political implications of the Emirati-Israeli relations on the Palestinian cause, and the political effects of normalisation which can be summed up in four central points, as follows:

1- Neglecting the "two-state solution

Despite the keenness of the UAE Foreign Minister in his speech during the signing ceremony of the "Abraham" agreement to mention a just and comprehensive two-state solution as a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and that it would be the basis and solid base for such peace, without defining the 1967 borders and Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine, the text of the agreement did not mention He never referred to this issue, not even with this truncated wording. Instead, on the front page of the second page of the agreement, he contented himself with affirming the need to "find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-"Israeli" conflict (in a manner that achieves the needs and aspirations of the two peoples), and this is the language of Trump's peace plan, the "deal of the century." The agreement did not refer to any terms of reference for this solution, nor did United Nations Security Council Resolution No. (242) Or the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 A.D. be mentioned. Netanyahu did not fail to refer to this point when he said: "Who ever dreamed of a peace agreement with an Arab country without our return to the borders of 1967" (The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2020).

In addition, the normalisation agreements confirm that the two parties will continue their "efforts to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian-" Israeli "conflict, without specifying the nature of that" just and comprehensive solution" (The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2020).

Accordingly, normalisation will contribute to employing some Arab countries in liquidating the Palestinian cause and dispelling the aspirations of the Palestinian people to liberate their land, restore their full rights, and establish their state because normalisation restricts the capabilities of the nation and turns it into tools in the service of "Israel", which changes its security and military doctrine and reformulates its networks of relations. Accordingly, it becomes clear that the normalisation of "Israeli-Emirati relations negatively affects the natural right of the Palestinian people to establish their state, determine their destiny, and achieve their independence and sovereignty by setting the " Israeli occupation" and making it permanent and considering it a natural entity, ignoring the Palestinian right to obtain their narrow gains (Saad & Zaidi, 2020).

2- Adopting the Trump Peace Plan " as a reference for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli" conflict:

The normalisation establishes the foundation for a new Arab phase, as resolving the Palestinian issue is no longer a condition for establishing relations with "Israel," which is confirmed by "Netanyahu" himself (The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2020). To a large extent, the "Israeli"-Emirati normalisation contributes to the weakening of the Palestinian cause, foremost of which is the issue of Jerusalem, which is unique to "Israel" after the decision of U.S. President "Donald Trump" to recognise that Jerusalem is the capital of "Israel", and his decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem (Abu Mustafa, 2019).

Without a doubt, this allowed Israel to break the link between ending its occupation of Arab lands and spreading peace, contrary to what the Palestinians and most Arabs demand, as well as abandoning the Arab peace initiative and the weak will to impose it and if the link is broken by normalisation before implementing the initiative, then the Arabs will lose another card. One of their remaining papers is to demand an end to the "Israeli occupation" and to stop the expansionist Zionist project at their expense, leaving the Palestinians alone in the confrontation with the occupation (Hawash, 2020).

Not only that, but the announcement of the normalisation agreement is considered a blow to the unified Palestinian position because it rejects Trump's peace initiative, the "deal of the century," which some Gulf states supported and followed the side of the United States of America to normalise relations with "Israel" (Al-Sayed, and others, 2021). Accordingly, it became clear that normalisation has nothing to do with the Palestinian cause or its urgency. Instead, the UAE's interests with "Israel" were the most critical factor and under American pressure on these countries for normalisation.

3- Israeli"-Emirati normalisation is not dependent on resolving the Palestinian issue

Undoubtedly, "Israel" sought to exploit the shifts that occurred in the Arab and regional environment, to work to bypass the Palestinian cause, and establish normal relations with the UAE, and the "Israeli"-Emirati

relations represented a threat to the Palestinian cause, as it did not link this normalisation with finding a just solution. For the Palestinian reason and to preserve the Palestinian national constants (Shamiya, 2020). The researcher believes that "Israel" worked in the first place to extract the recognition of the Arab countries, especially those printing with them, of the Jewishness of the "Israeli state" and its Hereness, as the mere approval of those countries of the deal of the century means their public recognition of the Jewishness of the Hebrew state, and the subsequent plans to liquidate the issue and that it may lead to more "Israeli" intransigence towards the terms of the Settlement. The developments witnessed in the "Israeli"-Emirati relations, the failure of the final status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and the attempt to force the Palestinian side to give up the Palestinian constants in the final status negotiations (Al-Ajami, 2005). Then, the Abraham Accord was reached, and it dealt a fatal blow to the idea of getting peace first and strengthening the course of normalising relations afterwards.

4- The annexation scheme is still present:

The UAE tried to show a softened image in its announcement of the normalisation of "Israeli-Emirati relations through the words of Crown Prince " Mohammed bin Zayed", who described what happened as an agreement to stop implementing the annexation plan and to develop a road map towards inaugurating cooperation and leading to bilateral relations. (Mohamed bin Zayed's Twitter account, 2020).

However, "Israeli" Prime Minister "Benjamin Netanyahu" confirmed that he had promised "Mohammed bin Zayed" that he would postpone the annexation of lands from the West Bank and would not stop annexing parts of it (Al-Sayed and others, 2021).

However, the joint declaration in August 2020 stipulated a "freezing" and not a "stopping" of the Israeli annexation decision. According to an "Israel" newspaper report, the UAE obtained a pledge from the Trump administration not to agree to any "Israeli" decision to annex parts of the country. From the West Bank before 2024 if Trump succeeds in a second term (MAGID, 2020).

Moreover, the UAE tried to justify the agreement as a deal that prevents annexation measures in the West Bank, but this was denied by the U.S. administration and "Israel", respectively, as it was emphasised that the annexation was temporarily frozen and not permanently stopped, with what this means of undermining Any possibility of establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.

The UAE's normalisation agreement with Israel has been criticized for preventing the plan to annex Palestinian lands. However, Israel has exploited this justification by acquiring more lands. The timing of the agreement was seen as a gift to the Israeli right, giving Israel justification for retreating from the Arab Peace Initiative, which stipulates a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue before normalisation (The Arab Center, "Abraham" agreement, normalisation of relations or an announcement of an existing alliance between the Emirates and Israel, 2020).

Discussion

The study came out with several important results; on top of these results, Emirati-Israeli relations have moved more clearly and witnessed a qualitative shift at all political, economic, and military levels after they moved from secret to the public since the emergence of "Mohammed bin Zayed" in the political scene of the UAE as its de facto ruler. Despite maintaining a low profile, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed has driven the UAE's rise to diplomatic prominence. His ambition and strategic vision have become evident as the UAE has actively built its profile as a regional player. In summary, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan's vision, pragmatism, and strategic decisions have reshaped Emirati-Israeli relations, moving them from secrecy to a public and normalised partnership.

Second result, UAE-Israeli relations have witnessed remarkable developments over the past years after Israel presented itself as a reliable strategic ally of the Gulf states to face common challenges. Here are several reasons behind this transformation: the changing geopolitical landscape and shared interests have led to a reevaluation of this approach despite the informal ties that have existed since the 1990s. At the top of these reasons is the emergence of common challenges, The most important of which is Iran, as the perceived threat posed by Iran's regional ambitions, has driven Israel and the Gulf states closer together. They share concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, regional influence, and support for proxy groups. As well as Security Cooperation; initially, intelligence sharing was conducted discreetly to counter Iran's activities. Over time, this cooperation expanded beyond security to the economic, political, and cultural realms. In addition to the shift in priorities, the Palestinian national movement's diminished influence has allowed Gulf states to prioritise their national interests over pan-Arab solidarity. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, the Gulf states have widened their latitude to engage with Israel. And lastly, publicity and approval from Washington played a role in the UAE and Bahrain's decision to normalise relations with Israel. In summary, UAE-Israeli relations have evolved due to shared interests, changing regional dynamics, and pragmatic considerations.

The third result, The normalisation represented a turning point in the Arab position towards the Palestinian cause, encouraging other Arab countries to normalise relations with "Israel." Before the recent normalisation agreements, only two Arab countries—Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994)—had official diplomatic ties with Israel. The consensus among most Arab states was that any recognition of Israel should be conditional on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and establishing a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. After The

Abrahamic Accords In August 2020, Bahrain followed suit a month later, and Sudan also announced normalisation with Israel. While Saudi Arabia has not formally recognised ties with Israel, it announced a formal mutual meeting could lead to a normalisation. In summary, normalisation has opened new avenues for other Arab countries to follow the example of the Emirates.

Lastly, the study found that "normalisation represents the greatest danger to the Palestinian cause. Here, the normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE under the September 2020 Abrahamic Accords raised concerns regarding their impact on the Palestinian cause. Normalisation without addressing the core Palestinian issues undermines the long-standing pan-Arab position of solidarity with the Palestinian people. At the same time, the normalisation may allow Israel to build a network of relations with Arab countries without adequately addressing the rights of the Palestinian people. Also, settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank continues, and normalisation has not necessarily led to a halt in these activities. While normalisation offers short-term benefits regarding international standing, economic synergies, and strategic opportunities, it must not come at the expense of Palestinian rights as well according to Awais (2020) the issues of Jerusalem, as the holy city, are of vital importance to the Palestinians In addition, the other issues, such as refugees and the struggle with Israel. In summary, ensuring that the Palestinian cause remains central to regional discussions is essential. The delicate balance between strategic interests and Palestinian rights remains a critical challenge for all parties.

Recommendations

To effectively confront challenges to the Palestinian cause, it is imperative to develop a unified national strategy that garners widespread acceptance and addresses the full scope of the issue. This strategy should be complemented by the establishment of a Palestinian national front, which extends its reach to Arab and international allies, dedicated to resisting normalization efforts and bolstering the boycott of the occupation. Concurrently, Palestinian foreign policy must be enhanced to align with international and regional bodies, underscoring the significance of global legitimacy in the quest for resolution. Internally, efforts must be concentrated on reconciling Palestinian divisions, thereby strengthening the collective Palestinian position in response to the dynamic shifts occurring within the Arab landscape. Furthermore, it is essential to amplify research initiatives aimed at uncovering the perils of normalization and evaluating its repercussions on both the Palestinian cause and broader Arab interests. These concerted efforts will fortify the Palestinian resolve and advance their aspirations for self-determination and peace.

Conclusion

Emirati-Israeli relations have witnessed remarkable development over the past years, as Israel's relations with the UAE moved from secret to public relations, and the Abraham Accord represents a strategic turning point in Arab-Israeli relations.

The "Abraham" agreement is also the product of a series of joint relations, and the UAE has taken stopping the process of annexing settlements located in the Palestinian territories as a pretext for signing it. By annexing Palestinian lands in the West Bank, however, "Netanyahu" and other "Israeli" officials confirmed that the agreement with the UAE does not include a concession on the annexation scheme as far as it is a temporary suspension of it to achieve more critical Arab diplomatic breakthroughs at this stage. Instead, this is stipulated by the joint media between the UAE and Israel.

The "Abraham" agreement will also contribute to further isolating the Palestinian cause from its Arab surroundings, and Arab and American pressure will increase on the Palestinian side to create a new framework for the peace process as part of efforts to find leadership consistent with American plans and contemporary Middle Eastern alliances.

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